Hatfield v. Hatfield
| Decision Date | 30 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 2670,2670 |
| Citation | 327 S.C. 360,489 S.E.2d 212 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Patricia A. HATFIELD, Appellant, v. Lloyd E. HATFIELD, Respondent. |
Marvin H. Dukes, III, of Dukes, Williams, Infinger & Meeks, Beaufort; James B. Richardson, Jr., of Svalina, Richardson & Larson, Columbia, for Appellant.
James H. Moss, H. Fred Kuhn, of Moss & Kuhn, Beaufort, for Respondent.
This is a domestic action for separate maintenance and support brought by Patricia A. Hatfield. She appeals the provisions of the family court order which denied her request for alimony and divided the marital property. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 1
By complaint dated February 17, 1994, Wife sought "a Decree of Separate Maintenance," equitable distribution of the marital assets, and alimony. 2 Husband answered and counterclaimed for a divorce on the ground of physical cruelty on March 28, 1994. Wife replied to the counterclaim on May 3, 1994. A merits hearing was held on September 21 and 22, 1994.
The family court judge issued a final order on February 14, 1995. The judge granted the parties a decree of separate support and maintenance "each from the other," and he ordered an equitable distribution of the marital property. However, because he found Wife had substantial assets and was capable of making a living, the judge ruled Wife was "barred from alimony." Further, the judge found no grounds were established by either party to justify the granting of a divorce. 3 Both parties moved to alter or amend the judgment. 4 The judge granted the motions in part and denied them in part by order dated July 19, 1995. Wife appeals.
In appeals from the family court, the Court of Appeals has the authority to find the facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Owens v. Owens, 320 S.C. 543, 466 S.E.2d 373 (Ct.App.1996). This broad scope of review does not, however, require this court to disregard the findings of the family court. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 276 S.C. 475, 279 S.E.2d 616 (1981). Neither are we required to ignore the fact that the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony. Cherry v. Thomasson, 276 S.C. 524, 280 S.E.2d 541 (1981).
Did the family court err in:
(1) denying Wife alimony?
(2) finding Husband's inherited shares of stock were not transmuted?
(3) finding Wife possessed $65,000 in a savings account?
Wife contends the family court erred in denying her request for alimony and in failing to reserve the right to make a future award of alimony. We disagree.
This case was initiated as an action for separate maintenance and support, not a divorce. However, S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-140 (Supp.1996) provides an award of alimony S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-130(C) (Supp.1996) lists the factors the family court judge should consider in deciding whether to award alimony or separate maintenance and support. 5 The evidence relevant to these factors is as follows: The parties were married on February 23, 1985. This was the fourth marriage for each. They had been married nine years when Wife filed this action for separate maintenance and support. At the time of the merits hearing in 1994, Husband was 71 and Wife was 57. Although Husband suffered some medical problems with his leg which required surgery shortly after their marriage, both parties apparently were in good health at the time of the hearing.
is to be made in actions for separate maintenance and support according to the factors applied in divorce actions. Rivenbark v. Rivenbark, 301 S.C. 175, 391 S.E.2d 232 (1990). The decision to grant or deny alimony is within the sound discretion of the family court judge, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Williamson v. Williamson, 311 S.C. 47, 426 S.E.2d 758 (1993); Sexton v. Sexton, 321 S.C. 487, 469 S.E.2d 608 (Ct.App.1996).
Husband left high school to join the United States Marine Corps and saw combat in World War II. After he left the military, he obtained an associate's degree in aeronautical engineering, a pilot's license, and a number of licenses in aircraft frame and engine maintenance. He retired in 1985 as a journeyman aircraft mechanic after 38 years in the federal service.
Wife has a bachelor's degree in business administration and two associate's degrees. At the time she met Husband, Wife was a senior auditor in the civil service, GS-11, at the naval air station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. She was earning over $30,000 per year and receiving free housing, utilities, movies, and reduced meal prices. She had worked for the federal government for 18 years. Wife relinquished her position as auditor in September of 1985 and took a nonappropriated, contract position in Puerto Rico in order to be with her Husband. Wife allegedly was wrongfully terminated from this contract position on December 24, 1985. She settled a wrongful termination suit in 1987 for one year's salary. Wife testified that she was currently working as a part-time, temporary bank teller, and that she earned $301.00 every two weeks. Wife stated she had been unable to find full-time employment.
