Hatfield v. Cristopher

• Decision Date: 27 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 841 S.W.2d 761
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 17216A Ray HATFIELD, Appellant, v. Rina CRISTOPHER, Respondent. 45668.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 761

841 S.W.2d 761

39 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 574, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 17216A

Ray HATFIELD, Appellant, v. Rina CRISTOPHER, Respondent.

No. WD 45668.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Oct. 27, 1992.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Nov. 24, 1992.

Application to Transfer Denied Dec. 18, 1992.

Janet Ivy Blauvelt, Dysart, Taylor, Penner, Lay & Lewandowski, Kansas City, for appellant.

Gabriel Andrew Domjan, Lee's Summit, for respondent.

Before TURNAGE, P.J., and BRECKENRIDGE and HANNA, JJ.

BRECKENRIDGE, Judge.

This appeal arises from the trial court's issuance of two contradictory orders, one quashing an execution and one ordering payment into court of the money held under the same execution. Ray Hatfield asserts four points on appeal arguing that (1) the appeal is moot because the December 17, 1991 order to pay in overrules the December 12, 1991 order quashing execution; (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence over Hatfield's objection a document purporting to be a satisfaction of the judgment; (3) the trial court failed to state in the December 12, 1991 order the reason for quashing the execution; (4) the trial court erred in quashing the execution because a) the social security exemption does not apply, b) joint accounts can be garnished if the debtor has provided all the funds, and c) the satisfaction agreement is at best a promise without consideration because it does not comply with the law regarding satisfaction of judgments. The motion to dismiss is denied and the judgment is affirmed.

On April 11, 1989, the appellant, Ray Hatfield, obtained a judgment for money loaned to the respondent, Rina Cristopher, in the amount of $7,540 and costs. Hatfield requested garnishment in aid of execution on September 10, 1991 and such was granted on September 25, 1991.

Pursuant to the execution, Home Federal Savings was summoned as garnishee. In response to interrogatories, Home Federal Savings disclosed a joint savings account, opened November 23, 1984, held by Cristopher and her daughter. The account had a balance of $3,328.93. Cristopher's daughter, the joint tenant, had not contributed money to the account. Commencing in June of 1988, a source of funds in the account was the monthly social security payments Cristopher received. In 1990, the amount of her monthly payment was $419. Cristopher testified that she usually cashed the social security check, took part of the funds in cash to pay bills and put the remainder into the savings account.

Shortly after the judgment, Cristopher obtained a signed, handwritten document from Hatfield dated April 24, 1989, in which Hatfield promised to discontinue legal action against Cristopher and release her from all obligations. Hatfield also promised in the document to be Cristopher's best friend for the rest of their lives and stated that the $8000 involved in the suit was canceled. This document was allowed into evidence as "Exhibit 3" over Hatfield's objection. Cristopher did not pay Hatfield any money in exchange for Exhibit 3. Cristopher testified that prior to obtaining Exhibit 3, she cooked for Hatfield, did his washing and cleaned apartments managed by him. Cristopher stated that she was sometimes paid or taken places in return for her work. Cristopher testified that after she obtained Exhibit 3, she and Hatfield "started all over again" with Cristopher cooking, although a little less than before, doing the laundry and some cleaning for Hatfield. Hatfield, who was 89 at the time of the hearing, stated that he was under the influence of alcohol when Cristopher had him write Exhibit 3, which he did not understand or comprehend.

On October 18, 1991, Cristopher filed a Petition for Quashing Execution. Thereafter, Hatfield filed a motion for an order that the garnishee pay in the amount of $3,328.93. The trial court held a hearing on both motions and on December 12, 1991, entered an order quashing the execution. On December 17, 1991, the trial court entered a conflicting order for Home Federal Savings to pay $3,328.93 from the savings account into the court administrator. Cristopher was not notified of the December 17, 1991 order and did not discover it until the Legal File was obtained to prepare the brief for this appeal. Cristopher filed a motion to dismiss Hatfield's appeal on June 4, 1992, which has not previously been ruled and will be considered at this time.

