Hawthorne v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 12 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 6:16-cv-1586-Orl-40TBS |
| Parties | JOHN HILL HAWTHORNE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed, through counsel, by John Hill Hawthorne ("Hawthorne" or "Petitioner") under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1, filed September 12, 2016). In compliance with this Court's Order (Doc. 4), Respondents filed a Response to the Petition. (Doc. 7). Hawthorne filed a Reply to the Response (Doc. 11), and it is ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, each of Hawthorne's claims will be denied.
I. Background and Procedural History
On August 5, 2009, the State of Florida charged Hawthorne by information with the second-degree murder of Joel David Boner ("Boner"), in violation of Florida Statute §§ 782.04(2) and 775.087(1). (Doc. 8-5 at 27). Thereafter, Hawthorne filed a motion for immunity pursuant to Florida Statute § 775.032, commonly known as the "Stand Your Ground Law," in which he urged that he had acted in self-defense when he stabbed Boner. (Doc. 8-5 at 106).
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the Stand Your Ground motion, and Hawthorne, Cameron Milner, and Dr. William Anderson testified. (Doc. 8-6 at 4). Both Hawthorne and Milner testified that they were riding an ATV at around 6:00 a.m. on July 9, 2009 when they decided to go see where Boner was camping. (Doc. 8-5 at 106-107). When they arrived at Boner's campsite, Hawthorne cut a hole in his tent and ordered Boner to leave the property, which belonged to Hawthorne's cousin. (Id.). Hawthorne also cut down Boner's clothes line. (Id.). Hawthorne's and Milner's testimony differed as to what happened next. Hawthorne testified that Boner "came" at him, whereas Milner said that Hawthorne followed Boner, calling him "fag" and "gay" as he (Boner) walked away. Thereafter, Hawthorne and Boner became involved in a physical altercation during which Boner was stabbed. (Id. at 108-109). Hawthorne refused to take Boner to the hospital, even though he begged him to do so. (Id.).
The trial court denied the Stand Your Ground motion, noting:
The evidence in this case establishes that the defendant was the aggressor in this case. There is no evidence to suggest that the defendant had a reasonable belief that his use of deadly force was necessary to defend himself since he was the only one who first banished [sic] a deadly weapon and according to a witness attacked the victim in this case.
(Id. at 111). Thereafter, Hawthorne proceeded to trial, and argued that he stabbed Boner in self-defense. A jury found Hawthorne guilty as charged. (Id. at 76). The trial court sentenced him to thirty-eight years in prison, and five years of probation. (Id. at 114). Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal ("Fifth DCA") per curiam affirmed Hawthorne's conviction and sentence. (Doc. 8-7 at 2).
On December 12, 2012, Hawthorne filed a counseled motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 3.850 Motion"), raising seven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 8-7 at 79). On January 2, 2014, Hawthorne filed a supplement to the Rule 3.850 motion, raising an eighth claim of ineffective assistance. (Id. at 100). He filed a second supplement, raising a ninth ineffective assistance claim on April 21, 2014. (Id. at 105). On January 8, 2015, the post-conviction court struck the supplements because they were untimely. (Id. at 151). Thereafter, Hawthorne's post-conviction counsel filed an amended supplement arguing that the post-conviction court should consider the new claims because he ("post-conviction counsel") had negligently failed to timely file them, even though Hawthorne had asked him to do so. (Id. at 155). On September 15, 2015, the post-conviction court summarily denied relief on six of Hawthorne's Rule 3.850 claims, found one claim to be untimely, and ordered an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims. (Id. at 164).
The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing on September 15, 2015. Thereafter, the post-conviction court entered a written order denying the remaining claims, and finding no cumulative error. (Doc. 8-8 at 18). Florida's Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of Hawthorne's Rule 3.850 Motion without a written opinion. (Doc. 8-9 at 251).
I. Legal Standards
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014).
"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issued its decision. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702; Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). Even if there is clearly established federal law on point, habeas relief is only appropriate if the state court decision was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of," that federal law. 29 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court]precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). The petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)).
Notably, even when the opinion of a lower state post-conviction court contains flawed reasoning, the federal court must give the last state court to adjudicate the prisoner's claim on the merits "the benefit of the doubt." Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016), cert granted Wilson v. Sellers, No. 16-6855, 137S. Ct. 1203 (2017). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits—warranting deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Therefore, to determine which theories could have supported the state appellate court's decision, the federal habeas court may look to a state post-conviction court's previous opinion as one example of a reasonable application of law or determination of fact; however, the federal court is not limited to assessing the reasoning of the lower court. Wilson, 834 F.3d at 1239.
Finally, when reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must bear in mind that any "determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct[,]" and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) ().
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This is a "doubly deferential" standard of review that gives both the state court and the petitioner's attorney the benefit of the doubt. Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 13 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011)).
In reviewing counsel's performance, a court must adhere to a strong presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Indeed, the petitioner must "prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance was unreasonable[.]" Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). A court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct," applying a "highly deferential" level of judicial scrutiny. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
Prejudice "requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a...
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