Haugen v. Henry County
Decision Date | 01 March 2004 |
Docket Number | No. S03A1444.,S03A1444. |
Citation | 277 Ga. 743,594 S.E.2d 324 |
Parties | HAUGEN v. HENRY COUNTY et al. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James L. Haugen, McDonough, pro se.
O'Quinn & Cronin, Michael A. O'Quinn, Donald A. Cronin, Jr., McDonough, for appellees.
In September of 1996, the voters of Henry County passed a referendum authorizing the imposition of a Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST) for a period of five years. The tax was intended to raise not more than $60 million for road and street repair, as well as for specified capital projects. During the five-year period, the tax generated more than $71.8 million in revenue. Although $60 million was spent for the stated purposes, certain of the projects remained incomplete. When the County proposed to expend the additional SPLOST funds on the unfinished projects, James L. Haugen, who is a resident and taxpayer of the County, instituted an action seeking mandamus and injunctive relief. He alleged that, pursuant to OCGA § 48-8-121(g)(1)(B) and (g)(2), any "excess proceeds" must be used to reduce ad valorem taxes.
The County moved to dismiss and the trial court granted the motion on procedural and on substantive grounds. It found that Haugen had failed to comply with OCGA § 9-6-27(a), because no mandamus nisi was granted and served on the County. It also concluded that there were no "excess proceeds" as defined by OCGA § 48-8-121(g)(1)(B) and (g)(2). Haugen appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing all claims against the County.
See In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 265 Ga. 326, 329(2), 454 S.E.2d 780 (1995) ( ). Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the action on procedural grounds.
2. The tax was in effect for the full five-year period. See Jackson v. Shadix, 272 Ga. 631, 632(1), 533 S.E.2d 706 (2000) ( ). However, Shadix did not concern and, thus, is not dispositive of, the substantive issue of statutory construction that is presented here. Under OCGA § 48-8-121(g)(1)(B), the taxing authority receives excess net SPLOST proceeds to the extent that the revenue obtained is "in excess of the maximum cost of the project or projects stated in the resolution... or in excess of the actual cost of such project or projects...." OCGA § 48-8-121(g)(2) provides, in relevant part, that the County can use such excess proceeds only to reduce its ad valorem taxes. The maximum cost of the projects stated in the SPLOST resolution was $60 million, but the actual cost of the projects exceeds that amount. Accordingly, the issue to be decided is whether the County is entitled to use the $11.8 million plus accrued interest to complete the projects before it can be charged with possessing any "excess" SPLOST proceeds.
Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169(2), 465 S.E.2d 440 (1996). Thus, OCGA § 48-8-121(g)(1)(B) provides that SPLOST proceeds are considered to be "excess" either when they are greater than the cost of the project specified in the resolution or when they are greater than the actual cost of the project. The determinative factors are the estimated and the actual costs of the project. However, the statute does not expressly provide which alternative applies where, as here, the net tax proceeds exceed the estimated, but not the actual, cost of the project. The dissent simply assumes that, because the General Assembly used the word "or" to separate the two alternatives, whichever cost is the lesser would control, with the result that the estimated cost establishes the maximum amount of SPLOST revenue that can be expended on the project. As soon as the tax proceeds reach an amount equal to the estimated cost, all additional proceeds are deemed excess. Thus, according to that interpretation, once the County raised the $60 million specified in the resolution, all further SPLOST revenues were excess even though the projects had not been completed.
Dickey v. Storey, 262 Ga. 452, 456(3), 423 S.E.2d 650 (1992). Therefore, as a matter of law, there can be no "excess" SPLOST proceeds so long as revenue is available and the projects specified in the resolution imposing the tax have not been completed.
Accordingly, the only construction of OCGA § 48-8-121(g)(1)(B) which comports with sound reasoning and the entirety of the statute of which it is a part is that the actual cost, rather than estimated cost, establishes the maximum amount of SPLOST revenue that can be expended. While estimated "or" actual cost are the applicable standards for determining "excess proceeds," on those occasions when actual cost exceeds estimated cost, actual cost is the determinative standard. Thus, even though the tax proceeds received by the taxing authority may exceed the estimated cost of any given unfinished project, no "excess" proceeds exist so long as the project remains incomplete. To hold otherwise would render OCGA § 48-8-121(a)(1) meaningless and sanction the unnecessary abandonment of projects based upon a good-faith, but incorrect estimate as to the effect of inflation or other variables on the actual cost to complete them.
The judiciary has the duty to reject a construction of a statute which will result in unreasonable consequences or absurd results not contemplated by the legislature. General Electric Credit Corp. of Ga. v. Brooks, 242 Ga. 109, 112, 249 S.E.2d 596 (1978). The General Assembly did not intend that a taxing authority be precluded from expending available SPLOST proceeds on unfinished projects simply because the original estimate of the cost of completion was too low. The trial court correctly interpreted the relevant statutory provisions and, therefore, properly dismissed Haugen's petition on substantive grounds.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except SEARS, P.J., THOMPSON and HINES, JJ., who dissent.
I agree with Division 1 of the majority opinion that OCGA § 9-11-4( k) permits ordinary...
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