Hathcock v. Cohen

• Decision Date: 29 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 05-61764-CIV.,05-61764-CIV.
• Citation: 547 F.Supp.2d 1271
• Parties: Herbert Lee HATHCOCK, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey S. COHEN et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

547 F.Supp.2d 1271

Herbert Lee HATHCOCK, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey S. COHEN et al., Defendants.

No. 05-61764-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

February 29, 2008.

Herbert Lee Hathcock, Jr., Monticello, FL, pro se.

Adriana Mihaela Jisa, Purdy Jolly Giuffreda & Barranco PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

KENNETH A. MARRA, District Judge.

This matter was tried before the Court on August 27, 2007. Based upon the evidence presented during the bench trial, the argument of counsel and the pro se plaintiff, the post-trial submissions by the parties, and otherwise being duly advised in the premises, the Court issues these findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. Introduction

This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and stems from events surrounding the theft from a gas station convenience store on July 21, 2004, after which Plaintiff Herbert Lee Hathcock, Jr. ("Plaintiff) was arrested in his home without a warrant. Plaintiff brings an illegal entry claim against Broward County Deputy Sheriffs Michael Clark ("Clark"), Jeffrey Cohen ("Cohen") and Joseph A. Russo ("Russo") (collectively, "Defendants"), the officers involved in the arrest of Plaintiff inside his home. Defendants assert that their entry into Plaintiffs home without a warrant was justified based on the doctrine of "hot pursuit"

II. Findings of Fact

On July 21, 2004, at approximately 2:50 p.m., Russo received a dispatched call regarding a theft at a gas station located at 2701 West Atlantic Boulevard, Pompano Beach, Florida. At the time, Russo was patrolling the shopping plaza directly across the street from the gas station, and therefore arrived at the station shortly thereafter. Upon his arrival, Russo observed a large crowd of people yelling and pointing down the street. After conducting witness interviews, Russo was told that Plaintiff had entered the gas station and left with unpaid merchandise. Two of the gas station attendants followed Plaintiff outside and confronted him. Plaintiff then turned on his car's ignition and one of the attendants jumped on the hood. Plaintiff drove erratically from side to side with the attendant on the hood until the attendant eventually fell off.

A witness informed Russo that she knew Plaintiff and could direct Russo to Plaintiffs home, which was only 4 blocks away. Russo followed the witness to Plaintiffs house and arrived no more than twelve or fifteen minutes after he had first arrived at the gas station. Clark and Cohen joined Russo outside of Plaintiffs house to provide additional assistance. Once Defendants ascertained Plaintiff was in the house, they proceeded to ask him to come outside, and although Plaintiff stated that he would emerge, Plaintiff failed to do so. Eventually, Defendants made the decision to enter the house and arrest Plaintiff.¹

Plaintiff suffered no actual damages as a result of this incident.²

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations committed under color of state law. To prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that a defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law and that the deprivation occurred under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir.1998). A violation of the Fourth Amendment is cognizable under section 1983. Reyes v. Maschmeier. 446 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir.2006).

There is no question here that Defendants acted under color of state law, thus the Court need only address whether Defendants acted in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Because Defendants have raised the defense of qualified immunity, the Court will address the constitutional violation in the context of this defense.

B. Qualified Immunity

"Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct `does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2002) quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). A defendant who seeks qualified immunity must first establish that he or she was acting within the scope of his or her discretionary authority.³ McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir.2007). Once established, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant has violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Next, the plaintiff must show that the constitutional violation was "clearly established." Id.

In examining the "clearly established" prong, the Court's inquiry involves an examination into "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Bashir v. Rockdale County, Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir.2006) quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 1330. In analyzing "the contours of the right" in the context of a warrantless search of a home, the United States Supreme Court has stated that government officials should not be personally liable for reasonably but mistakenly concluding that exigent circumstances exist. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). In making such a determination, government officials must have been given "fair and clear notice" and "the unlawfulness [of the act] must be apparent." Bashir, 445 F.3d at 1331 quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034 and Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350. Notice to officials may be given by federal statute, federal constitutional provision, caselaw decisions of the United States Supreme Court, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 1331.

1. Constitutional Violation

It is axiomatic that law enforcement officers are prohibited from entering a suspect's home without consent or a warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, a warrantless arrest in a suspect's home is permissible if probable cause and exigent circumstances are present. Id. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371; United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1357 n. 1 (11th Cir.1982). Probable cause to arrest exists if "at the moment the arrest was made, the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense." Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir.2003) quoting Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir.2002) (internal quotations omitted). Exigent circumstances arise when "the inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action." United States v. Satterfield 743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir.1984) citing United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphasis in the original). Examples of recognized exigent circumstances include: (1) danger of flight or escape; (2) danger of harm to police officers or the general public; (3) risk of destruction of evidence and (4) hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 669 (11th Cir.2000).

The United States Supreme Court addressed the concept of exigent circumstances in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). That case involved an armed robbery in which a suspect, believed to be armed, fled into a home. Id. at 297, 87 S.Ct. 1642. Witnesses contacted the police, and the police arrived at the home less than five minutes after the suspect entered the home. Id. at 298, 87 S.Ct. 1642. In finding that the police's entry into the home without a warrant was valid, the Warden Court stated the following:

[The police] acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use against them. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that [the suspect] was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape.

Id. at 298-99, 87 S.Ct. 1642.

Thus, Warden permits a warrantless entry into a home when there is a risk of danger to the police or the public. In Warden, the risk was apparent based on the suspect's use of a weapon to commit the crime and the possibility that the weapon would be used to escape and elude the police.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also addressed exigent circumstances as it pertains to danger to human life and the need to protect the public in United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir.2002). In that 911 caller reported hearing gunshots and an argument emanating from the suspect's home. Id. at 1332-33. Upon arrival, the police spotted a shotgun and several shell casings on the porch, and decided to enter the residence to check for victims and weapons. Id. at 1333. In upholding the warrantless search, the Holloway Court held that "emergency situations involving endangerment to life fall squarely within the exigent circumstances exception." Id. at 1337. In so finding, the Court noted that the police act constitutionally when they reasonably believe an emergency exists that calls for an "immediate response to protect the public from imminent...