Hastings v. City of Bremerton

• Decision Date: 23 December 1930
• Docket Number: 22635.
• Citation: 159 Wash. 621,294 P. 551
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: HASTINGS et al. v. CITY OF BREMERTON et al.

294 P. 551

159 Wash. 621

HASTINGS et al. v. CITY OF BREMERTON et al.

No. 22635.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 23, 1930

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Kitsap County; Chester A. Batchelor Judge.

Action by Samuel Hastings and others against the City of Bremerton and others. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

Byers &amp Byers, Alfred J. Westberg, and McBurney & O'Brien, all of Seattle, for appellants.

H. E Gorman, of Bremerton, for respondents.

Lundin, Barto & Devin, of Seattle, amicus curiae.

BEALS J.

Plaintiff Golden Rule Bakery is a corporation engaged in business in the city of Seattle as a baker, its products being distributed in that city and adjacent territory by agents who solicit patronage and who sell and deliver its bread and similar food stuffs from house to house, using motor trucks which follow regular routes. It employs fifty or sixty of these distributing agents, two of whom, plaintiffs Hastings and Johnson, were handling its business in the city of Bremerton.

March 27, 1930, ordinance No. 910 of defendant city of Bremerton, a municipal corporation of the second class, became effective, which ordinance provided for the licensing of peddlers and hawkers, fixing a license fee for the former in the sum of $5 per day, or $25 per month. The ordinance provided that persons violating the same should be guilty of a misdemeanor and subjected to certain penalties therein prescribed. Plaintiffs instituted this action against the city of Bremerton, its chief of police and police judge, praying for a decree against defendants enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance against plaintiffs Hastings and Johnson, or other employees of plaintiff Golden Rule Bakery, alleging in their complaint that the ordinance above referred to is in violation of certain statutes of the state of Washington hereinafter referred to, and that the ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore invalid. The trial resulted in a judgment denying plaintiffs any relief and dismissing the action, from which judgment plaintiffs appeal.

Appellants contend that the ordinance cannot be enforced as to them because of chapter 45, p. 199, Laws of 1917 (Rem. Comp. Stat., 8343), which reads as follows:

'An act relating to the disposal fo certain products, and permitting farmers, gardeners and manufacturers to sell same without license, and amending section 7055 of Remington and Ballinger's Annotated Codes and Statutes of Washington.

'Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:

'Section 1. That section 7055 of Rem. & Bal. Code be amended to read as follows:

'Section 7055. It shall be lawful for any farmer, gardener or other person, without license, to sell, deliver or peddle, any fruits, vegetables, berries, butter, eggs, fish, milk, poultry, meats, or any farm produce or edibles raised, caught, produced or manufactured by such person in any place in this state, each and every day, except Sundays, and no city or town shall pass or enforce any ordinance prohibiting the sale by or requiring license from the producers and manufacturers of farm produce and edibles as herein defined, and all city or town ordinances in violation hereof are hereby declared void: Provided, That this section shall not prohibit the sale or delivery of dairy products on Sunday.'

By chapter 57 Laws of 1893 (p. 103), certain municipal corporations were granted, among other powers, the right to license all businesses carried on within their respective limits. This comprehensive authority was limited by chapter 62, p. 97, Laws of 1897, which reads as follows:

'An act to permit farmers, gardeners and manufacturers to dispose of the products of their labor.

'Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:

'Section 1. It shall be lawful for any farmer, gardener or other person, without license, to sell, deliver or peddle, any fruits, vegetables, berries, butter, eggs, fish, milk, poultry, meats, or any farm produce or edibles raised, caught, produced or manufactured by such person in any place in this state, each and every day, except Sundays, and all city or town ordinances in violation hereof are hereby declared void, and no city or town shall pass or enforce any ordinance requiring license from the producers and manufacturers of farm produce and edibles as herein defined: Provided, That this act shall not prohibit the sale or delivery of dairy products on Sunday.'

This last-mentioned act was amended by chapter 45, Laws of 1917, supra, which has been neither amended, nor directly repealed.

Appellants contend that under Rem. Comp. Stat. section 8343, above quoted, the city of Bremerton has no authority to exact any license fee from persons soliciting orders for or selling the products of appellant Golden Rule Bakery within the city of Bremerton. In support of their contention, appellants rely upon the use of the word 'manufacturers' in the title of the act, as well as upon the language of the body thereof arguing that appellant bakery is a manufacturer of edibles and is within the purview of the law. The title of chapter 62, p. 67, Laws of 1897, supra, is broad, declaring the purpose of the act to be 'to permit farmers, gardeners and manufacturers to dispose of the products of their labor.' The title of chapter 45, Laws of 1917, amendatory of the prior act, is more restricted, it relating only 'to the disposal of certain products' which farmers, gardeners, and manufacturers may sell without license. It is evident that fishermen are included within the purview of both acts, although that class of producers is mentioned in neither title. Appellants contend that the act is clear and not susceptible of judicial construction; that by its terms persons manufacturing food products in this state may sell the same therein free from interference by the legislative or executive authority of any city or town. We cannot agree with appellants' contention that the statute is unambiguous; on the contrary, it seems to us that the statute is extremely ambiguous, and that it is in fact most difficult to determine therefrom the legislative intent. Able and forceful arguments are advanced on each side of the question, and it has not been easy to determine which line of reasoning is the better or more logical. In the first place, however, bearing in mind the...