Hawaii Public Employment Relations Bd. v. United Public Workers, Local 646, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO

• Citation: 667 P.2d 783,66 Haw. 461
• Decision Date: 24 June 1983
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,7916,Nos. 7681,s. 7681
• Parties: HAWAII PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS, LOCAL 646, AFSCME,, et al., Defendants-Appellants. (Two cases)
• Court: Supreme Court of Hawai'i

Page 783

667 P.2d 783

66 Haw. 461

HAWAII PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS, LOCAL 646, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, et al Defendants-Appellants. (Two cases)

Nos. 7681, 7916.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

June 24, 1983.

Syllabus by the Court

1. While a defendant may be punished for criminal contempt for disobedience of an order later set aside on appeal, the plaintiff in the action may not profit by way of a fine imposed in a simultaneous proceeding for civil contempt based upon a violation of the same order. The right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued.

2. Generally, the granting or denying of injunctive relief rests with the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court's discretion will be sustained absent a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.

3. Abuse of discretion may be found in trial court's granting of injunctive relief where the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief or where the trial court based its decision on an unsound proposition of law.

4. In construing statutory language, the fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature which is obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.

5. Statutory construction permits the implication of words apparently intended for the purpose of upholding and giving force to the legislative will, but does not authorize the interpolation of conditions into a statute not found in the statute construed as a whole.

6. Statutory language must be read in the context of the entire statute and construed in a manner consistent with the purpose of the statute.

7. Findings of fact, to be sufficient to support an order, must include the basic facts, from which the ultimate facts in terms of the statutory criterion are inferred.

8. The right to a jury trial in a criminal contempt proceeding under the sixth amendment depends upon the magnitude of the penalty imposed.

9. There is no right to a jury trial in a civil contempt proceeding under the sixth amendment.

10. Inasmuch as Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 89-12(e) grants specific jurisdictional powers to the circuit courts, the phrase "in compliance with chapter 380" in conjunction with the phrased "as may be appropriate to enforce this section," must be read so that said grant of specific jurisdictional powers is not abrogated.

11. There is no right to a jury trial in civil contempt proceedings brought pursuant to Chapter 89 12. Sentences or fines for criminal contempt are punitive in nature. Civil as distinguished from criminal contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with an order of the court or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by reasons of noncompliance and may be imposed for prohibited acts irrespective of intent.

13. It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish civil from criminal contempt. The test may be stated as: what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing sentence?

14. The significant and essential characteristic of a sanction imposed for civil contempt is that the penalty can be avoided by compliance with the court's order.

15. Although fines were imposed for past violations of, as well as for future noncompliance with a preliminary injunction, where such fines could be totally avoided by compliance with the injunction, the contempt proceeding was civil in nature.

16. Civil contempt proceeding abates where parties settle the main action, a trial on the merits results in a ruling adverse to the complainant, or a change in circumstances renders the controversy between the parties moot.

James A. King, Honolulu (King & Nakamura, a Law Corporation, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendants-appellants.

Valri Lei Kunimoto, Honolulu (Linda K. Goto, Honolulu, on brief, Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C.J., LUM, PADGETT and HAYASHI, JJ., and SPENCER, Circuit Judge, in place of NAKAMURA, J., disqualified. ^*

HAYASHI, Justice.

These appeals are taken from the Fifth Circuit Court's grant of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction and from its judgment fining defendant-appellant, the United Public Workers Union (UPW), $30,000 for contempt. The dispute which spawned the present litigation began on October 22, 1979, when all the Unit 1 public employees, represented by the UPW, went on strike, despite a prior decision by plaintiff-appellee, Hawaii Public Employees Relations Board (HPERB), requiring that certain positions designated as essential remain filled. This strike has since been settled and many of the statutory provisions which required interpretation have been amended by the legislature. However, during the course of the controversy, the UPW was adjudged in contempt and fined for violating a preliminary injunction issued at the behest of HPERB to compel compliance with HPERB's decision. It is the validity of the fine imposed which is at the heart of the present appeals. We must, therefore, determine (1) whether the preliminary injunction, upon which the civil contempt is predicated, was properly granted; (2) whether the UPW was erroneously denied the right to a jury trial in the contempt proceedings; (3) whether fines were erroneously imposed retroactive from the filing of the contempt order; and (4) whether the termination of the strike prior to the calculation of the amount of the fine due necessitated a dismissal of the civil contempt proceedings. For reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

Hawaii's public employees are given the right to strike pursuant to HRS Chapter 89; the right can, however, be limited in situations where HPERB determines that a strike would pose an imminent or present danger to the health and safety of the public.

On September 19, 1979, the public employers of the State and four counties, cognizant of an impending UPW Unit 1 strike, petitioned HPERB to conduct an investigation pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 89-12(c) (1976) to determine if a strike by state and county Unit 1 employees would endanger the public, and if so, to set requirements to protect the public from such danger.

During the investigatory hearings held from September 25 through October 16, 1979, the City and County of Honolulu filed a motion to adopt a plan setting requirements to be complied with to avoid any threat to the health and safety of the public. ¹ A portion of the city's plan was the basis for what later became known as the special orders of Decision 119 issued by HPERB. The UPW objected to the City's motion stating, inter alia, that it was premature since the investigatory proceedings weren't completed.

Decision 119 required that certain essential positions remain filled to protect the public; the special orders put the onus on the UPW to implement the manning of the essential positions. ² Despite Decision 119, the essential positions were left unfilled when the Unit 1 employees struck on October 22, 1979. Consequently, HPERB filed a complaint against the UPW and individual defendants requesting a permanent injunction and moving for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order; on November 9, 1979, the court issued the preliminary injunction in question.

Subsequently, HPERB filed a motion for order to show cause and for a contempt judgment based on violations of the preliminary injunction. The UPW requested a jury trial; the request was denied. On November 19, 1979, the court found the UPW in contempt for not complying with provisions of the orders contained in the preliminary injunction and ordered that a fine be imposed of $5,000 a day from the date of the injunction--November 9, 1979--for each working day that the preliminary injunction was not complied with. The UPW was given a grace period up until 2 p.m., Wednesday, November 21, 1979, within which to purge itself of contempt by effectuating the staffing of the essential-employee positions. The order adjudging the UPW in civil contempt was signed by the court on November 17, 1979, and filed on November 19, 1979. At the hearing on November 21, the court noted that substantial steps had been taken toward compliance but continued the original sanctions until full compliance was achieved.

Thereafter, on December 1, 1979, the UPW members ratified a contract proposal and resumed work on December 3, 1979.

On December 11, 1979, HPERB filed a motion for an order to confirm the amount of judgment and for an order directing payment of fines to the chief clerk. The UPW filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and/or dissolve the injunction on the grounds of mootness. Both motions were heard on January 4, 1980; the court denied the motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on March 4, 1980, the court filed its order confirming the amount of judgment.

The court entered a judgment fining the UPW $30,000 for non-compliance for November 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, and 21, on March 20, 1980. ³

II.

We note at the outset that while "a defendant may be punished for criminal contempt for disobedience of an order later set aside on appeal, that the plaintiff in the action [may not] profit by way of a fine imposed in a simultaneous proceeding for civil contempt based upon a violation of the same order. The right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued." United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 294-95, 67 S.Ct. 677, 696, 91 L.Ed. 884, 913 (1947); United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175 (3rd Cir.1976). ⁴ As discussed below, we deem the contempt to be civil in nature, thus, we must determine whether the injunction upon which it is predicated was properly issued.

Generally, the granting or denying of injunctive relief rests with the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court's decision will be sustained absent a...