Haulers Ins. Co., Inc. v. Wyatt, 25868.
| Decision Date | 02 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 25868.,25868. |
| Citation | 170 S.W.3d 541 |
| Parties | HAULERS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Rodger P. WYATT, Sr. and Jerry Wyatt, d/b/a Wyatt's Auto Sales, Rodger P. Wyatt, Jr., and Christopher Meyer, Defendants, and Rhonda Meyer, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Rich A. Courtney, St. Louis, for appellant.
Jeffrey P. Hine, Kimberly S. Price, Osburn, Hine, Kuntze, Yates & Murphy, LLC, Cape Girardeau, for respondent.
Haulers Insurance Company ("Haulers") filed a declaratory judgment suit against Rhonda Meyer ("Appellant") and others to determine the applicable liability limits under an "Amended Garage Coverage Form" insurance policy ("the policy") issued by it. On this appeal, Appellant contests the entry of a summary judgment in favor of Haulers. We affirm.
This case involves the issue of the amount of insurance coverage for injuries sustained in an automobile accident involving Appellant, Christopher Meyer ("Mr. Meyer"), and Rodger Wyatt, Jr. ("Wyatt"). Wyatt was driving a vehicle owned by Wyatt's Auto Sales when it collided with a motorcycle operated by Mr. Meyer and on which Appellant was a passenger, causing injuries to both of them. Appellant filed a personal injury suit against Wyatt, individually, and Jerry Wyatt and Rodger P. Wyatt, Sr., d/b/a Wyatt's Auto Sales ("Wyatt's Auto Sales").1 Haulers had issued the policy to Wyatt's Auto Sales which included automobile liability insurance coverage on the vehicle driven by Wyatt.
The policy contains the following on the Amended Garage Coverage Form Declarations page:
ITEM TWO
This policy provides only those coverages where a charge is shown in the premium column below. Each of these coverages will apply only to those "autos" shown as covered "autos". "Autos" are shown as covered "autos" for a particular coverage by the entry of one or more of the symbols from the COVERED AUTO Section of the Garage Coverage Form next to the name of the coverage. Entry of a symbol next to the LIABILITY provides coverage for "garage operations."
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COVERAGES COVERED AUTOS LIMIT PREMIUM
(Entry of one or more of the THE MOST WE WILL PAY FOR
symbols from the COVERED ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR LOSS
AUTOS Section of the Garage
Coverage Form shows which
autos are covered autos.)
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LIABILITY 22 27 $500,000 PER ACCIDENT 1,166.00
$1,500,000 Other than auto only AGGREGATE
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Under the Covered Autos section of the policy, the number "22" is the symbol for "Owned `Autos' Only" and the number "27" is the symbol for "Specifically Described `Autos.'" The fact that the vehicle driven by Wyatt at the time of the collision in question was a "covered — auto" is not disputed.
The policy described liability for "`Garage Operations' — Covered `Autos'" as:
We will pay all sums an "insured" legally must pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies, caused by an "accident" and resulting from "garage operations" involving the ownership, maintenance or use of covered "autos"
. . . .
. . . Our duty to defend or settle ends when the Liability Coverage Limit of Insurance — "Garage Operations" — Covered "Autos" has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.
The policy also contains provisions concerning the limits of the insurance coverages. A section under "Limit of Insurance" is titled "`Garage Operations' — Covered `Autos'" and provides:
For "accidents" resulting from "garage operations" involving the ownership, maintenance or use of covered "autos", the following applies:
Regardless of the number of covered "autos", "insureds", premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the "accident", the most we will pay for the total of all damages and "covered pollution cost or expense" combined, resulting from any one "accident" involving a covered "auto" is the Each "Accident" Limit of Insurance — "Garage Operations" — Covered "Autos" for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.
Damages and "covered pollution cost or expense" payable under the Each "Accident" Limit of Insurance — "Garage Operations" — Covered "Autos" are not payable under the Each "Accident" Limit of Insurance — "Garage Operations" — Other Than Covered "Autos".
The policy contains the following definitions:
A. "Accident" includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in "bodily injury" or "property damage".
. . . .
C. "Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person including death resulting from any of these.
Haulers filed a declaratory judgment suit against Wyatt and Wyatt's Auto Sales as well as Appellant and Mr. Meyer, seeking a determination that its policy provided a single limit of $500,000 for the accident in question to satisfy both Appellant's and Mr. Meyer's claims. In her answer to the suit, Appellant contended that there was $1,500,000 in coverage under the policy. Both Haulers and Appellant filed motions for summary judgment. Appellant's motion, however, was premised on there being $500,000 coverage for her claims and another $500,000 for the claims of Mr. Meyer. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Haulers and declared that there was a total of $500,000 coverage under the policy for the claims of both Appellant and Mr. Meyer.
In entering judgment, the trial court held that the policy language in question was unambiguous and that:
The language of the declarations page can only mean [Haulers] is liable for a maximum total of $500,000 for an accident involving an auto owned by the insured. The language of the insurance policy does not support [Appellant's] argument that the injury to [her] was one accident and the injury to [Mr. Meyer] was a separate "accident." The policy states:
All "bodily injury," "property damage," and "covered pollution cost or expense" resulting from continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same conditions will be considered as resulting from one "accident."
This appeal followed.
Our review of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material facts, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. First Nat. Bank of Annapolis, N.A. v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 891 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Mo.App. S.D.1995). "The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law." ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 376. "[A]n appellate court need not defer to the trial court's order granting summary judgment." Id. "When considering appeals from summary judgments, the [appellate court] will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered." Id.
Appellant presents one point on appeal. She claims that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Haulers, and in denying her motion for summary judgment, because the policy provides coverage in the amount of $500,000 per person injured in an accident. In support, she contends that the policy language defines an accident as bodily injury to "a person." In the alternative, she contends that to the extent there is any ambiguity in the definition of "accident," the policy is to be construed in favor of the insured. Essentially, Appellant argues that the definition of "accident" can be interpreted to mean that both she and Mr. Meyer suffered different accidents because each "suffered exposure to different conditions as widely varying physical forces were applied to each of their persons as they were flung in different directions from the motorcycle." She concludes that "there were two accidents, the accident of [Appellant] and the accident of [Mr. Meyer]." In further support of this contention, Appellant points to the fact that the definition of "bodily injury" states that it is bodily injury sustained by "a" person. Consequently, she argues that the "clear interpretation is that each person's `bodily injury' is a separate item."
Haulers contends that the policy language is unambiguous and provides only $500,000 coverage regardless of the claims made and damages resulting from any one accident. It argues that the insured event in this case was the one collision that occurred, not the separate injuries sustained by Appellant and Mr. Meyer. In support, Haulers cites Kansas Fire and Cas. Co. v. Koelling, 729 S.W.2d 251 (Mo.App. E.D.1987), in which the issue was whether, for the purpose of determining the amount of coverage under a liability policy, two separate accidents occurred when the insured driver collided with an oncoming vehicle as well as one he was trying to pass at the time. Id. at 252. The insurer contended that its obligation was satisfied by paying its maximum liability for one accident. Id. In determining the case, the appellate court considered the "cause" approach and the "effect" approach. Id. It explained that under the "cause" approach, an insured's single act is considered the accident from which all claims flow, while under the "effect" approach, each claim arising out of an insured's act is considered a separate accident. Id. It held that the "cause" approach rather than the "effect" approach applied and that only...
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