Hassan v. Town of Brookhaven
| Decision Date | 03 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | 13-cv-4544 (JMA)(SIL) |
| Parties | JOHN HASSAN, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Pro se Plaintiff John Hassan ("Plaintiff" or "Hassan") commenced this action on August 12, 2013 against Defendant Town of Brookhaven ("Defendant" or the "Town"), alleging constitutional violations by the Town and its agents.1 Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") 56. See Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment by Town of Brookhaven, DE [92]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.2
The following facts are taken from the pleadings, affidavits, exhibits and Defendant's Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) statement.4 Unless otherwise noted, these facts are not in dispute.
This lawsuit arises from the Town's prosecution of Hassan, pursuant to Section 45-4 of the Sanitary Code of the Town of Brookhaven (the "Anti-Littering Law"), which provides, in relevant part:
Any person owning, occupying or in control of private property shall maintain such property, including the sidewalk in front thereof, free of litter. In the event that the owner, occupant or person in control of private property located within the Town shall fail to remove litter located on such property, the Town shall have the authority, as provided for herein, to enter upon such property, to remove the litter so located, to assess the cost and expense of such action against the property and to establish a lien in the manner provided herein below.
Local Rule 56.1 Statement ("Def. 56.1"), DE [92-1], ¶ 3. According to Plaintiff, an unidentified resident complained to Defendant about the condition of his property located in Center Moriches, New York (the "Property"). See Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), DE [83], 3.5 As a result, agents of the Town inspected the Property and issued notices, dated July 30, 2013 and August 9, 2013, advising Hassan that the Property was "in an unsanitary condition" due to the presence of litter, including "plastic bags, food wrappers, totes, buckets, plywood, [and a] cooler[.]" See Def. 56.1, ¶¶ 5-6; Exhibit A ( ), DE [92-4]; Exhibit B ("Ex. B"), DE [92-5]. Thesenotices further informed Plaintiff that if he did not remove the litter, so as to comply with the Town's Anti-Littering Law, Defendant would enter the Property and "assess the cost of such removal against the [P]roperty." See Def. 56.1, ¶ 6; Ex. B.
Shortly thereafter, Hassan filed the instant lawsuit alleging that the Town's agents had trespassed on the Property and that the Anti-Littering Law was unconstitutional. See Proposed Order to Show Cause, DE [1]. While the instant lawsuit was underway, Plaintiff was found guilty of violating the Anti-Littering Law after a bench trial held on September 19, 2014 in Brookhaven Community Court. See Def. 56.1, ¶ 10; Affirmation ("Def. Affirmation"), DE [92-2], ¶ 10; see also Exhibit C ("Ex. C"), DE [92-6].
Four years after initiating this lawsuit, on leave of the Court and with Defendant's consent, Hassan filed a Second Amended Complaint to include allegations that the Town had denied him access to the local Meals on Wheels program. See SAC, 4-5. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all counts of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff alleges that: (1) the Anti-Littering Law, which "restrict[s] and declare[s] what possessions a resident may have on his property[,] is malicious, selective and prejudiced"; (2) the Town violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully spying on him and photographing his "possessions and activities within the boundaries of [his] privacy" and attempting to seize his possessions; (3) the July 30, 2013 and August 9, 2013 notices from Defendant advising Hassan that he was in violation of the Anti-Littering Law were defamatory; and (4) the Town's practice ofinspecting the homes of applicants for its local Meals on Wheels program constitutes an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See SAC, 2-5; see also DE [98] (letter from Hassan summarizing claims).6
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the "difficult" burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact such that summary judgment is appropriate. See Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court "is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986) ().
Once the movant has met its initial burden, the party opposing summary judgment Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Maxton v. Underwriter Labs., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 534, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) () (citation omitted). In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, "the court's responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried, while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences against the moving party." Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); see also Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 553 () (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
It is well-established that pleadings filed by pro se plaintiffs, such as Hassan, are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S. Ct. 173, 176 (1980); see also Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) () (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Second Circuit has held that a court reviewing a pro se complaint must "construe the complaint broadly, and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests." Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal alterations omitted); see also Colorado Capital v. Owens, 227 F.R.D. 181, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) () (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, courts must afford pro se plaintiffs "special solicitude" before granting motions for summary judgment. Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, the court "need not argue a pro se litigant's case nor create a case for the pro se which does not exist." Ogunmokun v. Am. Educ. Servs., No. 12-cv-4403, 2014 WL 4724707, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Town moves for summary judgment against Hassan on all counts of his Second Amended Complaint. In reviewing Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court relies on those facts not in dispute and gives Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt when his assertions conflict with those of the Town. See In re Corcoran, 246 B.R. 152, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir.1996)). Further, in light of Hassan's pro se status, the Court considers not only his opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, see DEs [91], [95], but also considers two submissions which are not labeled as opposition, but which Plaintiff filed after the Town had filed its motion for summary judgment, see DEs [98]-[99]. See Santiago v. C.O. Campisi Shield No. 4592, 91 F. Supp. 2d 665, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (); see also Bradley v. Coughlin, 671 F.2d 686, 690 (2d Cir. 1982) ().
Plaintiff first alleges that the Town's Anti-Littering Law is "malicious, selective and prejudiced[.]" See SAC, 2. The Court treats this cause of action as one for unlawful selective enforcement. To prevail on a claim of selective enforcement of the law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) "compared to others similarly situated, [he] was selectively treated"; and (2) "such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000) (...
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