Hathaway v. East Tennessee, V. & G.R.R.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1886
• Citation: 29 F. 489
• Parties: Hathaway v. EAST TENNESSEE, V. & G.R.R.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

29 F. 489

Hathaway v. EAST TENNESSEE, V. & G.R.R.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. Georgia, Western Division.

October, 1886

Syllabus by the Court

The question of negligence is for the jury when there is substantial doubt as to the facts, or as to the inferences to be drawn from them.

When however, all the evidence offered to show negligence is assumed to be true, and no inference which tends to show a failure of duty could fairly be drawn therefrom, the court must instruct the jury that no negligence has been shown, and to find their verdict accordingly.

The doctrine of 'scintilla of evidence' considered.

In the federal courts the judges are no longer required to submit a case to the jury merely because some evidence has been offered by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that it would warrant the jury to find a verdict for the party adducing it.

The practice of giving peremptory instructions to the jury considered and defined. 'The practice is a wise one. It saves time and costs. It gives the certainty of applied science to the results of judicial investigation. It draws clearly the line which separates the province of the judge and the jury, and fixes where it belongs the responsibility which should be assumed by the court. ' Mr. Justice SWAYNE, 10 Wall. 604-637.

Section 3248 of the Code of Georgia, prohibiting the trial judge from expressing any opinion upon the facts in evidence, is not regarded in the courts of the United States. Railway Co v. Putnam, 7 S.Ct. 1, (decided S.Ct. U.S. October 1886.)

Under the facts of this case the jury instructed to find for the defendant.

Lyon &amp Gresham, for plaintiff.

Bacon & Rutherford, for defendant.

SPEER J.

The question whether or not negligence existed is generally a question for the jury. It has been held that the case should always go to the jury (1) when the facts which, if true, would constitute evidence of negligence, are controverted; (2) where such facts are not controverted, but where there might be a fair difference whether the inference of negligence should be drawn; (3) when at the same time the facts are in dispute, and the inferences to be drawn from them are doubtful. In other words, the question of negligence is for the jury when there is substantial doubt as to the facts, or as to the inferences to be drawn from them. When, however, it is assumed that the evidence which is favorable to the plaintiff is true, and no fair inference that the defendant had been guilty of a failure of duty could be drawn from such evidence, the judge should, according to the practice of the court, decide the case by peremptory instructions to the jury.

In the courts of the state of Georgia it is held 'that when there is any evidence, however slight, tending to support a material issue, the case must go to the jury, in deference to the theory that they are the exclusive judges of the weight of evidence,' (Mercier v. Mercier, 43 Ga. 323; Johnston v. Crawley, 22 Ga. 348; Stamper v. Hayes, 25 Ga. 546; Phillips v. Brigham, 26 Ga. 617;) and a verdict based upon such a scintilla of evidence will not be disturbed, although the court trying the case is dissatisfied with the verdict, and is of the opinion it is against the weight of the evidence. This doctrine is not recognized in the courts of the United States.

In the case of the Commissioners, etc., v. Clark, 94 U.S. 278-284, Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivering the opinion, it is held the judges are no longer required to submit a case to the jury merely because some evidence has been offered by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that it would warrant the jury to proceed in finding a verdict in favor of the party adducing such evidence. Decided cases may be found where it is held that, if there is a scintilla of evidence in support of a case, the judge is bound to leave it to the jury; but the modern decisions have established a more reasonable rule, to-wit, that, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is or may be in every case a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the burden of proof is imposed.

Mr. Justice GRIER announced in Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 373, the following forcible propositions:

'Undoubtedly it is the peculiar province of the jury to find all matters of fact, and of the court to decide all questions of law. But a jury has no right to assume the truth of any material fact without some evidence legally sufficient to establish it. It is therefore error in the court to instruct the jury that they may find a material fact when there is no evidence from which it may be legally inferred. Hence the practice of granting an instruction like the present, which makes it imperative upon the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, and which has in many states superseded the ancient practice of a demurrer to the evidence. It answers the same purpose, and should be tested by the same rules. A demurrer to evidence admits, not only the facts stated therein, but also every conclusion which a jury might fairly or reasonably infer therefrom.' In Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. 197-201, it is declared by Mr. Justice SWAYNE that 'when there is no evidence, or such a defect in it that the law will not permit a verdict for the plaintiff to be given, such an instruction to the jury may be properly demanded, and it is the duty of the court to give it, and error to refuse it. ' And in Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604-637, it is, in the opinion of the supreme court of the United States, delivered by the same eminent jurist, held that, according to the settled practice of the courts of the United States, it is proper to give such instructions if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot recover. 'The practice,' he declares, 'is a wise one. It saves time and costs. It gives the certainty of applied science to the results of judicial investigations. It draws clearly the line which separates the province of the judge and jury, and fixes where it belongs the responsibility which should be assumed by the court.'

Chief Justice MARSHALL, in the early history of the great tribunal which has rendered so renowned the jurisprudence of American, in Pawling v. U.S., 4 Cranch, 219, announced the same principle:

'The general doctrine (said he) on a demurrer to the evidence has been correctly stated at the bar. The party demurring admits the truth of the testimony to which he demurs, and also those conclusions of fact which a jury may fairly draw from that testimony. Forced and violent inferences he does not admit, but the testimony is to be taken most strongly against him; and such conclusions as a jury might justifiably draw the court ought to draw.'

Mr. Justice MILLER, in Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 121, 122, reiterates this rule:

'It is the duty of the court, in its relation to the jury, to protect parties from unjust verdicts arising from ignorance of the rules of law and of evidence, from impulse of passion or prejudice, or from any other violation of his lawful rights in the conduct of a trial. This is done by making plain to them the issues they are to try; by admitting only such evidence as is proper in these issues, and rejecting all else; by instructing them in the rules of law by which that evidence is to be examined and applied; and finally, when necessary, by setting aside a verdict which is unsupported by evidence or contrary to law. In the

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