Hathcock v. Wood

• Decision Date: 16 March 2001
• Citation: 815 So.2d 502
• Parties: Ben Cleburn HATHCOCK v. Marshall WOOD and Reba Wood.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

815 So.2d 502

Ben Cleburn HATHCOCK v. Marshall WOOD and Reba Wood.

1982225.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 16, 2001.

Barbara F. Olschner and J. Mark Hart of Olschner & Hart, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.

Gregory S. Cusimano, Michael L. Roberts, and David A. Kimberley of Cusimano, Keener, Roberts & Kimberley, P.C., Gadsden, for appellees.

BROWN, Justice.

This negligence case arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on March 19, 1994. The defendant Ben Cleburn Hathcock appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict awarding $600,000 to the plaintiff Marshall Wood and $200,000 to the plaintiff Reba Wood. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On the morning of March 19, 1994, Ben Hathcock was traveling west, behind three automobiles, on Highway 278, which connects Piedmont and Gadsden. Dorothy Law was driving the first vehicle, the one the farthest ahead of Hathcock; Reba Wood, with her husband Marshall Wood as her passenger, was driving the second vehicle; an unknown person was driving the third vehicle, the vehicle immediately ahead of Hathcock. According to the evidence presented at trial, Law, driving the lead automobile, activated her left turn signal as she reached the crest of a hill, to indicate her intent to turn into the driveway of a private residence. As Law stopped on the highway to allow an oncoming car to pass, Mrs. Wood prepared to stop behind her. The third vehicle, however, swerved to the right and headed toward the shoulder of the road past the Woods' vehicle. Hathcock, who testified that he did not see Law's turn signal or brake lights, quickly applied his brakes and turned to the right also; his vehicle hit the rear of the Woods' vehicle, at an angle, shoving it into Law's vehicle.

Mr. and Mrs. Wood were injured in the accident. Soon after the accident, they sought medical treatment for their injuries at a hospital emergency room. Mrs. Wood complained of rib and chest pain; she was treated and released that same day. Her medical expenses totalled $1,068.50. Mr. Wood was treated for a neck strain and was given a cervical collar, and he, too, was released that same day. This visit to the hospital provided Mrs. Wood's only treatment, but the record suggests that it merely marked the beginning of Mr. Wood's treatment.

Over the next two years, Mr. Wood sought treatment from several doctors. On April 7, 1994, almost three weeks after the accident, Mr. Wood sought treatment for his neck. He was diagnosed with a neck strain; he did not return for treatment until February 2, 1995. At that time, he was continuing to complain about pain in his neck. On March 22, 1995, Mr. Wood sought treatment from a chiropractor; the chiropractor treated him 34 times, until August 1995. After Mr. Wood had concluded the chiropractic treatments, he sought medical attention, in December 1996, from a new physician. The record suggests that, after that time, Mr. Wood sought regular treatment from several physicians, including a neurosurgeon, for pain in his neck, shoulders, and back, as well as for what he alleges was a deteriorating mental condition. The Woods sued Hathcock on March 18, 1996, alleging that Hathcock had negligently or wantonly caused the 1994 automobile accident. As the trial began, defense counsel suggested in her opening argument that the evidence would show that Mr. Wood's alleged injuries were exaggerated, or, alternatively, were not related to the 1994 accident. She specifically stated that the evidence would show significant gaps of time between treatments, especially during the year following the accident. At the conclusion of the opening statements, the Woods' counsel called Mrs. Wood as his first witness. During her testimony, Mrs. Wood on several occasions referred the Woods' financial condition, indicating that it was poor, and at times suggesting that it caused them to delay Mr. Wood's medical visits. Mrs. Wood also said that as a result of the accident she and her husband had been poor and that their poverty had caused them to lose their house and their upholstery business. Defense counsel, who had previously made a motion in limine to exclude all testimony as to the Woods' poverty, properly objected to Mrs. Wood's statement.¹

The trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") in favor of Hathcock on the wantonness claim, but submitted the negligence claim to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Woods, awarding them $600,000 for Mr. Wood's physical injuries, mental anguish, and lost earnings and $200,000 for Mrs. Wood's physical injuries and the loss of consortium of her husband. Hathcock moved for a remittitur or, alternatively, for a new trial. The court conducted a hearing on the motion and then denied it. The court entered a judgment on the verdict. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

Hathcock first argues that the trial court erred in not entering a JML for him on the Woods' negligence claim because, he says, he did not breach a duty of care. He contends that he was driving at a safe speed and was following the vehicle in front of him at a lawful distance, but that he was nevertheless unable to see that the Woods' vehicle was stopping, because his view of its brake lights was obstructed by the vehicle between the Woods and Hathcock.

