Hatch v. Ford Motor Co.
| Citation | 329 P.2d 605,163 Cal.App.2d 393 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 10 September 1958 |
| Parties | Charies Terrance HATCH, an infant, by Curtis C. Hatch, his Guardian ad litem and Curtis C. Hatch, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 22861. |
Richard Rathbun and Gerald H. Gottlieb, Reseda, for appellants.
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Fred C. Quimby, Jr. and Henry F. Walker, Los Angeles, for respondents.
Defendant's demurrer to plaintiffs' second amended complaint having been sustained upon grounds that the causes of action plead were uncertain and on the further grounds that none of them stated a case of action and plaintiffs having failed to amend their complaint within the time limited by the court, plaintiffs appeal from the order dismissing the action.
By the first and second causes of action the plaintiff, Charles Terrance Hatch, a minor, seeks damages against the defendant. By the third and fourth causes of action plaintiff, Curtis C. Hatch, the father of Charles, seeks to recover damages sustained by him by reason of the injuries sustained by his son. The question as to whether a cause of action is stated is the same in the third and fourth causes of action as it is in the first and second and we will therefore confine our discussion to the first two causes of action.
In substance the first cause of action alleges the following facts: On June 30, 1955, a certain automobile manufactured and assembled by the defendant and sold as new after January 1939 was parked at the edge of Stansbury Avenue; at the time of the sale of said motor vehicle and at the date above mentioned there was included as a part of said automobile a pointed radiator decoration or radiator ornament, approximately 9 3/4 inches in length, which was fastened to the front and center portion of said automobile over the radiator thereof and pointed forward so as to protrude beyond the front of that portion of the automobile to which it was attached. (It is not alleged that it protruded beyond the front of the vehicle.) On the aforementioned date the plaintiff, Charles Hatch, who was then 6 years of age proceeded on foot along Stansbury Avenue towards the front of said automobile (there being no sidewalks) and collided with said automobile with the result that said decoration pierced his left eyeball causing the loss of that eye. It is further alleged that said accident was caused solely and proximately by the negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture, assembly and sale of said motor vehicle in that the defendant manufactured said vehicle under a plan or design by which defendant utilized the decoration above mentioned and thereby created 'an unreasonable risk and danger that the anatomy of a person coming in contact with the front portion of the vehicle would be pierced, thus rendering the vehicle and decoration or ornament dangerous for the uses for which defendant manufactured the same' and in that the defendants failed and refused to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan and design for * * * said vehicle and decoration or ornament.' (Italics ours.) It is further alleged that the plaintiff was a person whom the defendant might reasonably expect to be in the vicinity of the vehicle and its probable use.
The question posed as to the first cause of action is: Did the defendant owe to the plaintiff a nonstatutory duty to manufacture an automobile with which it was safe to collide? Unless such duty existed this count of the complaint does not state a cause of action for defendant can only be held liable to the plaintiff if it breached a duty which it owed him. Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal.2d 488, 491-492, 127 P.2d 1, 149 A.L.R. 215; Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60, 63, 271 P.2d 23; Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal.App.2d 623, 634, 288 P.2d 90; 35 Cal.Jur.2d 495.
The facts here do not present the question as to whether defendant owed to the public a duty to so design its automobile as to lessen the severity of injuries that might be caused by it if it were negligently operated on the highways of this State but only the question as to whether it owed to the public, including the plaintiff, the duty above stated, i. e., to so design the vehicles sold by it as to prevent the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff when said automobile was at rest, properly parked upon the highway. Counsel for the plaintiff have not cited us to any authorities which uphold their contention that the defendant owed any such duty and our own research has not disclosed any.
There is not involved in this case any question of a defect which created a risk of injury to its driver or passengers therein or to persons upon the highway through its use in the normal manner for which it was manufactured to be used such as were involved in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A. 1916F, 696; Olds Motor Works v. Shaffner, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047, 37 L.R.A.,N.S., 560; Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Company, 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855, 60 A.L.R. 357.
The vehicle in question here, in the condition in which it way by the complaint alleged to be, was safe to park and could cause no harm except to one whose own acts or the acts of some third person caused him to collide with it. Such a risk is not one which the defendant was required to anticipate or to protect against. Richards v. Stanley, supra, 43 Cal.2d 60, 65-67, 271 P.2d 23.
Whether a duty on the part of the defendant exists is a question of law for the court. Richards v. Stanley, supra; Redington v. Pacific Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 107 Cal. 317, 324, 40 P. 432; 36 Cal.Jur.2d 84-85; Prosser or Torts, p. 281 and cases there cited under Note 9. The duty having been found to exist, whether it has been breached is a question of fact for the triers of the facts. McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal.2d 295, 298-299, 195 P.2d 783; Copfer v. Golden, supra, 135 Cal.App.2d 623, 629-630, 288 P.2d 90; 36 Cal.Jur.2d 84-85.
If we were to hold that there was a duty to render a vehicle safe to collide with rather than simply a duty to so manufacture it as to make it safe for the use for which it is intended, i. e., to move upon the highways or to be safely parked, that duty would...
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...36 Cal.2d 493, 497, 225 P.2d 497; Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581, 590, 177 P.2d 279; Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal.App.2d 393, 399, 329 P.2d 605; Boie-Hansen v. Sisters of Charity, 152 Cal.App.2d 845, 848, 314 P.2d 189; Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60, 62, 271 P.......
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