Haugen v. Dick Thayer Motor Co.
| Citation | 91 N.W.2d 585,253 Minn. 199 |
| Decision Date | 18 July 1958 |
| Docket Number | 37232,37397,Nos. 37227,37481,37231,37396,37480,s. 37227 |
| Parties | Henry HAUGEN and Cleo Okeson, Respondents, 37227, 37231, 37396--7, 37480--37481, v. DICK THAYER MOTOR COMPANY, Respondent (37227, 37231, 37480--37481), Appellant(37396--37397), George HAUGEN, Appellant (37227, 37231, 37480--37481), Respondent (37396--37397), Otto SCHLIMME, Respondent. George HAUGEN, Appellant, 37232 v. Otto SCHLIMME, Defendant and Third-Party-Plaintiff, Respondent, Dick Thayer Motor Company, Third-Party-Defendant, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Under the circumstances recited in this opinion the negligence of the automobile driver who entered an intersection at an excessive rate of speed was not an efficient intervening cause breaking the chain of causation between the appellant's negligence and the resulting collision, where the record establishes that the negligence of appellant in entering the intersection at or about the same time without maintaining a proper lookout or yielding the right-of-way constituted a concurrent and contributing cause of the collision.
2. Title to personal property passes as of the time the parties intend it should pass. The intent of the parties is determined objectively from the acts and conduct of the parties at the time of the transaction which gives rise to the intention to pass title, as well as from the terms of the contract, usages of trade, and circumstances of the case.
3. M.S.A. § 169.09, subd. 13, relating to accident reports maintained by the highway department, makes such reports privileged except for information relating to names and addresses of persons involved in the accident.
Eastvold & Pflueger, Ortonville, for George Haugen.
Benson & Schreiner, Ortonville, Rosengren, Rufer & Blatti, Fergus Falls, for respondents Haugen and Okeson.
Gordon J. Mangan and William Westphal, Minneapolis, for respondent Dick Thayer Motor Co.
Field, Arvesen & Donoho, Fergus Falls, for respondent Schlimme.
This is an appeal from judgments and from various orders of the District Court of Big Stone County denying motions for judgment notwithstanding verdicts or for new trials in actions arising out of an automobile accident involving cars driven by one George Haugen and one Otto Schlimme. Henry Haugen was a guest passenger in the automobile driven by his brother, George. Cleo Okeson was a guest passenger in the car driven by Otto Schlimme, which automobile was alleged to have been the property of the Dick Thayer Motor Company. Individual actions were commenced by Henry Haugen and Cleo Okeson against Dick Thayer Motor Company, George Haugen, and Otto Schlimme for personal injuries resulting from the accident. George Haugen commenced an action against Otto Schlimme for property damage and personal injuries. Schlimme brought the Dick Thayer Motor Company into the action as a third-party defendant, claiming that the car he was driving was the property of the Thayer company. Answers and cross-claims were filed, and all of the actions were consolidated for trial.
The plaintiffs Henry Haugen and Cleo Okeson recovered substantial verdicts against the defendants Schlimme and the Dick Thayer Motor Company. By a special verdict the jury found that George Haugen was guilty of negligence, but an interrogatory as to whether or not his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident was answered by the jury in the negative. The jury found by a special verdict that the Dick Thayer Motor Company was the owner of the car driven by Schlimme.
Various post-trial motions were made, as a result of which the trial court, contrary to the verdict of the jury, determined (a) that George Haugen was negligent as a matter of law and that the other plaintiffs were entitled to judgment against drivers of both automobiles, as well as the Dick Thayer Motor Company; and (b) that the evidence sustained the finding of the jury that the Dick Thayer Motor Company was the owner of the automobile which the defendant Schlimme was driving when the accident happened.
On this appeal two principal questions are presented: (1) Did the court err in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict against the defendant George Haugen, and (2) does the record support a finding to the effect that at the time of the accident the Dick Thayer Motor Company was the owner of the automobile driven by the defendant Schlimme?