In support of her request for alimony, Wife alleged marital misconduct on the part of Husband during a trip to Dallas, Texas to see his divorced niece, Joni. Wife testified that Husband went to Dallas at the end of December 1992 to visit Joni and to help her with a home renovation. He stayed with Joni for about seven weeks. Wife stated Husband gave Joni oil massages while Joni was nude, and also gave massages to Joni's friend Suzanne and another woman. Wife admitted Husband voluntarily told her about the massages as soon as he returned home, and that he wanted to go to massage school. Wife complained Husband made unsecured loans totalling $50,000 to Joni and Suzanne after he returned from Dallas.
Husband admitted giving Joni fewer than a dozen "full body" massages, giving one to her friend Suzanne, and two to a woman named Kathy who was a massage therapist. However, he maintained there was always someone else present and that there was nothing improper in his conduct. Husband testified that, as soon as he came home, he told his Wife about the massages and that he wanted to become a masseur. Husband acknowledged making the unsecured loans, but asserted they were made from his own property Husband in turn alleged several acts by Wife in regards to marital fault and to support his request for a divorce on the ground of physical cruelty. In one incident, he testified Wife was "haranguing" him about his trip to Dallas when she allegedly attacked him while he was in the bathroom. Wife threw a drink on him, which escalated into a physical confrontation when Husband tried to get out of the bathroom. Wife called the police and both parties were arrested. Husband also recounted an incident in which they were drinking creme de menthe cocktails when they threw their drinks at each other during an argument. Wife afterwards threatened Husband four or five times by telling him, "Don't you close your eyes tonight ... [b]ecause I'll cut your throat." Husband called the police on this occasion.
and with the prior knowledge and consent of Wife.
The family court judge found there was no proof that Husband's conduct "advanced beyond the massage level into an adulterous relationship," and there was mutual fault in the breakup of the marriage. In the judge's 56-page order, he divided numerous items of personal and real property in the equitable apportionment of the marital estate. The judge reviewed the financial declarations of the parties. 6 Wife's declaration reflected gross income of $1,735.31 per month and expenses of $978.01 per month. 7 The judge noted Wife testified at trial that she was working as a part-time bank teller and earned $301.00 every two weeks, and had claimed to have a total income of $829.00 per month, but this was inconsistent with her financial declaration. As for Husband, his financial declaration listed gross monthly income of $5,419.01 ($4,612.34 after taxes and insurance), and monthly expenses of $4,525.00. The majority of Husband's income comes from his government pension, social security, and dividends and interest.
The judge determined he would not award Wife alimony, concluding:
The Court is of the opinion that [Wife] is an able bodied woman, well educated and capable of making a living. She has been in the workplace for many years and has held responsible positions. She has substantial assets as she leaves this marriage. Additionally[,] she is considerably younger than [Husband] and the Court will not award alimony in this case.
On Wife's motion to reconsider, the judge stated he would not reconsider the denial of alimony "[b]ased on the training, education, age, employ ability [sic], health, financial position, duration of marriage[,] and all other relative factors entering into alimony awards, as well as on the issues raised in" Wife's motion. The judge stated he "remains of the opinion that alimony is not warranted at this time." He noted that Wife had been "less than candid" about some of the financial evidence at the hearing.
The decision to grant or deny alimony is within the sound discretion of the family court judge. Williamson v. Williamson, supra; Sexton v. Sexton, supra. It is clear from his orders that the judge considered all of the pertinent factors in deciding whether to make an award of alimony in this case. We find no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to deny Wife alimony and therefore affirm his ruling. As for Wife's contention that alimony should be reserved, this issue was never raised to the judge in Wife's Rule 59(e) motion and...
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