Hatch v. Sallinger

• Decision Date: 11 June 1926
• Docket Number: No. 6185.,6185.
• Parties: HATCH v. SALLINGER.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

133 A. 621

HATCH

v. SALLINGER.

No. 6185.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 11, 1926.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Charles A. Walsh, Judge.

Action of the case in assumpsit by William H. Hatch against Nathan Sallinger. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled and case remitted with direction.

Ernest P. B. Atwood, of Providence, for plaintiff.

Hinckley, Allen, Tillinghast & Phillips, Ratcliffe G. E. Hicks, and Clifford A. Kingsley, all of Providence, for defendant.

SWEENEY, J. This is an action of the case in assumpsit to' recover damages for breach of a contract of employment. After trial in the superior court, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $6,147.04. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging the usual grounds. The trial justice sustained the verdict as to liability, but found the damages excessive, and ordered a new trial, unless plaintiff files a remittitur of all of said verdict in excess of $5,568.40. Plaintiff filed a remittitur. Defendant then brought the case to this court by his bill of exceptions.

Defendant claims an exception to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict. The motion is based upon the following facts: In April, 1919, defendant engaged plaintiff to act as manager of his store. After the parties came to an oral agreement, defendant's agent confirmed the oral agreement by letter dated April 12, 1919, a portion of which is as follows:

"This letter is to confirm our conversation of April 10th, in which it was agreed that you should assume the management of our new Richard Store in Providence, beginning July 1, 1919, and that we should compensate you at the rate of $6,000 per year as a drawing account, together with 10 per cent. of the net profits. Should these arrangements not net you a total of $8,000 for the first year, we will make up the difference. Of course, this is based on you giving your entire time and attention to the interest of our business. Would suggest that you confirm by letter."

April 15th, plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the letter by stating that it was agreeable to him. July 1st, plaintiff entered upon the performance of his duties and continued to perform them until December 4th, when defendant gave him written notice that his employment was terminated and to leave the store at once. Plaintiff complied with the notice. Two months afterwards he secured employment in another state at a lower salary. Plaintiff, claiming that he had a contract for one year at a minimum salary of $S,000, brought this action to recover the balance alleged to be due.

The circumstances under which defendant hired the plaintiff are these: Early in 1919 defendant decided to open a new store in Providence for the sale of women's wearing apparel. Before his first interview with plaintiff he had executed a lease of a building on Westminster street, and had made plans for the reconstruction of the building. He expected to have the work completed so his store could be opened about September 15, 1919. On account of delay in completing the work the opening of the store was delayed for one month. Defendant was engaged in business in several cities, and it was necessary for him to hire a suitable person to manage his new store. After several interviews with the plaintiff he was hired to manage the new store. At the time of his engagement, plaintiff was working as department manager in a local department store. Plaintiff gave up his employment in the department store, and July 1st entered upon the performance of his contract with the defendant. He had a great deal of work to do in selecting and employing suitable help, buying merchandise, and getting ready for the opening of the new store.

Defendant claimed at the trial that his contract of hire with the plaintiff was not for a year or for any definite length of time, but a hiring terminable at will, and asked for a direction of a verdict on this ground. The trial justice said he was convinced that the parties contemplated contracting for one year, but that he would leave the interpretation of the contract for the jury. Defendant states in his brief that the construction of the contract was for the court and should not have been submitted to the jury. It is settled law that, when the terms of a contract are clear, its construction is for the court. American Surety Co. of New York v. Bristow (R. I.) 131 A. 312; Richmond v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 263 R. I. 225, 58 A. 767; Vaughan v. Mason, 23 R. I. 348, 50 A. 390; Butler Exchange Co. v. Fess Rotary Oil Burner Co. (R. I.) 125 A. 360. The intention of the parties must govern when that intention can be clearly inferred from the terms of the contract, and can be fairly carried out consistent with the settled rules of law. Butler Exchange Co. v. Fess Rotary Oil Burner Co., supra; Newport Waterworks v. Taylor, 34 R. I. 478, 83 A. 833. Defendant has cited many cases to sustain his contention that, when a person is hired "at the rate of?per year," it is a hiring at will, terminable by either of the parties at any time. It was so held in Booth v. National India Rubber Co., 19 R. I. 696, 36 A. 714, but it appears that plaintiff Booth testified that he understood the oral hiring was for an indefinite period. The cases op this...