Hassan v. GCA Prod. Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 24 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 80542-8-I,80542-8-I |
| Citation | 487 P.3d 203,17 Wash.App.2d 625 |
| Parties | Abdikadir HASSAN, Aden Yusuf, Aman Adam, Amina Ahmed, Anab Ali, Asha Ali, Ashwani Bhardwaj, Binh Le, Chinderpal Singh, Fadumo Mohamed, Fardous Hussein, Farhia Adam, Felix Garcia, Gurmail Singh, Hai Pham, Hamza Aden, Hani Osman, Harinder Nahal, Jaswinder Grewal, Jasminder Singh Gill, Joggit Singh Bhullar, Macario Espinoza, Malkit Singh, Murayo Guled, Resham Singh Gill, Salado Khalif Ali, Surinder Singh, Thu Thi Nguyen, Ubah Sheik, Valentin Galleta, Yasin Abdullahi, Abdihakim Rashid, Aden Jama, Ahmed Adam, Ali Ali, Ayaan Nuur, Basra Bashir, Burhan Farah, Daljinder Singh, Farhio Gurhan, Farhiyo Hussien, Gurjit Singh, Harlin Kaur, Hassan Abdi, Hussein Aden Molamed, Hussein Ali, Ishmahan Muse, Kuldip Singh, Larry Tullis, Layla Yuusuf, Mino Yusuf, Mohamed Ware, Mohamud Moalin, Mujhtaar Ali, Muhubo Barqadle, Muhyadiin Ali, Mulki Abdi, Naima Ahmed and Sadia Adan, Appellants, v. GCA PRODUCTION SERVICES, INC., Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
William Joel Rutzick, Schroeter Goldmark & Bender, 810 3rd Ave. Ste. 500, Seattle, WA, 98104-1657, David N. Mark, Beau C. Haynes, Washington Wage Claim Project, 810 3rd Ave. Ste. 500, Seattle, WA, 98104-1619, for Appellants.
Timothy J. O'Connell, Stoel Rives LLP, 600 University St. Ste. 3600, Seattle, WA, 98101-3197, Dustin D. Berger, Attorney at Law, 6808 Wesson Dr., Plano, TX, 75023-1846, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION
Smith, J. ¶ 1 This case revolves around the interpretation of SeaTac Municipal Code (SMC) 7.45.010(M)(2) (ordinance), which requires defined transportation employers, including those that provide or operate rental car services, to pay employees $15 per hour. In 2009, GCA Production Services Inc. (GCA) contracted with Avis Budget Car Rental LLC to shuttle Avis's rental cars to and from its Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (Sea-Tac Airport) location in SeaTac, Washington. In 2014, after SeaTac residents voted to raise the minimum wage for certain, but not all, employees, the city of SeaTac enacted SMC 7.45.050. When GCA failed to pay its employees $15 per hour, a number of employees filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, and others filed wage complaints with the Washington Department of Labor and Industries (DLI). The employees alleged—and allege here—that GCA is a transportation employer subject to the ordinance. The district court and DLI concluded that the ordinance did not apply to GCA.
¶ 2 Later, many of the same employees filed a complaint in superior court, which is the subject of this appeal. GCA moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on the doctrines of claim preclusion and collateral estoppel. On December 11, 2018, in its order on GCA's motion to dismiss (2018 Order), the court addressed the motion as a summary judgment motion and concluded that claim preclusion barred 13 employee-plaintiffs who had filed complaints with DLI from relitigating their claim. GCA then moved for summary judgment, this time arguing that it was not subject to the ordinance. On September 4, 2019, the superior court granted GCA's motion and concluded that GCA was not a transportation employer under the ordinance (2019 Order).
¶ 3 The employees appeal both orders. First, we review the issue of claim preclusion and GCA's appeal of the 2018 Order. Because an additional 37 plaintiffs had filed wage complaints with DLI, claim preclusion also bars their claims. Therefore, we reverse the 2018 Order as to those 37 employees and dismiss their complaints. With regard to the 2019 Order and the remaining 9 employees, because the ordinary meaning of providing or operating rental car services does not include the services that GCA provided to Avis, the trial court did not err when it concluded that GCA was not subject to the ordinance. Therefore, we reverse in part the 2018 Order, but we affirm the 2019 Order. We thereby dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
FACTS
¶ 4 In September 2009, GCA and Avis entered into the "Master Supplier Agreement" (MSA). Pursuant to the MSA, GCA managed and operated "the on-airport shuttling and off-airport shuttling duties for" Avis as an independent contractor. Specifically, GCA transported Avis's rental cars between various Avis locations in Seattle, Everett, Tukwila, and Tacoma, Washington.
¶ 5 In 2013, by voter initiative, SeaTac voters passed Proposition 1, which required a $15 minimum hourly wage for defined transportation and hospitality employers. Subsequently, SeaTac enacted the proposition as chapter 7.45 SMC, which took effect on January 1, 2014.
