Hassoun v. Searls

• Decision Date: 18 June 2020
• Docket Number: 1:19-CV-00370 EAW
• Citation: 467 F.Supp.3d 111
• Parties: Adham Amin HASSOUN, Petitioner, v. Jeffrey SEARLS, in his official capacity as Acting Assistant Field Office Director and Administrator of the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

467 F.Supp.3d 111

Adham Amin HASSOUN, Petitioner,

v.Jeffrey SEARLS, in his official capacity as Acting Assistant Field Office Director and Administrator of the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, Respondent.

1:19-CV-00370 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed June 18, 2020

A. Nicole Hallett, Mandel Legal Aid Clinic University of Chicago Law School, Jonathan Matthew Manes, Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Chicago, IL, Brett Max Kaufman, Celso Javier Perez, Charles Hogle, Christopher T. Dunn, Jonathan Hafetz, Judy Rabinovitz, Victoria Marie Roeck, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Daniel Barrie Moar, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, John J.W. Inkeles, Steven A. Platt, Anthony D. Bianco, Edward S. White, Joseph F. Carilli, Jr., Timothy M. Belsan, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, United States Attorney's Office, Western District of New York, for Respondent.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Adham Amin Hassoun ("Petitioner") is a civil immigration detainee currently housed at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility (the "BFDF") in Batavia, New York. Respondent Jeffrey Searls ("Respondent") is administrator of the BFDF. Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(b), arguing that his current detention is unauthorized by lawful statute or regulation and that he must be released, with appropriate conditions of supervision. Respondent contends that Petitioner is lawfully detained pursuant to both 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d).

On December 13, 2019, the Court entered a Decision and Order (Dkt. 55) finding that Petitioner's continued detention is not lawfully authorized by 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d) and that an evidentiary hearing is necessary in connection with Petitioner's challenge to the lawfulness of his continued detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226a. The legal and factual background of this action are set forth in detail in the Court's Decision and Order of December 13, 2019, familiarity with which is assumed for purposes of the instant Decision and Order. The Court further assumes familiarity with its prior Decision and Order dated January 24, 2020, regarding the parameters of the evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 75).

The Court permitted the parties to engage in discovery in anticipation of the evidentiary hearing (Dkt. 57; Dkt. 58; Dkt. 70) and ordered that any discovery motions be filed by February 28, 2020 (Dkt. 70; Dkt. 71). On February 28, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion to compel and for a protective order (Dkt. 91), and Respondent filed a motion to defer consideration of any potential assertion of the state secrets privilege (Dkt. 90).

On March 16, 2020, Respondent filed a motion (Dkt. 104) to enforce the Protective Order entered by the Court on February 6, 2020 (Dkt. 77). Also on March 16, 2020, oral argument on the pending discovery motions was held, and the Court resolved some issues from the bench and reserved decision on others. (See Dkt. 113; Dkt. 114). The Court further instructed the parties to attempt to resolve among themselves certain disputes related to Respondent's privilege logs. (Dkt. 108).

On April 7, 2020, the Court found that there was "undisputed evidence that Petitioner violated the Protective Order" but denied Respondent's motion to enforce the Protective Order as moot without prejudice to any future motion by Respondent seeking other relief. (Dkt. 138).

On April 30, 2020, Respondent filed a motion for sanctions related to Petitioner's breach of the Protective Order. (Dkt. 154). Petitioner filed a cross-motion to compel disclosure and for sanctions on May 15, 2020. (Dkt. 164).

The evidentiary hearing is scheduled to commence on June 24, 2020. (Dkt. 158). Pursuant to an Order of the Court (see id. ), Respondent submitted a pre-hearing memorandum containing a request to present hearsay statements from five individuals at the evidentiary hearing (Dkt. 169). Petitioner objects to four out of five of Respondent's requests. (Dkt. 199).

On June 8, 2020, Petitioner filed motions to amend his exhibit list (Dkt. 201) and to file supplemental objections to Respondent's requests to admit hearsay evidence (Dkt. 202). On June 11, 2020, Respondent filed a Notice (Dkt. 207) informing the Court that on June 5, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") issued a "letterhead memorandum" to Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad F. Wolf in connection with the periodic review of Petitioner's continuing detention required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 and 8 U.S.C. § 1226a. Respondent filed a motion on June 12, 2020, to amend his witness and exhibit lists based on information found in the FBI's letterhead memorandum of June 5, 2020. (Dkt. 209 (sealed version); Dkt. 219 (redacted version)).

