Hatch v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 May 1906
• Citation: 15 N.D. 490,107 N.W. 1087
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
• Parties: HATCH et al. v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. P. & S. S. M. RY. CO.

15 N.D. 490

107 N.W. 1087

HATCH et al.

v.MINNEAPOLIS, ST. P. & S. S. M. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

May 22, 1906.

Syllabus by the Court.

The words “place of destination,” as used in a stipulation in a shipping contract, requiring the giving of notice of injuries to stock before its removal from the place of destination, refer to the town, village, or city to which the shipment is made.

A stipulation requiring the giving of such notice of injuries is not strictly a condition precedent to the bringing of an action for damages for injuries; but is a limitation upon the right of recovery. A compliance with such stipulation need not be affirmatively shown by the complaint, but noncompliance is a matter of defense to be raised by answer.

A stipulation in a contract for the shipment of stock, requiring the shipper to give notice to the carrier, of injuries to the stock before it is removed from the place of destination, and before it is mingled with other stock is a reasonable stipulation, and binding upon the shipper when duly entered into.

Such a stipulation is binding upon the shipper although not based on any consideration except that for the contract generally.

Appeal from District Court, Wells County; Edward T. Burke, Judge.

Action by J. J. Hatch and another against the Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.George K. Shaw, Jr., and Alfred H. Bright, for appellant. Hanchett & Wartner, for respondents.

MORGAN, C. J.

The plaintiffs entered into a written contract with the defendant under which a carload of horses was to be carried from the Minnesota Transfer to Harvey, N. D. The plaintiffs claim that the horses were injured through the defendant's negligence, and that they were damaged thereby in the sum of $504. The written contract is attached to the complaint and made a part thereof. The defendant demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it appears upon the face thereof that it does not state a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled. Defendant appeals from the order overruling it.

The contract of shipment contained the following condition or stipulation: “The said shipper further agrees that as a condition precedent to his right to recover any damages for loss of or injury to any of said stock, he will give notice in writing of his claim therefor to some officer of said railroad company or its nearest station agent before said stock has been removed from said place of destination, and before said stock has been mingled with other stock.” It is claimed that the complaint states no cause of action because it fails to state that the notice provided for in said contract was given. The plaintiff contends that the condition above set forth is an unreasonable condition, and therefore void. This contention is based upon other portions of the contract, wherein it is stated that the horses are to be “transported from Minnesota Transfer station to Harvey, N. D. station.” This statement in no way affects the agreement concerning giving of notice. The contract as to shipment was complied with when the horses were delivered at the station. That was the place where the horses were to be unloaded. But the stipulation or agreement as to notice refers to the place of destination. The word “place” in that connection refers to the village of Harvey, and not to the station at Harvey. This is the construction given to the same language used in the contract involved in Welch v. N. P. Ry. Co., 14 N. D. ---, 103 N. W. 396.

These conditions or stipulations in shipping contracts are for the benefit of the carrier. Their object is to prevent false claims as to injuries received by stock during shipment. If the stock is mingled with other stock before notice of injuries is communicated to the carrier, he is placed at serious disadvantage in determining the facts as to the injuries claimed. The time during which notice must be given is not limited. Unlimited opportunity is given to ascertain if the stock is injured. The stipulation does not limit the carrier's liability. It simply requires notice to be given that injuries have occurred, before the stock is moved away or mingled with other stock. The shipper is deprived of no right. We are unable to say that the stipulation is an unreasonable one as a matter of law. The following authorities held that similar conditions or stipulations are not unreasonable as a matter of law: Rice v. K. P. Ry., 63 Mo. 314;Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 264, 22 L. Ed. 556; Goggin v. K. P. Ry. Co., 12 Kan. 416; Sprague v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 34 Kan. 347, 8 Pac. 465; Hutchinson on Carriers, § 259, and cases cited; Southern Railway Co. v. Adams, 115 Ga. 705, 42 S. E. 35;Glenn v. Express Co., 86...