Hawkins v. Laughlin
| Decision Date | 08 January 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 21515,21515 |
| Citation | 236 S.W.2d 375 |
| Parties | HAWKINS v. LAUGHLIN et al. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Philip J. Fowler, Kirksville, Allen Rolston, Lancaster, for appellant.
Jayne & Jayne, Kirksville, for respondents.
This is an action to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff resulting from burns inflicted upon her while she was a patient at defendants' hospital.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence defendants filed a motion for a directed verdict because of the insufficiency of the evidence to make a submissible case. Code Sec. 112, R.S.1949, Sec. 510.280. This motion was overruled and defendants declined to offer any evidence and the cause was submitted to a jury, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $1500. Thereater, defendants filed a motion in the alternative, asking, first, that the court, notwithstanding the verdict, set aside the verdict and enter a judgment for defendants; and, second, that defendants be granted a new trial. Code Sec. 113, R.S.1949, Sec. 510.290. The court sustained the motion to set aside the verdict, and thereupon sustained defendants' motion for judgment filed at the close of plaintiff's evidence and entered judgment against the plaintiff, from which she has appealed. See Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., Mo.Sup., 214 S.W.2d 5.
Plaintiff's petition alleged that she was a patient at defendants' hospital, and while she was so confined in said hospital '* * * said defendants and their servants, doctors and nurses while acting within their scope of authority, negligently and carelessly placed the right foot and ankle and leg of plaintiff on a bottle or container filled with very hot water or other hot substances unknown to this plaintiff, and so placed such container so filled upon and against such leg, ankle, and foot, and kept the leg, foot, and anke of this plaintiff in contact with such container so filled with such hot substances for many hours, and at the same time negligently and carelessly placed covers upon this plaintiff, so placed as to retain such excessive heat in contact with the leg, foot, and ankle of plaintiff as aforesaid and kept the same there for many hours all while plaintiff was so unconscious, and all so as to cause such container so filled with such hot substance to burn, sear, cook and impair and destroy the skin, flesh muscles, blood vessels, tendons and all other parts of such leg, foot and ankle. * * *'
The sole question presented here is whether plaintiff's evidence made a submissible case of negligence for which the defendants are liable. The principal contentions of the defendants are that plaintiff's evidence failed to prove that the person who placed the hot water bottle at plaintiff's feet was an agent or an employee of the defendants; and that there is no evidence that plaintiff's injury was caused by any negligence. This will necessitate a detailed statement of the testimony concerning such issues.
It is conceded that the defendants are a co-partnership doing business under the firm name of The Laughlin Hospital and Clinic; that they own and operate a general hospital in Kirksville where they receive and treat patients; that the plaintiff was a patient of Dr. Earl Laughlin, one of the partners, and was received into the hospital on November 10, 1948; that he performed a gall bladder operation for her on November 11. The operation was successful and no complaint is made because of that service.
This action was tried and submitted on the theory that sometime during the night of November 11 a nurse put a hot water bottle at the feet of plaintiff and left it for several hours, resulting in a burn to her right foot and ankle. The evidence is overwhelming that plaintiff received a severe burn to her foot and ankle. The question is, does the evidence fix liability therefor on the defendants? In deciding this question, we must follow the well-settled rule in this state that plaintiff's evidence, and all reasonable favorable inferences that may be legally drawn therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to her.
Both the plaintiff and her husband testified that they did not employ a special nurse or any particular nurse to attend the plaintiff while she was in the hospital, and that they did not authorize anyone else to do so.
Mrs. Hawkins testified that she did not regain complete consciousness from the operation until early the next morning, at which time her foot 'was burning.'
Mr. Hawkins testified that he brought his wife to defendants' hospital on the morning of November 10; that she was operated on by defendant, Dr. Earl Laughlin, on the morning of the 11th, and that he remained with her all that day until sometime in the evening 'after supper'; that he returned to the hospital the next morning shortly before 7 o'clock and found that his wife was not rational, 'she could not talk at all'; the first thing she said was 'my foot,' or 'my feet,' and he asked the nurse to 'look at her feet'; that the nurse did look, and
He stated that the nurse applied Unguentine to his wife's foot and bandaged it. His wife was placed in a ward of the hospital immediately after the operation where there were three or four other patients and there were nurses coming in and out of the ward during the time he was there. When it appeared that his wife was not doing as well as he thought she should, 'I told them I wanted to be there until somebody come there to take care of her and somebody there said there would be somebody there to take care of her. Said if she was that sick they had good nurses and they would take care of her, * * *.
* * *
He also testified that he paid the expenses incident to the hospitalization of his wife and that he paid the various nurses for their services by checks separate from those given to the hospital for the operation. On cross-examination he was asked:
'Q. You didn't have any information about the employment of special nurses by your wife or for your wife until after she had been there several days? A. Nobody ever said a word to me about any special nurses, no, sir.
'Q. The means by which they were employed or at whose direction or instance, you havt got no information about that? A. That's right. I did not.
'Q. You just did know that she did have special nurses? A. I didn't even know there was special nurses for several days. * * *
'Q. Now, on the morning of the 12th of November when you came to the hospital who did you see in the ward where your wife was? A. Well, I think it was the Supervisor and Rosemary Lott and they said it was Mrs. Roe. * * *
'Q. And at seven o'clock did they change nurses? A. Yes, one was going off and one coming on.
'Q. And at seven o'clock Rosemary Lott came on duty? A. Yes, sir. * * *
'Q. Now, when did you first find out that there were special nurses working there? A. Oh, it was seven or eight days I think.
'Q. How did you learn that? A. Through Doctor Earl Laughlin. * * * I asked him how long it would be that he was going to keep the nurses on--it was getting about time that she should have went home--and he said--well, he says, I said,
'
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Defendant, Dr. Earl Laughlin, testified as follows:
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