Hawloetz v. Kass

• Decision Date: 12 November 1885
• Citation: 25 F. 765
• Parties: HAWLOETZ v. KASS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

25 F. 765

HAWLOETZ v. KASS.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. New York.

November 12, 1885

Louis C. Raegner, for plaintiff in error.

Antonio Knauth, for defendant in error.

WALLACE J.

Upon the trial of this action in the district court a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant has brought this writ of error to review the judgment entered upon the verdict. The action was brought under the provisions of section 4901 of the Revised Statutes, to recover penalties for marking unpatented articles as patented, with intent to deceive the public. By the statute, one-half the sum recovered is given to any person who may sue for the same and one-half goes to the United States. Upon the trial the judge instructed the jury, in substance, that they were to be reasonably satisfied upon the evidence as to the material facts upon which the plaintiff's right to recover depended; that is, whether the article was stamped as patented by the defendant, or by his employes under his directions; whether the article was unpatented; and whether it was stamped as patented by the defendant with intent to deceive the public. They were also instructed that the plaintiff could not recover, although the article stamped was not patented, if the defendant honestly believed that it was patented under a certain patent owned by him. They were further instructed that the defendant's patent did not embrace the article stamped. The defendant requested the judge to instruct the jury that the plaintiff was required to prove his case with the same particularity and exactness as on the trial of an indictment. The court declined to give this instruction. The defendant excepted to the court's refusal to instruct the jury as requested, and also to the instruction that the article in controversy was not covered by the defendant's patent. He now assigns this refusal to instruct and the instructions given as error.

As to the instruction in reference to the defendant's patent it was clearly the duty of the trial judge to construe the patent, and determine its scope and effect. There was not the slightest room for doubt, upon the evidence, that the patent did not cover articles such as it was alleged had been stamped as patented by the defendant. There was no question of fact, upon this point, which could have been properly submitted to the jury.

The instruction asked for in reference to the exactness and particularity of proof required, upon the trial of such an action, called for the statement of a mere abstract proposition, and if it had been given by the judge would not have enlightened the jury, without a further explanation respecting its practical application to the case in hand. Assuming, however, as has been assumed by counsel on the argument, that the request and refusal was in effect a refusal to charge the jury that the plaintiff's evidence must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt, it should be held that the instruction was properly refused. The question whether, in a civil action brought to recover a penalty, the case must be proved against the defendant, as in criminal cases, beyond a reasonable doubt, has seldom been decided and is one upon which the authorities disagree. In the case of White v. Comstock, 6 Vt. 405, it is held that such strict proof was not required, and that it was sufficient if the jury were reasonably satisfied upon the evidence. In Hitchcock v. Munger, 15 N.H. 97, the contrary was held. In each of these cases the action was brought to recover penalties for taking usurious interest under a statute authorizing a recovery in treble the amount exacted. Both of the decisions were by courts of last resort.

The question does not seem to have been determined or considered by the federal courts except at nisi prius. In Nicole v Newell, 1 Fisher, 647, SPRAGUE, J., in charging the jury, instructed them in a case like the present that the plaintiff must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in suits for forfeiture tried in this circuit, the jury have been instructed, as they were in the present case, that it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to...