Hatfield v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n
| Decision Date | 20 January 1917 |
| Docket Number | 30857 |
| Citation | 161 N.W. 123,180 Iowa 39 |
| Parties | EDITH S. HATFIELD, Appellee, v. IOWA STATE TRAVELING MEN'S ASSOCIATION, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1917.
Appeal from Polk District Court.--WM. H. MCHENRY and CHARLES A DUDLEY, Judges.
ACTION at law to recover on a policy or benefit certificate insuring William J. Hatfield, while a member of said association in good standing, against injury through external, violent and accidental means, which injury shall, "independently of all other causes, result in death within 90 days from said injury." The defendant contested the claim, and on trial to a jury there was a verdict for plaintiff. From the judgment rendered on the verdict, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Sullivan & Sullivan, for appellant.
Dowell McLennon & Zeuch, T. B. Hanley and Parker, Parrish & Miller, for appellee.
William J. Hatfield, a resident of Portland, Oregon, died at that place on June 14, 1913. At the time of his death, he held three several policies or certificates of accident insurance, issued respectively by the Iowa State Traveling Men's Association (defendant herein), The Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, and Travelers Protective Association of America. The widow of Hatfield, in her own right and as administrator of her husband's estate, made claim against each of these three companies or associations upon their several contracts of insurance, on the theory that his death was occasioned by accidental means, within the terms of such contracts. These claims being denied, separate suits were brought in the district court of Polk County for their collection. In each case, the plaintiff recovered judgment, and in each, an appeal was taken to this court. The cases have been prosecuted and defended by the same counsel throughout, and, subject to some minor exceptions, the issues presented are identical. The principal defense relied upon in all of them is that the death of Hatfield was not caused by accidental means, within the terms of the contract, but that he died from disease or bodily infirmity. We have at this term considered the appeal in the case against the Fidelity & Casualty Company, and reached a conclusion affirming the judgment of the trial court. In that opinion we have stated, as far as seems to be necessary, the substance of the testimony and of the record of the trial, and shall not extend this opinion for their repetition. We have also there given consideration to the several legal propositions advanced by counsel, and, so far as the same questions are raised in this case, that opinion must be considered as governing the result in this. Other features not common to the cases against the Fidelity & Casualty Company and against this defendant will now be noted.
I. In the case at bar, defendant admitted the membership of Hatfield in good standing at the date of his death, that plaintiff is his beneficiary, and that due notice and proofs of loss were given, thus in effect limiting the dispute between the parties to the actual cause of death of the insured. Appellant did not ask or submit special findings for answer by the jury, but in other respects, the conduct of the defense was like that to which we have referred in disposing of the case first mentioned. Counsel for the defense did, however, present and ask to have submitted to the jury some fifteen different instructions upon the law applicable to the issues of fact, and many of the propositions so stated were, in words or in substance, incorporated into the charge given by the court, and, this being so, we think appellant is not at liberty to say that the questions which it thus aided in submitting as matters of fact for the jury are, nevertheless, matters of law, and should be so considered on this appeal.
We will also say, as suggested in the opinion referred to, that independently of the rule just applied, we think the testimony concerning the death of the insured and the cause thereof was such as to make necessary its submission to the jury. In addition to the testimony concerning the autopsy which was offered in each case, both parties on this trial introduced additional medical witnesses, who expressed their opinions founded upon hypothetical questions embodying an assumption of facts claimed to have been developed from other sources of evidence, or facts admitted or proved. As is not unusual, the experts offered by the defendant express their conviction that the disclosures made by the autopsy and the statements made in the hypothesis submitted to them indicate death from disease or abnormal internal conditions, while plaintiff's experts are no less certain, not only that a fall by insured upon the handle of...
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