The standard by which we review an appeal from a ruling on a motion for a JML is materially indistinguishable from the standard by which we review a summary judgment. Simply, this standard is "`whether the nonmoving party has presented substantial evidence in support of his position.'" Norfolk So. Ry. v. Bradley, 772 So.2d 1147, 1150 (Ala.2000) (quoting K.S. v. Carr, 618 So.2d 707, 713 (Ala.1993)). Evidence is "substantial" only if it is "of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Fla., 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). A JML should be entered only when "there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue or where there are no disputed questions of fact for the jury to determine." Norfolk So., supra, 772 So.2d at 1150 (quoting K.S. v. Carr, 618 So.2d at 713). In determining whether material questions of fact exist, the court must view the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Given that principle, we must resolve all factual disputes in favor of the Woods.

Hathcock relies, in part, on Tinsley v. Henderson, 613 So.2d 1268 (Ala.1993). In that case, Henderson was driving down a two-lane road, at a speed below the legal limit, when his truck struck and killed Timothy Tinsley, as Timothy was riding his bicycle. Timothy's parents sued Henderson, claiming that he had negligently or wantonly caused the accident. This Court affirmed a summary judgment in Henderson's favor, holding that the Tinsleys had failed to present substantial evidence indicating that Henderson's actions were not reasonably prudent. Tinsley, 613 So.2d at 1271.

This present case is distinguishable from Tinsley, because Hathcock could reasonably have expected that the vehicles traveling in front of him could suddenly slow down or stop at any time; indeed, slowing down or stopping is part of the nature of traffic on a two-lane road. Thus, while Hathcock claims he was confronted with "a sudden emergency not of his making," he was not presented with an unexpected emergency as Henderson was in Tinsley. The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that Hathcock breached a duty of care by not anticipating that the vehicles he was following might stop. See Martin v. Arnold, 643 So.2d 564, 567 (Ala.1994)

("a motorist is negligent if he fails to discover a vehicle that he reasonably could have discovered in time to avoid injury").

Hathcock also argues that the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Dr. Thomas Conboy, one of the Woods' expert witnesses, as to the probationary status of his professional license. The trial court refused to admit this evidence, concluding that its prejudice outweighed its relevance. In Ayres v. Lakeshore Community Hospital, 689 So.2d 39 (Ala.1997), this Court stated the following general rule regarding the cross-examination of an expert witness:

"[T]he trial judge has substantial discretion as to the questions a party is allowed to ask of an expert witness. The scope and extent of cross-examination [are] vested in the trial court's sound discretion, and this court will not reverse on the basis of the trial court's rulings regarding cross-examination unless an abuse of discretion has occurred."

689 So.2d at 41. Thus, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by curtailing defense counsel's cross-examination as to matters involving Dr. Conboy's probation imposed by his governing professional association.

Hathcock argues in his brief that the evidence of Dr. Conboy's probation was relevant to show bias on the part of Dr. Conboy. The record, however, reveals that during a hearing on pretrial motions defense counsel repeatedly urged the trial court to allow this evidence on the basis that it was germane to the question of Dr. Conboy's veracity.² The record also shows during the trial defense counsel made a similar argument during her offer of proof: "This is a serious case, and the defendant ought to be able, in fairness, to qualify [Dr. Conboy's] truthfulness...." This Court's consideration of this issue is limited to the grounds raised before the trial court. See Lance, Inc. v. Ramanauskas, 731 So.2d 1204, 1220 (Ala.1999)

(stating that "specific objections waive all other objections").

The Alabama Rules of Evidence clearly allow cross-examination as to "matters affecting the credibility of the witness." Rule 611(b), Ala R.Evid. Rule 608, however, requires the trial judge to keep a watchful eye on evidence concerning the character or conduct of a witness....