Hawthorne v. Sturgeon

• Decision Date: 08 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 9:17-CV-438 (LEK/CFH),9:17-CV-438 (LEK/CFH)
• Parties: RUDOLPH HAWTHORNE, Plaintiff, v. NURSE STURGEON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

RUDOLPH HAWTHORNE, Plaintiff, v. NURSE STURGEON, Defendant.

No. 9:17-CV-438 (LEK/CFH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 8, 2018

APPEARANCES:

Rudolph Hawthorne

03-A-3348

Bare Hill Correctional Facility

Caller Box 20

Malone, New York 12953

Plaintiff prose

Attorney General for the

State of New York

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

Attorney for Defendants

OF COUNSEL:

DENISE P. BUCKLEY, ESQ.

Assistant Attorney General

CHRISTIAN F. HUMMEL U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER¹

Plaintiff pro se Rudolph Hawthorne ("plaintiff), an inmate who was, at all relevant times, in the custody of the New York Department of Corrections and CommunitySupervision ("DOCCS") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Nurse Sturgeon - who, at all relevant times, was employed at Upstate Correctional Facility ("Upstate")² - violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. Dkt. No. 5 ("Am. Compl."). Presently pending before the Court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P."). Dkt. No. 16. Plaintiff informed the Court that he did "not wish to file a response in this matter." Dkt. No. 18. For the following reasons, it is recommended that defendant's motion be granted.

I. Background

The facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the non-moving party. See subsection II infra. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim centers on the medical treatment he received at Upstate following unsuccessful surgery on his left hand in January 2016 to treat carpal tunnel syndrome. See Am. Compl. at 2-3; Dkt. No. 16-1 ("Def. Mem. of Law") at 4. Plaintiff contends that after the surgery, he "continued to experience severe pain in [his] left hand" and attended sick call. Am. Compl. at 2. Plaintiff claims that "[t]his went on for several months before Nurse [Sturgen] finally scheduled an [appointment] to see non-party Dr. Schroyer in Dec. 2016." Id. "From the 31^st of January, [plaintiff] . . . complained of the continued pain and lack of any kind of treatment." Id. at 3. NurseSturgen "repeatedly offered" plaintiff Motrin, which he believes "exacerbates the problem." Id. Plaintiff has "a huge problem with Nurse [Sturgen] who continually refuses to schedule [him] [appointments] to see a doctor, and by doing so[,] she is denying [him] needed medical treatment." Id. On May 7, 2017, Nurse Sturgen informed plaintiff that "the only way [he] [would] receive treatment for this problem is if [he] got transferred" or went home. Id. "Because of their actions, [plaintiff] [was] denied corrective surgery, which has made [his] ability to function normally painful and unbearable." Id. Plaintiff alleges that because of the failed surgery and "Nurse [Sturgen's] unwillingness to provide basic and standard care," plaintiff lost 90% of mobility in his left hand. Id.; Def. Mem. of Law at 4. Separately, plaintiff alleges that the events that gave rise to his claim against Nurse Sturgen occurred on January 21, 2016. Id. at 2.

II. Discussion

Plaintiff contends that Nurse Sturgen was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See generally Am. Compl. Defendant argues that plaintiff's amended complaint must be dismissed because plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege facts to satisfy the objective and subjective components of medical indifference. Def. Mem. of Law at 7-12. Defendant also moves for dismissal on the grounds that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to commencing his action. Id. at 12-16.

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12 (b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for a plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering such a motion, a court must "construe plaintiff['s] complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff['s] favor." Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 326, 335 (2d Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this "tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Accordingly, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is "'plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (explaining that the plausibility test "does not impose a probability requirement . . . it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].")); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that "[o]n a motion to dismiss, courts require enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible . . . .") (internal citations omitted). Determining whether plausibility exists is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Where, as here, a party seeks judgment against a pro se litigant, a court must affordthe non-movant special solicitude. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006). As the Second Circuit stated,

[t]here are many cases in which we have said that a pro se litigant is entitled to special solicitude, that a pro se litigant's submissions must be construed liberally, and that such submissions must be read to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. At the same time, our cases have also indicated that we cannot read into pro se submissions claims that are not consistent with the pro se litigant's allegations or arguments that the submissions themselves do not suggest that we should not excuse frivolous or vexatious filings by pro se litigants, and that pro se status does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law . . . .

Id. (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted); see also Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191-92 ("On occasions too numerous to count, we have reminded district courts that 'when [a] plaintiff proceeds pro se, . . . a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally.") (internal citations omitted).

B. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

The Eighth Amendment forbids the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" on those convicted of crimes, "which includes punishments that involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). "In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove 'deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.'" Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Thedeliberate indifference standard consists of both an objective and subjective component. Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66. The objective component requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that his alleged medical need is "sufficiently serious." Id. The subjective component requires a showing that the defendant has acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Id.

As a threshold matter, in order for a prisoner to state a cognizable claim of deliberate indifference, he must make a showing of serious illness or injury. Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). A "sufficiently serious" medical need is "a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain." Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66 (quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1990) (Pratt, J., dissenting)). As there is no bright-line rule to determine whether a condition is sufficiently serious, the Second Circuit has identified several factors that are highly relevant to the inquiry, including: "(1) whether a reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the medical need in question as 'important and worthy of comment or treatment,' (2) whether the condition significantly affects daily activities, and (3) 'the existence of chronic and substantial pain.'" Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Chance, 143 F.3d at 702 (internal citation omitted)).

"In Jones v. Westchester County Department of Corrections, . . . the court held that, on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff 'adequately pleaded' the objective element by alleging that he experienced chronic pain and that the pain 'would have been alleviated' if he had been given reasonable care.'" Lloyd v. Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Jones v. Westchester Cnty. Dep't of Corr., 557 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415 (S.D.N.Y.2008)). Plaintiff alleges that he suffered severe pain in his left hand from an unsuccessful carpal tunnel surgery. See Am. Compl. at 2-3. He contends that Nurse Sturgen continually refused to schedule plaintiff to see a physician, and that he continued to experience significant pain and loss of function in his left hand. See id. Even assuming for the purposes of this motion that plaintiff had a sufficiently serious medical need that satisfied the objective component and warranted protection under the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Nurse Sturgen acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66.

A prison official acts with a sufficiently culpable state of mind when "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must...