Hawxhurst v. State
Decision Date | 25 March 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 3D13–527.,3D13–527. |
Parties | Peter Josephson HAWXHURST, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jacob Addicott, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.
Peter Hawxhurst entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of cocaine, expressly reserving the right to appeal the dispositive order of the trial court denying his motion to suppress.1 We hold that there was no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, as there was probable cause to arrest Hawxhurst for the crime of criminal mischief.
Generally, a police officer may make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest only if it is committed in the presence of the officer. See § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). However, there are a number of statutory exceptions, one of which permits a warrantless misdemeanor arrest when the officer has probable cause to believe the defendant has committed the offense of criminal mischief, even if it was not committed in the presence of the officer. See § 901.15(9)(b) ( ).
Although the officer testified that he arrested Hawxhurst based upon probable cause to believe Hawxhurst committed a violation of a domestic violence injunction,2 the very same facts upon which the officer relied (and upon which the trial court based its determination) established probable cause to arrest Hawxhurst for criminal mischief. In the context of a motion to suppress, the trial court's determination of historical facts are accorded a presumption of correctness, which we review under a standard of competent, substantial evidence, interpreting the evidence and reasonable inferences in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling. Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 521 (Fla.2003) ; Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 806 (Fla.2002) ; Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla.2001).
By contrast, we review de novo the trial court's determination of whether those historical facts constitute probable cause. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696–97, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ; Pagan, 830 So.2d at 806. Moreover, the concept of probable cause is grounded upon a standard of objective reasonableness. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 ( )(emphasis added).
Therefore, a police officer's subjective belief regarding the existence or non-existence of probable cause for a warrantless arrest is neither dispositive of, nor generally relevant to, this issue. See e.g., Thomas v. State, 395 So.2d 280, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) ( ). See also Davison v. State, 15 So.3d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ( ); Jackson v. State, 660 So.2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) ( ).
Thus, even if we were to conclude the officer did not have probable cause to arrest Hawxhurst for violation of a domestic violence injunction (a question we do not reach3 ), we hold the arrest was nevertheless valid as it was supported by probable cause to believe Hawxhurst committed the offense of criminal mischief. See Thomas, 395 So.2d at 280–81 ( ). See also D.S. v. State, 122 So.3d 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) ; Freeman v. State, 909 So.2d 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) ; Moss v. State, 512 So.2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
Because we affirm on this basis, we do not address the...
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...or view of the officer in such a manner as to be actually detected by the officer by the use of one of his senses"); Hawxhurst v. State, 159 So. 3d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) ; Weaver v. State, 233 So. 3d 501 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ; Kirby v. State, 217 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).3 It is plain......
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