Hatcher v. Globe Union Mfg. Co., 24999.

• Decision Date: 01 August 1934
• Docket Number: 24999.
• Citation: 35 P.2d 32,178 Wash. 411
• Parties: HATCHER v. GLOBE UNION MFG. CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

35 P.2d 32

178 Wash. 411

HATCHER v. GLOBE UNION MFG. CO.

No. 24999.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 1, 1934

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Chester A. Batchelor Judge.

Action by Charles M. Hatcher against the Globe Union Manufacturing Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Cause remanded, with directions.

Roberts, Skeel & Holman and W. R. McKelvy, all of Seattle, for appellant.

Vanderveer & Bassett, of Seattle, for respondent.

BLAKE Justice.

This case has been here Before . Hatcher v. Globe Union Mfg Co., 170 Wash. 494, 16 P.2d 824, 827. Since a comprehensive statement of the issues and facts is to be found in that opinion, we shall discuss only such facts as may be necessary to a disposal of the questions raised on this appeal.

Pursuant to the remand on the former appeal, another trial was had which resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for $4,000. From judgment entered on the verdict, defendant appeals.

Assignments of error, for convenience of discussion, may be grouped as follows: (1) Error in the admission of evidence; (2) misconduct of counsel for plaintiff; (3) excessive damages resulting from passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.

I. The court permitted counsel for plaintiff to cross-examine witnesses for the defense upon the practicability of equipping the saw with a blower or suction device to carry off the lead dust. The witnesses were not entirely candid in answering the questions, saying that such device was not necessary. Counsel then asked if some such device had not been installed subsequent to respondent's injury. Objection to this question was sustained.

Evidence of measures taken subsequently to safeguard an instrumentality which caused an injury is not admissible to prove negligence. Bell v. Washington Cedar Shingle Co., 8 Wash. 27, 35 P. 405; Carter v. Seattle, 21 Wash. 585, 59 P. 500. Such evidence is admissible, however, to show the practicability of safeguarding such instrumentality. Erickson v. E. J. McNeeley & Co., 41 Wash. 509, 84 P. 3, 5; Lindblom v. Hazel Mill Co., 91 Wash. 333, 157 P. 998. In the former case, it is said: 'The general rule is that the taking of precautions against the future is not to be construed as an admission of responsibilities in the past, and evidence of what has been done since an accident occurred is not admissible. * * * But the avowed purpose here was to show that the saw could have been advantageously guarded, and the jury were instructed to consider it only for that purpose. * * * The fact that the same or similar saws were subsequently, and within a very short time, guarded by placing a hood over them, was, we think, competent evidence that this one could have been advantageously guarded at the time of the injury, and its reception was not error, where the jury were told plainly the only purpose for which it might be considered.'

In the former appeal of this case, the court obviously had both rules in mind, for it is there said: 'The issue Before the court was not whether the installation of a blower was practicable and feasible, and it was not offered for that purpose. The issue was whether its installation was required under the Factory Act, and the objectionable evidence was offered generally and unconditionally.'

In the second trial, counsel brought the evidence within the rule by expressly limiting it to the practicability of installing a blower or suction device, suggesting to the court that he would submit an instruction for that purpose. The question, so limited, was proper. The error, if any, was in sustaining the objection to it.

II. Appellant next contends that counsel for respondent was unduly persistent in attempting to show the installation of the blower or suction device after the court had ruled evidence of the fact inadmissible. There is some merit in this contention. It is obvious that counsel was determined to get the fact Before the jury in some manner. The court having ruled the evidence inadmissible, counsel should have abided by the...