The Court conducted a pre-hearing conference and heard oral argument on the parties’ sanctions motions and the additional outstanding pre-hearing issues on June 12, 2020. (Dkt. 218). The Court issued oral rulings on several outstanding issues and reserved decision on the others. (Id. ). The Court issued a Text Order on June 12, 2020, resolving Petitioner's motion to amend his exhibit list and to file supplemental objections to Respondent's pre-hearing memorandum, to which Respondent had not objected. (Dkt. 211). On June 15, 2020, the Court entered a further Text Order stating that it would admit hearsay evidence related to Ahmed Hamed and granting in part and denying in part Respondent's motion to amend his witness and exhibit lists. (Dkt. 216).

This Decision and Order sets forth the reasons for the Court's prior rulings and resolves the majority of the outstanding issues. However, for reasons discussed below and stated on the record on June 12, 2020, the Court reserves decision on Petitioner's request for sanctions and additional discovery related to Respondent's alleged litigation misconduct.

DISCUSSION

I. Nature of the Proceeding

As a threshold matter, the Court sets forth the basis for its ruling, made from the bench on March 16, 2020, that "[t]his is not a criminal proceeding. And it's not a quasi-criminal proceeding.... It's a civil habeas corpus proceeding." (Dkt. 114 at 7).

Many of Petitioner's arguments in this case have been premised on his contention that this proceeding is "quasi-criminal" and that he is accordingly entitled to the protections afforded to criminal defendants. The Court previously rejected the argument that Petitioner is entitled to the same protections afforded to criminal defendants, specifically with respect to the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. (See Dkt. 75 at 14-15). The Court expands on that determination below.

Despite Petitioner's arguments to the contrary, it is well-established that "[a] petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a civil proceeding." In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig. , 630 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2009) ; see also Dhiab v. Trump , 852 F.3d 1087, 1092 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("[T]he writ of habeas corpus is a civil remedy for the enforcement of the right to personal liberty not a stage of a criminal proceeding." (quotations omitted)); Goldsmith v. Valentine , 36 App. D.C. 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1910) ("It is well settled that habeas corpus is a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding...."); Sarno v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 278 F. Supp. 3d 112, 125 (D.D.C. 2017) ("Habeas petitions are civil proceedings ... which allow an individual to challenge his detention on the grounds that it occurs in violation of his constitutional rights."). Petitioner's argument that he faces potentially indefinite detention does not, standing alone, warrant a departure from this well-established law. Habeas proceedings by their very nature frequently implicate weighty liberty interests. Nonetheless, "such proceedings are not subject to all the protections given to defendants in criminal prosecutions." Al Alwi v. Obama , 653 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).

Petitioner has not cited a single case in which a habeas court has accepted the argument that the proceeding is "quasi-criminal" and applied the full panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants. Petitioner does cite the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1968), which found that juvenile delinquency hearings "which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as ‘criminal’ for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 49, 87 S.Ct. 1428. Petitioner's reliance on In re Gault is misplaced. As an initial matter, In re Gault dealt not with the procedure to be used in the habeas proceeding itself, but with the procedures in the underlying adjudication. Further, as Petitioner acknowledges, the Supreme Court subsequently declined to extend In re Gault to the civil commitment context, stating that "involuntary commitment does not itself trigger the entire range of criminal procedural protections." Allen v. Illinois , 478 U.S. 364, 372, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986). In re Gault does not support the conclusion that these proceedings should be treated as "quasi-criminal" or that Petitioner is entitled to the constitutional protections given to criminal defendants. The Court has already performed an in-depth analysis of the process that is due to Plaintiff under these circumstances, taking into account the significant liberty interest at stake and the countervailing concerns of national security, as well as longstanding case law regarding involuntary confinement in the civil context. (See Dkt. 75).

The Court further notes it is well-established that "the scope and extent" of any discovery in a habeas proceeding "is a matter confided to the discretion of the District Court." Bracy v. Gramley , 520 U.S. 899, 909, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997). While the Court has determined that some discovery is warranted in this case, that does not mean that ...