Cristopher argues in her motion to dismiss that jurisdiction on appeal does not exist in this court because of a failure to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement under § 512.180, RSMo 1986. ¹ In Missouri, the right to appeal is purely statutory and does not exist unless a statute grants the right. State of Missouri ex rel. Benton v. Airport Limousine Service, Premier Service Corp., 791 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Mo.App.1990). Under § 512.180.1, an appeal of a judgment in a civil case tried without a jury by an associate circuit judge is by way of a trial de novo if the amount in controversy is $5,000 or less. Id. There must be an amount in dispute in excess of $5,000 for the court of appeals to acquire jurisdiction of the appeal. Section 512.180(2).

Cristopher relies upon Central Missouri Paving Co. v. Kraft, 678 S.W.2d 420 (Mo.App.1984), to support her jurisdictional argument. Kraft is distinguishable, however, from the case at hand. Although Kraft involved an appeal of an order quashing a writ of garnishment in aid of execution, the underlying judgment and execution was for $3,353, an amount less than the $5,000 jurisdictional requirement. The amount for which the execution issued is the figure used to determine whether the jurisdictional requirement has been met. Flynn v. Janssen, 266 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Mo.1954). Cristopher's case differs from Kraft because the original judgment against Cristopher and the amount sought under the execution was $7,540 which exceeds the $5,000 jurisdictional requirement. The amount in controversy in this case is $7,540 plus costs rather than, as Cristopher asserts, the $3,328.93 seized under the garnishment. Jurisdiction on appeal is proper in this court. The motion to dismiss is denied.

The case was court-tried. Pursuant to Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo.banc 1976), this court affirms the judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence or the trial court erroneously declared or applied the law.

Hatfield argues in his Point I that the December 17, 1991 order to pay overrules the December 12, 1991 order quashing execution and renders this appeal moot. The December 17, 1991 order to pay is invalid because it was issued in violation of Rule 75.01. Under Rule 75.01, the trial court retains control over judgments during the thirty-day period following entry of judgment. Within that time, the court may, for good cause, vacate, amend or modify its judgment, but only after giving the parties reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Terre Du Lac, Inc. v. Black, 713 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Mo.App.1986).

The trial court entered the December 17, 1991 order without notifying either party, thereby denying them the opportunity to be heard. The Missouri Supreme Court held in Brockhoff v. Leary, 711 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Mo. banc 1986), that notice must be provided to the adversely affected party when the trial court acts on its own initiative within the thirty-day period of Rule 75.01. Cristopher's opportunity to appeal was adversely affected by the lack of notice. The December 17, 1991 order is vacated and the appeal is not moot. Point I is denied.

In Point II, Hatfield argues that the trial court erred by allowing Exhibit 3, a handwritten release signed by Hatfield, into evidence because a promise to satisfy a judgment without consideration is not admissible as evidence to satisfy a judgment or quash an execution. The objections Hatfield sets forth in his second point relate to the weight of the evidence rather than to the admissibility of Exhibit 3. A piece of evidence is not required to constitute sufficient proof of the ultimate issue in order to be admissible. Evidence is relevant, and therefore admissible, if it tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue or if it tends to corroborate other relevant evidence which bears on the ultimate issue. Reed v. Rope, 817 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Mo.App.1991). The cases cited by Hatfield to support Point II discuss whether Exhibit 3 is sufficient proof of a valid and binding release rather than whether such a document is admissible into evidence. Although Hatfield's supporting authority sets forth the level of proof required for the release to be valid, he fails to present authority supporting the inadmissibility of Exhibit 3. Point II is denied.

Hatfield argues in Point III that as a result of the court's failure to state its reasons for quashing execution in the order of December 12, 1991, Hatfield cannot determine whether the trial court relied on the social security exemption, a joint account argument or complete satisfaction of the judgment. Hatfield claims that the December 12, 1991 order should be void for vagueness.

Rule 73.01(a)(2) states that any party may request, before submission of the case, that the court indicate the grounds for its decision and its findings of fact. ² Since neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law in the case at hand, the trial court was not required to set forth grounds for its decision.

Hatfield's Point III addresses only the court's failure to state reasons for its decision. Hatfield argues in his discussion of Point III, however, that the overall language of the order was vague. Hatfield does not raise this argument in a point relied on as required by Rule 84.04(d). Nevertheless, this court will briefly address the vagueness issue.

On appeal, the court may review an order made by a trial court with jurisdiction to make the order and correct ambiguities as long as the...