Hawkins v. Rellim Inv. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 October 1926
• Citation: 92 Fla. 784,110 So. 350
• Parties: HAWKINS v. RELLIM INV. CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

110 So. 350

92 Fla. 784

HAWKINS v. RELLIM INV. CO.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

October 21, 1926

Suit by the Rellim Investment Company against Mary W. Hawkins. From an order overruling a demurrer, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Jurisdiction of proceedings to quiet title and prevent litigation is inherent in courts of equity; Legislature may remove restriction placed by courts of equity on their power to quiet title and prevent litigation. Jurisdiction of proceedings to quiet title and prevent litigation is inherent in courts of equity, and, although the courts have imposed limitations upon its exercise, it is always competent for the legislative power to remove those restrictions.

State and federal Constitution guarantee jury trial in proceedings at common law, as practiced at time of adoption of Constitution, and do not refer to equitable demands enforced in courts of chancery (Const. Fla. Declaration of Rights, § 3; Const. U.S. Amend. 7). In construing section 3 of the Declaration of Rights, Const. Fla., and the Seventh Amendment to the federal Constitution, the courts hold that these provisions are designed to preserve and guarantee the right of trial by jury in proceedings according to the course of the common law, as known and practiced at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and in neither case do they extend to or have any reference to equitable demands enforced in the courts of chancery.

Statute relating to quieting title held not to violate state or federal Constitution securing jury trial (Acts Fla. Ex. Sess 1925, c. 11383; Const. Fla. Declaration of Rights, § 3; Const. U.S. Amend. 7). Chapter 11383, Acts of 1925 (Extraordinary Session) held not in violation of either the Seventh Amendment to federal Constitution or section 3 of the Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; A. J. Rose Judge.

COUNSEL

Huber Clements & Blackwell, of Miami, for appellant.

Twyman & McCarthy, of Miami, for appellee.

OPINION

TERRELL J.

On August 1, 1925, Rellim investment Company, appellee, filed its bill of complaint against Mary W. Hawkins and John Anderson, both of Miami, Fla., to declare and enforce a trust in certain property therein more specifically described. October 5, 1925, appellant, Mary W. Hawkins, filed her answer in which was incorporated a demurrer to the said bill, and, on January 4, 1926, John Anderson filed his demurrer thereto. November 2, 1925, Rellim Investment Company filed its general replication to the answer of Mary W. Hawkins, and, on March 9, 1926, no further action having been taken, appellant set the cause down for final hearing on bill and answer, as provided for by Chancery rules 85 and 86 of the circuit courts of this state.

March 22, 1926, Rellim Investment Company submitted its motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental bill of complaint, which motion was heard and granted over the protest of the appellant and without hearing the cause on original bill and answer, according to setting. April 14, 1926, appellant filed her demurrer to the amended and supplemental bill, which demurrer was, in due course, overruled, and appeal was taken from the order overruling said demurrer.

It is contended here that the decree permitting the amended and supplemental bill to be filed, after the time for taking testimony had expired, was erroneous, that neither the original nor the amended and supplemental bill state a cause of action, that it affirmatively appears that Rellim Investment Company has a complete and adequate remedy at law, that a court of equity is without jurisdiction, and that chapter 11383, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1925 (Extraordinary Session) by which the amended and supplemental bill is sought to be maintained, is unconstitutional and has no retroactive effect.

The record as to all these assignments has been examined carefully and on the basis of the facts exemplified, each is adjudged to be without merit. We will attempt here to discuss only the assignment challenging the constitutional validity of chapter 11383, Acts of 1925. Appellant contends that chapter 11383 is violative of section 3 of the Declaration of Rights because if fails adequatiely to provide for a trial by jury, and that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on a court of equity when a complete and adequate remedy exists in ejectment at common law, Section 1, being the part of the act assaulted in this suit, is as follows:

'Section 1. Courts of chancery in this state shall entertain suits by any person or corporation claiming title to any tract or parcel of land, or portion thereof, or where any two or more are claiming to own the same land or any portion thereof, under a common title, against all persons or corporations claiming title to said land adversely to complainant whether defendants claim or hold under a common title or not; and in said suits shall determine the title of the complainant and may make decrees quieting and confirming the title, and awarding possession to party or parties entitled thereto: Provided, however, that if the defendant or any of them in such case is in the actual possession of any part of the land involved in such suit, a trial by a jury may be demanded by either party, whereupon the court shall order said cause to be docketed on the law side of said court, and at the next regular term thereof shall cause an issue in ejectment to be made up and tried by a jury as to any lands claimed to be in the actual possession of the defendant, or either of them. But this provision for a trial by a jury shall not affect the proceedings as to any lands involved in such suit as are not claimed to be in the actual possession of the defendant the court in equity may proceed to a final decree without awaiting the determination of the issue in ejectment hereinabove mentioned.'

In McDaniel v. McElvy (Fla.) 108 So. 820, this court said that the method of quieting title, under chapter 11383, was supplemental and additional to other remedies provided, under the laws of Florida, for the like purpose. It has also been adjudged competent for the Legislature to modify or expand the powers of the court of chancery as to its entire field of recognized jurisdiction, provided that rights guaranteed under the Constitution are not thereby impaired. Hughes v. Hannah, 39 Fla. 365, 22 So. 613.

Jurisdiction of proceedings to quiet title and prevent...