¶ 6 In 2016, a group of GCA employees filed a complaint against GCA Services Group Inc.1 (GSG) in the District Court for the Western District of Washington.2 The plaintiffs sought payment of wages from GCA in accordance with the ordinance. They argued that GSG was a transportation employer under SMC 7.45.010(M)(1),3 because it provided baggage handling, ground transportation management, and customer service in SeaTac. GSG moved for summary judgment, which the court granted, finding that GSG was not a transportation employer under SMC 7.45.010(M)(1). After the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs amended their complaint. However, the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice a few months later. The plaintiffs did not appeal.
¶ 7 In February 2017, DLI sent GCA a letter, asserting that it had received wage complaints from 93 GCA employees (complainants) and that it would begin an investigation into those claims. Some complainants filed "minimum wage not paid claims," while others asserted that GCA violated the ordinance, specifically. However, DLI's letter indicated that the "complaints focus on [GCA's] failure to pay minimum wage set forth in" SMC 7.45.050. GSG, on behalf of GCA, responded, contending that it had "already been held as a matter of law to not be covered under the relevant SeaTac ordinance."
¶ 8 On July 21, 2017, DLI issued a "Determination of Compliance." DLI concluded that GCA did "not meet the definition of a ‘Transportation Employer’ for the purpose of Ordinance SMC 7.45." Seven complainants appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which affirmed DLI's order.
¶ 9 On May 7, 2018, 32 employees filed the complaint in this case. They alleged that GCA was a transportation employer under SMC 7.45.010(M)(2) because it provided rental car services. A week later, the employees amended the complaint, adding 28 plaintiffs but asserting the same claim.
¶ 10 GCA answered the complaint and asserted that the complaint was barred "in whole or in part" because of claim preclusion or collateral estoppel. It filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that among other lawsuits and complaints,4 the DLI investigation constituted a final judgment on the merits for the purpose of claim preclusion and collateral estoppel. GCA provided the court with a letter from DLI, which certified that there were no records found for nine plaintiffs.
¶ 11 The court granted in part and denied in part GCA's motion to dismiss but "consider[ed] the motion as one for summary judgment." It concluded that the DLI order and the doctrine of issue preclusion barred 13 plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, the court allowed the remaining 46 plaintiffs’ claims to go forward.
¶ 12 Following the court's order, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and GCA filed a cross motion for summary judgment. GCA asserted that it was not a transportation employer and again asserted that the appellants’ claims were "barred under the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion." The trial court granted GCA's motion, concluding that GCA did not fall under the ordinance's definition of transportation employer. The remaining employees (appellants) appeal both trial court orders.
ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Under CR 56(c), "summary judgment is appropriate where there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ " Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wash.2d 157, 164, 273 P.3d 965 (2012) (alteration in original). "We review rulings on summary judgment and issues of statutory interpretation de novo." Am. Legion Post No. 149 v. Dep't of Health, 164 Wash.2d 570, 584, 192 P.3d 306 (2008).
Claim Preclusion
¶ 14 GCA contends that the trial court erred in its 2018 Order because "[a]ll [a]ppellants’ claims are barred on the basis of collateral estoppel" and "[a]ll [a]ppellants who participated in proceedings before DLI should have their claims dismissed on the basis of claim preclusion." With regard to collateral estoppel, we decline to address the issue because GCA failed to adequately brief its analysis thereof.5 With regard to claim preclusion, 37 appellants sought relief from DLI. Accordingly, claim preclusion bars those 37 appellants from relitigating their claim.
¶ 15 " ‘The doctrine of res judicata [or claim preclusion] rests upon the ground that a matter which has been litigated, or on which there has been an opportunity to litigate, in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, should not be permitted to be litigated again.’ " Ensley v. Pitcher, 152 Wash. App. 891, 899, 222 P.3d 99 (2009) (italics omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marino Prop. Co. v. Port Comm'rs of Port of Seattle, 97 Wash.2d 307, 312, 644 P.2d 1181 (1982) ). Because it is a question of law, we review a determination that claim preclusion applies de novo. Weaver v. City of Everett, 194 Wash.2d 464, 473, 450 P.3d 177 (2019). " ‘The threshold requirement of [claim preclusion] is a valid and final judgment on the merits in a prior suit.’ " In re Marriage of Weiser, 14 Wash. App. 2d 884, 903, 475 P.3d 237 (2020) (quoting Ensley, 152 Wash. App. at 899, 222 P.3d 99 ). And claim preclusion "applies in the administrative setting only where the administrative agency ‘resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had...
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...that we should decline to reach their merits for that reason. [3] See Hassan v. GCA Prod. Servs., Inc., 17 Wn.App. 2d 625, 634, 487 P.3d 203 (2021) ("[T]he 'party seeking to apply [claim must establish four elements as between a prior action and a subsequent challenged action: concurrence o......