Southern Ry. Co. v. Adams

• Decision Date: 10 June 1902
• Parties: SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. ADAMS et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

42 S.E. 35

115 Ga. 705

SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. ADAMS et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia

June 10, 1902

Syllabus by the Court.

1. When, in a written contract between a consignor and a transportation company, it was stipulated that, as a condition precedent to the right of the owner and shipper to recover damages for loss or injury to live stock shipped under such contract, "he will give notice in writing of his claim therefor to the agent of the railroad companies actually delivering said stock to him *** before said stock is removed from the place of destination, *** and before said stock is intermingled with other stock," the owner or consignor is not entitled to recover unless it be shown that such notice was given according to the terms of the contract. (a) Such an agreement is a reasonable one.

Error from superior court, Franklin county; R. B. Russell, Judge.

Action by William A. Adams and others against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

A. G. & J. B. McCurry, for plaintiff in error.

W. R Little, for defendants in error.

LITTLE J.

Adams instituted an action against the Southern Railway Company to recover damages in the sum of $80, which he alleged he had sustained in the shipment of a car load of cattle from Lavonia, Ga., to Norfolk, Va. He claims that he was injured by the negligence of the company in causing unreasonable delay in the transportation of said cattle, on account of which they had deteriorated in value. Attached to his petition was a written contract, into which the parties entered at the time the shipment was made. This contract is in the usual form of contracts for the transportation of live stock by railroad companies. It was signed both by the company and by Adams, the plaintiff, and recited that the cattle which were received at Lavonia were to be shipped to the freight station at Norfolk, Va., ready to be delivered to the consignee or his order. It also contained a stipulation hereafter set out and discussed. The defendant denied liability, and at the trial the plaintiff testified in part to the following effect: He went on the train with the cattle. They were watered and fed at Spencer, N.C. At Greensboro they were side-tracked, and remained five hours. They were further delayed an hour or more at Pinner's Point, opposite Norfolk. They were in bad condition when they arrived at Norfolk. They were off in flesh, and the witness considered that they were damaged $3 per head. They were not weighed on delivery, but were put in the lot of the consignee with other cattle and sold. He thought they brought less per pound on account of their bad condition, and in this way they were damaged $3 per head. No exceptions to the cattle were made by the witness or consignee when they were delivered and sold. No notice was given of any claim or damage at the point of destination or elsewhere, or before they were intermingled with other cattle. The damage was occasioned by reason of side-tracking the cattle at Greensboro and Pinner's Point and at Norfolk by reason of the fact that the cattle had had no food or water, and, being empty, looked bad, which caused a loss in sales. Other evidence, to which reference need not be made, was introduced. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $50. The defendant made a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, and without evidence to support it, against the weight of the evidence, and contrary to law. By an amendment other grounds assigning error on the failure of the judge to instruct the jury in certain particulars were added. In certifying to the amended grounds, the trial judge in a note states that no special reference was made to any particular piece of the testimony of either the plaintiff or defendant in his charge, nor was any request for the same made, but the general contentions of both parties were fully submitted to the jury with instructions as to the law applicable thereto. He overruled the motion for a new trial, and in his order so doing he states that the jury were instructed generally that the question of negligence was for them to determine, both as to its existence or nonexistence, and were fully charged upon that subject; and it was not the duty of the judge, in the absence of a request to elaborate or magnify any particular feature of the...