Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, CV 98-5605 DDP (CWx).
| Decision Date | 25 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 98-5605 DDP (CWx).,CV 98-5605 DDP (CWx). |
| Citation | 33 F.Supp.2d 1244 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Ronnie HAWKINS, individually, and as the representative of the class of persons defined in averment 16, Plaintiff, v. Joan COMPARET-CASSANI; the Los Angeles Municipal Court; the Los Angeles Superior Court; Sherman Block; County of Los Angeles, Defendants. |
Stephen Yagman, Marion R. Yagman, Joseph Reichmann, Yagman & Yagman, P.C., Venice Beach, CA, Richard H. Millard, Los Angeles, CA, and Kathryn Bloomfield, Studio City, CA, for Plaintiff.
Kevin C. Brazile, Principal Deputy County Counsel, Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION; AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The defendants' motion to dismiss and the plaintiff's motions for class certification and for preliminary injunction came before the Court for oral argument on November 16, 1998. After reviewing and considering the materials submitted by the parties and hearing oral argument, the Court grants in part and denies in part the defendants' motion to dismiss and grants plaintiff's motions for class certification and for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The plaintiff, Ronnie Hawkins ("Hawkins"), was tried and convicted of one count of felony burglary and one count of felony theft in April 1998 before Los Angeles County Municipal Court Judge Comparet-Cassani, a named defendant in this case. On June 30, 1998, Hawkins appeared before Judge Comparet-Cassani to have a motion heard and for sentencing. Due to alleged threats of violence to the Court, the Los Angeles County Sheriff received a court order to place a "stun belt" on Hawkins. At this hearing, Judge Comparet-Cassani claims that Hawkins made several statements out of order and acted in a generally disruptive manner. As a result, Judge Comparet-Cassani ordered a courtroom deputy to activate the stun belt.
The stun belt is manufactured by Stun Tech, Inc., an Ohio corporation. Stun Tech claims to have sold about 1,400 belts nationwide to various law enforcement agencies and courts. Stun Tech claims that the belts have been worn on over 50,000 occasions, out of which they have been activated on 27 occasions. Stun Tech claims that it has sold these devices to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.
Hawkins alleges that the stun belt operates by delivering a current of 50,000 volts of electricity. This shock "stuns" the victim into submission.
Judge Comparet-Cassani has recused herself from further proceedings in Hawkins's criminal matter. Furthermore, when Hawkins appeared again in municipal court on July 29, 1998, he was not required to and did not wear a stun belt.
The complaint requests the following relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that using the stun belt is unconstitutional; (2) an injunction prohibiting the defendants from using the stun belt; (3) compensatory damages against all defendants, punitive damages against all defendants except Los Angeles County, and punitive damages of $50,000,000 against Judge Comparet-Cassani; and (4) costs of the suit and attorney's fees.
First, the defendants move under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims against all defendants. Defendants argue that several defendants are immune from suit and that Hawkins failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Additionally, the defendants move to dismiss counts I, II, IV and X of the plaintiff's amended complaint for failure to state a claim.
Second, Hawkins moves that this Court issue a preliminary injunction to prevent any Los Angeles County Municipal or Superior Court Judge or the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department from using the stun belt against Hawkins or other members of the class, if certified.
Third, Hawkins moves to certify a class consisting of (1) all individuals who are in the custody of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, (2) persons who will be brought before a Los Angeles County Superior or Municipal Court, and (3) any person subjected to wearing a stun belt.
Article III dictates that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Before a federal court can hear a case it must determine that there is an actual case or controversy and that the claim falls within the subject matter of the court. Here, Hawkins bases his claims on a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This claim is sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
1. Eleventh Amendment issues
The Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from bringing civil suits "which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, an `arm of the state,' its instrumentalities, or its agencies." Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995). "In determining whether an entity is an arm of the state, [a federal court] look[s] to `the way state law treats the entity.'" Id., quoting Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988).
In evaluating the municipal and superior courts in California, the Ninth Circuit has held that these bodies are arms of the state and are "protected from ... lawsuit by Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id.; Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir.1987).
Therefore, the claims for damages and injunctive relief against both the Los Angeles Municipal Court and the Los Angeles Superior Court are DISMISSED based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.
In the motion for class certification and the motion for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that he has the appropriate Article III standing to bring such motions. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52-53, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ().
Generally, when seeking retrospective relief Article III standing requires three elements. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). First, "the plaintiff must have suffered an `injury in fact.'" Id. "Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of." Id. "Third, it must be `likely,' as opposed to merely `speculative,' that the injury will be `redressed by a favorable decision.'" Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
Additionally, if a party seeks injunctive relief under § 1983 then there is a separate standing requirement. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06, 103 S.Ct. 1660. Under Lyons, the party seeking an injunction must show that there is a "real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again — `a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.'" Id. at 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Furthermore, this "threat of injury must be both `real and immediate,' not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.'" Id. at 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660.
The Ninth Circuit, however, has created an exception to the Lyons standard. See Nava v. City of Dublin, 121 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir.1997) (). This exception states that the law of the Ninth Circuit "is that once a plaintiff establishes standing to seek damages, a court need not undertake a separate standing inquiry for equitable relief so long as the damages and equitable claims are predicated on the same operative facts and legal theories." Id. Although the Nava court is reluctant to follow this line of authority and questions its validity in light of the statements the Supreme Court made in Lyons, it acknowledges that it is the law in this circuit, and it is "obligated to follow this rule." Id.
Here, Hawkins states a claim for damages and injunctive relief arising out of the same operative facts and legal theories. Therefore, under Nava Hawkins has a right to seek injunctive relief if the plaintiff has standing to seek damages.
Clearly Hawkins meets the Lujan test for standing. Hawkins claims an actual injury, namely that the defendants violated Hawkins's Eighth Amendment rights by using the stun belt.1 Furthermore, Hawkins claims that the defendants caused the violation when they used the stun belt on him. Finally, Hawkins requests compensatory and punitive damages resulting from use of the stun belt. Under Lujan these allegations are sufficient to establish standing to bring a claim for damages. Consequently, under Nava, Hawkins has met his burden in establishing standing to bring his claim for injunctive relief.
Hawkins is suing Judge Comparet-Cassani as an individual and in her official capacity. The suit against Judge Comparet-Cassani in her official capacity is considered a suit against the entity — the Los Angeles County Municipal Court. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). As explained above, this entity has Eleventh Amendment immunity. (See supra Part I-A-1.) In an official capacity action, such as this one, the Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to damages, but not injunctive relief. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099.
Therefore, the claims for damages against Judge Comparet-Cassani in her official capacity are DISMISSED.
Judges have absolute immunity from suits seeking damages arising from the performance of their...
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