Haven v. Home Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1910
• Citation: 149 Mo. App. 291,130 S.W. 73
• Parties: HAVEN v. HOME INS. CO. et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

130 S.W. 73

149 Mo. App. 291

HAVEN v. HOME INS. CO. et al.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

July 7, 1910.

1. INSURANCE (§ 147)—LIFE POLICY—CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY—WHAT LAW GOVERNS.

Where a life insurance policy was negotiated in Missouri by a New York insurance company, the policy was governed by the Missouri law relating to the insured's right to change the beneficiary, though it provided that it should be construed according to the laws of New York.

2. INSURANCE (§ 587)—LIFE POLICY—CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY — STATUTES — "DIVORCEMENT."

Rev. St. 1899, § 7895 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 3749), provides that insurance policies for the benefit of insured's wife shall inure to her separate benefit, etc., provided that in the event of the death or divorcement of the wife before the husband's death he shall have a right to designate another beneficiary by written notice to the insurer. Held, that "divorcement" as so used meant a dissolution of the marriage tie; a legal dissolution of the marriage contract by a court or other body having competent authority, without reference to whether the fault authorizing the divorce was that of the husband or of the wife. And hence though the wife had a vested interest in a policy on her husband's life from the date of its issue, on her procuring a divorce for his fault she could not prevent his changing the beneficiary by notice to the company, though the policy also provided that, in case of the wife's death before the husband, the policy should be payable to the husband's executors, administrators, or assigns.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jasper County; David E. Blair, Judge.

Suit by Frank Haven against the Home Insurance Company and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Thomas & Hackney, for appellant. Howard Gray and Hockensmith & Braerton, for respondent Pearl L. Haven.

COX, J.

On August 24, 1903, the defendant insurance company issued to the plaintiff a policy of insurance No. 119,387, whereby it agreed to pay $5,000 to Pearl L. Haven, the wife of plaintiff, if she survive her husband, the insured; otherwise, the insured, his executors, administrators, or assigns, was the payee. This was a 20-year tontine policy; the annual premium being $194.75. The plaintiff lived at Carthage, Jasper county, at the time, and the policy was delivered to him there. On March 4, 1908, Pearl L. Haven was granted a divorce from the plaintiff by the circuit court of Jasper county for the fault of plaintiff. There was at the time living children born of this marriage, to wit, Ina, Edna, Mary, Helen, and Frank Haven. On December 21, 1908, plaintiff applied to defendant Home Insurance Company to have the name of the beneficiary in the policy changed from Pearl L. Haven to his five children aforesaid. The insurance company refused to make the change without the consent of Pearl L. Haven. Thereupon plaintiff brought this suit in equity asking to force the change to be made alleging the facts as above set out. Defendant Pearl L. Haven answered admitting the granting of the divorce, and alleging that it was for the fault of her husband, and asserting that she had an interest in the policy and was unwilling to consent to the change. The insurance company answered alleging that the beneficiary named in the policy had refused to consent to the change, and that the policy provided that it should be construed under the laws of the state of New York, and that state did not permit the change in the name of the beneficiary to be made without the consent of said beneficiary. Plaintiff replied with a general denial. Upon the trial the policy was offered in evidence by the plaintiff; also, the application of plaintiff to have the name of the beneficiary changed and designating his children as the ones he desired to be substituted for Pearl L. Haven, the one named in the policy. Plaintiff also testified that he had paid all the premiums from the time the policy was first issued. No evidence was offered on the part of defendant. The court upon these facts dismissed plaintiff's bill, and plaintiff has appealed.

No evidence was offered as to what the provisions of the law of New York are in relation to this question, and, if it had been shown that they were different from our statute, yet under the evidence in this case, this was Missouri business by a foreign insurance company, and hence this policy would have to be construed according to the Missouri law. Moore v. Insurance Co., 112 Mo. App. 696, 702, 87 S. W. 988; Cravens v. Insurance Company, 148 Mo. 583, 601, 50 S. W. 519, 53 L. R. A. 305, 71 Am. St. Rep. 628.

The contention in this case rests upon the construction to be given section 7895, Rev. St. 1899 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 3749), which is as follows: "Policy for benefit of married women.—Any policy of insurance heretofore or hereafter made by any insurance company on the life of any person, expressed to be for the benefit of the wife of the insured, shall inure to her separate benefit, independently of the creditors, executors, and administrators of the husband; provided, however, that in the event of the death or divorcement of the wife before the decease of the husband, he shall have the right to designate another beneficiary, upon written notice to the company, but such notice shall not be affected, unless indorsed upon the policy by the president or vice president and secretary of the company issuing the policy. But when the premiums paid in any year out of the funds or property of the husband shall exceed the sum of five hundred dollars, such exemptions from such claims shall not apply to so much of said premiums so paid as shall be in excess of five hundred dollars, but such excess shall inure to the benefit of his creditors."

Appellant contends that under this statute and the terms of this policy he has the right to designate another beneficiary upon the granting of the divorce to his wife. While respondent contends that this statute does not apply in this case for two reasons: First, that the divorce in this case was granted for the fault of the husband, and to permit plaintiff after the divorce has been granted to designate another beneficiary and destroy the wife's interest in the policy would be to permit him to take advantage of his own wrong; second, because this policy provides that upon the death of the beneficiary prior to the death of the plaintiff the policy would then be payable to the insured's executors, administrators, or assigns, and hence there is another party interested as beneficiary in the policy other than the wife, and for that reason this section of the statute does not apply.

The construction of this statute was before the Supreme Court of this state in the case of Blum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 197 Mo. 513, 95 S. W. 317, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 923, and the same point was made in that case that is made in this; but the court held in that case that it was unnecessary for them to pass upon that question and expressly refused to do so, and hence we are left without any precedent in that court upon which to determine the question involved in this case. It was there held that a policy issued prior to the enactment of section 7895 was not affected by that section. The policy in question in ...