State v. Van Huizen

• Decision Date: 16 February 2017
• Docket Number: No. 20140602-CA,20140602-CA
• Citation: 392 P.3d 933
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Cooper John Anthony VAN HUIZEN, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

392 P.3d 933

STATE of Utah, Appellee,

v.Cooper John Anthony VAN HUIZEN, Appellant.

No. 20140602-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed February 16, 2017

Elizabeth Hunt, Attorney for Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee.

Monica Maio, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Utah Juvenile Defender Attorneys.

Judge Stephen L. Roth authored this Opinion, in which Judge J. Frederic Voros Jr. and Senior Judge Russell W. Bench concurred.¹

Opinion

ROTH, Judge:

¶1 Cooper John Anthony Van Huizen was involved in an aggravated robbery when he was sixteen years old. The State charged him in juvenile court under the Serious Youth Offender Act. After a hearing, the juvenile court bound Van Huizen over to stand trial as an adult in district court as provided by the Act, and he appeals. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND²

¶2 In late 2013, Van Huizen committed a robbery with a friend and some acquaintances. At sixteen, Van Huizen was the youngest of the group; his friend was also a juvenile and their three acquaintances were adults. Although Van Huizen did not orchestrate the robbery, he agreed to it and facilitated the plan by providing guns from his family home.

¶3 In search of drugs, the group drove to the house of someone they knew would possess marijuana. They knocked on the back door, gained entry to the house and, brandishing the guns taken from Van Huizen's home, proceeded to rob the occupant of a cell phone, some cash, and a "little bit of weed." Though Van Huizen did not carry a firearm or other weapon, he was part of the group that entered the home and committed the robbery.

¶4 The State charged Van Huizen under the then-current Serious Youth Offender Act (the Act). See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (outlining the process by which a juvenile could be "bound over and held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult").³ The Act required that the State charge any minor accused of certain serious felony offenses by filing a criminal information in juvenile court. Id. § 78A-6-702(1). Once filed, the Act directed the court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, the State had "to establish probable cause" that the defendant committed the crime. Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(a). If the State proved probable cause, the burden shifted to the defendant to establish by clear and convincing evidence that "it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over." Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(d), (e).

¶5 In making the ultimate determination on whether to bind the juvenile over to district court, the Act directed that "the judge shall consider only" five factors:

(i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult;

(ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether the minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants;

(iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner;

(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile court; and

(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in the district court.

Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(c).

¶6 Under that framework, the Weber County Attorney's Office, acting on behalf of the State, charged Van Huizen in juvenile court with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary, all first degree felonies. Unbeknown to Van Huizen and his parents, the juvenile court judge assigned to his case was married to the then-Chief Criminal Deputy in the Weber County Attorney's Office.

¶7 The juvenile court determined that the State had met its initial burden of proof and that there was probable cause to bind Van Huizen over to the district court as an adult. In response, Van Huizen put on evidence that both his and the public's interests were both best served by remaining in the juvenile system. Van Huizen and the State stipulated to factors one and four, namely that he had no prior offenses and therefore no offenses involving a dangerous weapon. On the other factors, Van Huizen adduced testimony from his mother and father relating to the stability of his home life, his generally good nature, and his bright future.

¶8 The juvenile court considered the evidence and determined that Van Huizen had only carried half of his burden. While Van Huizen had shown that his best interest was served by remaining in juvenile court, he had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the public interests also favored retention. The court bound Van Huizen over to district court. Van Huizen did not timely appeal the bindover decision.

¶9 In district court, the same deputy county attorney that had handled the juvenile proceedings continued to prosecute Van Huizen, and the attorney received at least some assistance from the juvenile judge's husband, the Chief Criminal Deputy in the prosecutor's office. Van Huizen eventually pleaded guilty to two reduced counts of robbery, both second degree felonies. The district court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of one to fifteen years. He was paroled in November 2014.

¶10 While he was serving his prison sentence, Van Huizen retained new counsel and moved in district court to reinstate his time to appeal the juvenile court's bindover order under Manning v. State , 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628. He supported the motion by alleging that he had been denied his right to appeal the bindover order through ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that trial counsel had "misinformed [him] that the time for appeal had run" when it in fact had not. The State stipulated to Van Huizen's motion, and the district court reinstated his time to file an appeal. On that basis, Van Huizen now appeals the juvenile court's bindover order that initially transferred him into district court.⁴

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Van Huizen argues that the juvenile judge who bound him over was required to recuse herself under the Code of Judicial Conduct. "Determining whether a trial judge committed error by failing to recuse himself or herself under the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct ... is a question of law, and we review such questions for correctness." State v. Alonzo , 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998). Van Huizen also argues that the judge's "risk of bias" in his case was so strong that it "violated due process" under the United States Constitution. "Constitutional issues, including questions regarding due process, are questions of law that we review for correctness." In re E.K.S. , 2016 UT 56, ¶ 5, 387 P.3d 1032 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶12 Additionally, Van Huizen asserts that ineffective assistance of counsel and the doctrine of plain error require that we reverse the bindover order. Because we resolve this case on the disqualification issue, we do not address Van Huizen's other arguments.

ANALYSIS

¶13 Van Huizen argues that the juvenile court judge (the Juvenile Judge) who bound him over into adult court should have disqualified herself from his case because she was married to the Chief Criminal Deputy in charge of the criminal division in the Weber County Attorney's Office, the office that prosecuted him. He argues first that the Code of Judicial Conduct required the Juvenile Judge to recuse herself. Second, Van Huizen argues that he was denied constitutional due process due to the acute "risk of bias" inherent in the Juvenile Judge's relationship with the prosecuting office. The "general rule [is] that courts should avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can be decided on other grounds."

West v. Thomson Newspapers , 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994). We therefore address the Code of Judicial Conduct first, and because we resolve the appeal on that ground, we do not reach the constitutional question.

I. The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct

¶14 The Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a]n independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice." Utah Code Jud. Conduct, Preamble. As Justice Felix Frankfurter observed, courts possess "neither the purse nor the sword," so their authority "ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in [their] moral sanction." Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 267, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). That core principle is enshrined in our caselaw: "The purity and integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts." Haslam v. Morrison , 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948).

¶15 The Code lists the conditions under which a judge must recuse or disqualify himself or herself.⁵ Generally, "[a] judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes—and shall not undermine—public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 1.2. Specifically, "[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."⁶ Id. R. 2.11(A); accord Dahl v. Dahl , 2015 UT 79, ¶ 49, ––– P.3d –––– ("A judge should be disqualified when circumstances arise in which the judge's ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’ " (quoting State v. Gardner , 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989) )).

¶16 Rule 2.11(A) contains an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of disqualifying circumstances. In some circumstances, the judge's duty to recuse is absolute. For instance, if "[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer," he or she must disqualify. Utah Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(1); see also id....