Hawkins v. The State

• Decision Date: 31 October 1890
• Docket Number: 15,007
• Citation: 25 N.E. 818,125 Ind. 570
• Parties: Hawkins et al. v. The State
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

25 N.E. 818

125 Ind. 570

Hawkins et al. v. The State

No. 15,007

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 31, 1890

From the Martin Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

A. J Padgett and A. Paget, for appellants.

C. M Mears, Prosecuting Attorney, and J. H. O'Neall, for the State.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

In the information filed against the appellants these facts are stated: In 1887, William F. McDougal purchased at a commissioner's sale a tract of land in Daviess county. The sale was made pursuant to a decree of the Martin Circuit Court. After the purchase by McDougal he brought an action for the possession of the land purchased by him, and by change of venue, granted on the application of the defendants, the cause was removed to the court last named. The cause was tried at the February term, 1888, and a judgment was rendered in favor of McDougal. In March of the succeeding year, a writ was issued to the sheriff of Daviess county commanding him to put McDougal in possession of the land. Within a few days after the writ came into the hands of the sheriff he notified the defendants that the writ had been delivered to him, and that they had better seek a place to reside. On the 26th day of March, 1889, the sheriff formally demanded possession, the defendants asked for further time they repeated this request and they were finally granted until the 6th day of April, 1889. On that day Hiram L. Hawkins and Laura Hawkins, defendants in the action of ejectment and appellants in this cause, took out letters of guardianship for five persons who were under the age of twenty-one years. After obtaining the letters of guardianship the appellants conveyed the land to their wards, and thereafter assumed to hold possession of it as the guardian of those infants. On the 10th day of April the sheriff, by his deputies, undertook to execute the writ and did remove some of the household goods. While engaged in removing the goods Hiram L. Hawkins instituted a prosecution against the deputies of the sheriff for malicious trespass and procured their arrest on that charge. While the deputies were under arrest the appellants replaced the goods in the house from which they had been removed, and upon the return of the deputies, who had been released from arrest on giving bonds, the appellants, with others whom they had summoned to their assistance, resisted the officers with clubs and other weapons, and barricaded the doors so as to prevent an entrance.

The Martin Circuit Court undoubtedly had power to enforce obedience to its process and to punish for contempt those who resisted the officers charged with the execution of that process. The fact that the land was situated in Daviess county, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court whose process was resisted. The removal of the cause from the Daviess Circuit Court to the Martin Circuit Court vested the latter tribunal with plenary jurisdiction of the cause and all its incidents, and the former court had no longer any jurisdiction. It was the process of the Martin Circuit Court that was resisted, and that court was the proper tribunal to punish those who were guilty of contempt in resisting its process and the officers charged with the duty of executing that process.

The Constitution vests the judicial power of the State, although the officers by whom that power is to be exercised may be chosen under laws enacted by the Legislature. Shugart v. Miles, ante, p. 445; State ex rel., v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N.E. 244. The power of the courts necessarily comes from the Constitution, for, while it is true that the Legislature does possess powers in their nature judicial, it does not possess purely judicial powers, that is, such powers as courts of justice exercise. As the Legislature possesses no purely judicial power it can delegate none, although it may, in accordance with the Constitution, create and designate judicial tribunals in which the power shall reside. When a court is created by the Legislature, under the Constitution, all the powers essential to the existence of the tribunal and the due exercise of its powers at once vest in it from the Constitution. Among the powers which vest in a constitutional court, such as our circuit courts, is that of maintaining its existence and dignity by punishing those who assume to treat it with contempt. This power, as has often been held, is an inherent one and exists independently of statute. Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338; Holman v. State, 105 Ind. 513, 5 N.E. 556; Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L.Ed. 242; Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 19 Wall. 505, 22 L.Ed. 205; Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 32 L.Ed. 405, 9 S.Ct. 77. The Legislature can not take from a constitutional court the power to punish for contempt, since that would make the judiciary subservient to the legislative department and violate the provision which...