Hawthorne v. Cnty. of the Putnam

• Decision Date: 06 October 2020
• Docket Number: 19-cv-742 (NSR)
• Citation: 492 F.Supp.3d 281
• Parties: Nolan HAWTHORNE, an infant BY his natural parent and legal guardian, Keith HAWTHORNE, and Keith Hawthorne, individually, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF the PUTNAM, Putnam County Sheriff's Office, Putnam County Sheriff Robert Langley, Deputy Edward Kennedy, and Deputy Christopher Tompkins, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

492 F.Supp.3d 281

Nolan HAWTHORNE, an infant BY his natural parent and legal guardian, Keith HAWTHORNE, and Keith Hawthorne, individually, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF the PUTNAM, Putnam County Sheriff's Office, Putnam County Sheriff Robert Langley, Deputy Edward Kennedy, and Deputy Christopher Tompkins, Defendants.

19-cv-742 (NSR)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed October 6, 2020

Keith Hawthorne, Mahopac, NY, pro se.

James A. Randazzo, Portale Randazzo LLP, Drew William Sumner, Sumner Law LLP, White Plains, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Keith Hawthorne¹ ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se , commenced this action on January 24, 2019, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983" or " Section 1983"). (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff asserts claims against the County of Putnam ("Putnam County"), Putnam County Sheriff Robert Langley ("Sheriff Langley"), Deputy Edward Kennedy ("Deputy Kennedy"), and Deputy Christopher Tompkins ("Deputy Tompkins," and together with Putnam County, Sheriff Langley, and Deputy Kennedy, "Defendants"² ), alleging violations of his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and under Article I, Sections 8, 9, 11, and 12 of the New York State Constitution.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint and his opposition to the instant motion to dismiss³ and are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion. See Harris v. Mills , 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).

On or about November 1, 2018, at approximately 6:36 p.m., Deputy Kennedy stopped Plaintiff's vehicle on Secor Road in Mahopac, New York, for failing to stop at a stop sign about three-quarters of a mile from the traffic stop. (Compl. (ECF No. 2) ¶ 8; Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl. Opp.") (ECF No. 21) ¶ 5.) Plaintiff denied the allegation. (Pl. Opp. ¶ 5.) Deputy Kennedy asked for and was provided the vehicle operator's license and registration. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff does not state in the Complaint who the vehicle operator was at the time of the incident, but it is assumed based on Plaintiff's other submissions that he was in the driver's seat. (See Pl. Opp. ¶¶ 5–6 (describing Plaintiff lowering the driver's side window and stating that Plaintiff was dropping his child off at school at the time of the incident).)

According to Plaintiff, Deputy Kennedy proceeded to ask where Plaintiff was going, "whether [P]laintiff had anything illegal in the car" and whether "Plaintiff had any legal issues he should know about." (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff responded that he was going to his child's school and did not have anything illegal in the car, but then declined to answer further questions. (Id. ; Compl. ¶ 9.) Deputy Kennedy allegedly "became agitated" and told Plaintiff that "he asks everyone these questions and [Plaintiff] should just answer," but Plaintiff still declined to respond. (Pl. Opp. ¶ 7.) Deputy Kennedy then returned to his patrol vehicle for several minutes. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Meanwhile, Deputy Tompkins arrived at the scene in another patrol vehicle and pulled behind Plaintiff's vehicle along the shoulder of the road. (Id. )

Eventually, Deputy Kennedy returned to Keith's vehicle and ordered Plaintiff and his child to exit "under threat of violence," informing Plaintiff that the vehicle was going to be towed and impounded because the vehicle's inspection expired on the previous day, October 31, 2018. (Id. ¶ 11; Pl. Opp. ¶¶ 7–8.) Plaintiff objected and was told by Deputy Kennedy that "sometimes drivers get to leave and other times not" and that Plaintiff "should have just answered his questions." (Pl. Opp. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff avers that the true reason Deputy Kennedy had him exit the vehicle was because he refused to answer questions. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Deputy Kennedy then summoned a tow truck and performed an impound "inventory search" of the vehicle over Plaintiff's verbal objections while Deputy Tompkins "stood behind Plaintiff[ ] in a hostile[,] threatening manner." (Id. ¶ 13.) No seizure inventory form was used and Plaintiff was not given information about the impound or retrieval process. (Pl. Opp. ¶ 8.) Defendants found no illegal substances in the vehicle during the search. (Compl. ¶ 14.)

Deputy Kennedy issued two traffic summonses to Plaintiff for failure to stop at a stop sign and for the expired inspection, both of which were subsequently dismissed. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff states he was never arrested or otherwise place into police custody. (Id. ¶ 16.) However, Plaintiff also states that Deputies Kennedy and Tompkins held him "in custody from about 6:36 p.m. until approximately 7:10 p.m.," and that in so doing they "constructively placed Plaintiff under arrest." (Id. ¶¶ 44–45.) Plaintiff departed the scene in the tow truck and the vehicle was towed directly to Plaintiff's residence. (Id. ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff states that he maintained "complete custody and control" of the vehicle at all times and did not consent to the inventory search. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.) He avers that the inventory search constituted a pretext to investigate criminal activity without probable cause. (Id. ¶ 20.) As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff says he has suffered "extreme and severe emotional distress, pain and injury," in addition to "humiliation and embarrassment." (Id. ¶¶ 22, 28.) He is allegedly now "terrified" to leave his residence and does so infrequently. (Id. ¶ 24.)

On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint against Deputies Kennedy and Tompkins. (Pl. Opp. ¶ 10.) After failing to receive a response, Plaintiff wrote to the Putnam County Sherriff's Office (the "Sherriff's Office") on October 16, 2018, to inquire about the results of the investigation and was told it was concluded and "no further information was available." (Id. ¶ 11.) By letter dated November 20, 2018, Plaintiff sought specific information regarding the Sherriff's Office's alleged policy of using impound inventory searches as pretext to search for evidence and "punish drivers for exercising their Constitutional right against self-incrimination." (Id. ) Based on the correspondence submitted by Plaintiff, the November 20, 2018, letter was essentially an appeal of the initial denial of Plaintiff's October 16, 2018, FOIL request. (See id. at 43–49.) Sherriff Langley responded by letter dated November 27, 2018, that the prior denial was sustained, as the requested records were "personnel records" exempt from disclosure. (Id. at 48–49.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Rule 12(b)(6)

On a 12(b)(6) motion, dismissal is proper unless the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). When there are well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, "a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. When a motion to dismiss a complaint is unopposed, a court should nevertheless "assume the truth of a pleading's factual allegations and test only its legal sufficiency." McCall v. Pataki , 232 F.3d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 2000).

The critical inquiry is whether the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to nudge the claims "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A motion to dismiss will be denied where the allegations "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Where a pro se plaintiff is concerned, courts must construe the pleadings in a particularly liberal fashion. Harris v. Mills , 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). In fact, courts must interpret the pro se plaintiff's pleading "to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Harris v. City of New York , 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must contain factual allegations that sufficiently "raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Jackson v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Labor , 709 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and the court's duty to construe the complaint liberally is not "the equivalent of a duty to re-write it," Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. College , 663 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

II. Section 1983

Under Section 1983, "[e]very person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "is not itself the source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes it describes." Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) "the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution." Castilla v. City of New York. , No. 09 Civ. 5446(SHS), 2013 WL 1803896, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2013) ; see also Cornejo v. Bell , 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010).

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Claims

Plaintiff asserts that his First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights were violated when Deputies Kennedy and Tompkins...