The accident giving rise to these actions occurred on April 5, 1955, at about 3:30 p.m. at an intersection of County Aid Road No. 8 and County Aid Road No. 9 in Big Stone County. Haugen entered the intersection from the south on County Aid Road No. 9 which runs north and south, while Schlimme entered the intersection from the east on County Aid Road No. 8, which runs in an east and west direction. The intersection is level; the roads which form it are of hard-surface gravel approximately 24 feet in width and at the time of the accident were dry. The weather was partly cloudy but there was nothing in the air in the form of dust or haze that would reduce visibility. The roads are of equal importance, and the traffic on neither is controlled by a stop sign. There are crossroad signs on each road leading to the intersection.
It is important to examine the existing conditions at and near the intersection as they bear upon the opportunity of George Haugen to view oncoming traffic from the east, the direction from which the Schlimme car was approaching the intersection. It should be noted that a farmhouse was located at a point approximately 390 feet south of the intersection on County Aid Road No. 9. It appears from the record and exhibits that there was a row of trees along the easterly right-of-way line of County Aid Road No. 9 and a similar row of trees growing along the southerly right-of-way line of County Aid Road No. 8. These trees were variously described as being anywhere from 5 to 6 inches in diameter to 12 to 15 inches in diameter and were spaced at a distance of 20 to 25 feet apart. These trees were bare; they had not as yet acquired their new leaves. The defendant George Haugen testified that a person approaching the intersection from the south would have no difficulty in looking between the trees to the east to see a car or tractor approaching the intersection from that direction. 1 It appears from the record that the Haugen vehicle entered the intersection at approximately 25 m.p.h. After it entered the intersection, it was struck on the right side by the front end of the Schlimme vehicle and was damaged from the center of the right front door to the rear of the vehicle. Both vehicles came to rest in the ditch north and west of the intersection.
It appears from the record that as Haugen approached the intersection he looked to the east but did not see any cars approaching from that direction. Neither did he see any cars approaching from the north or the west. After clearing the farmhouse, which was about 390 feet south of the intersection, there was nothing in his line of vision, other than a row of trees, which interfered with his view. He said he would have been able to see a car or tractor approaching from the east. Except for the trees, Haugen's view was unobstructed for approximately a quarter of a mile to the east. The row of trees along the east line of County Aid Road No. 9 did not extend completely to the intersection but ended approximately 35 feet south of the southerly right-of-way line of County Aid Road No. 8. Therefore, at a distance of 35 feet from the intersection, Haugen had a completely unobstructed view to the east. However, Haugen testified that he did not see the Schlimme vehicle at any time prior to the collision and, in fact, he did not know from what direction the Schlimme vehicle had come. At no time did Haugen apply his brakes, although he testified they were in good condition, and he estimated that he could have stopped within a distance of 35 to 40 feet had he been required to do so.
It appears from the record that the defendant Schlimme, who had the benefit of the statutory right-of-way, entered the intersection at approximately 45 m.p.h. He had been driving in excess of that rate prior to that time and reduced his speed as he approached the intersection. He testified that he looked toward his left (south), the direction from which the Haugen car was approaching, when he was approximately 325 feet east of the intersection. He saw no car approaching from the south. He then turned his attention to the north where a grove of trees on the northeast corner of the intersection almost totally obstructed his view to the right. Thereafter he looked straight ahead and, at the moment of entering the intersection, he saw the Haugen vehicle enter the intersection from the left and appear in front of him. He applied his brakes but was unable to avoid a collision.
By its special verdict the jury found that Otto Schlimme was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. They also found that George Haugen was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. The trial court, however, granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict against George Haugen, being of the view that the special verdict of the jury was inconsistent and contrary to proven facts. The question arises on the state of the record whether the trial court was right in determining, as a matter of law, that the negligence of George Haugen was a proximate cause of the accident.
1. The appellant George Haugen recognizes the basic Minnesota rule that 'Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, Without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural and proximate; and for such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could not have foreseen the particular results which did follow.' (Italics supplied.) 2 He contends, however,...
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