Hayden v. Pierce

• Decision Date: 29 January 1895
• Citation: 144 N.Y. 512,39 N.E. 638
• Parties: HAYDEN v. PIERCE.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

144 N.Y. 512

39 N.E. 638

HAYDEN

v.PIERCE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 29, 1895.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Fourth department.

Action by Louisa Hayden against Mary R. Pierce, as executrix etc., of Eliza W. Brown, deceased, on a written instrument in the nature of a promissory note. From a judgment and order of the general term (25 N. Y. Supp. 55), affirming a judgment for plaintiff and denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Edmund L. Mooney, for appellant.

E. M. Harris, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J.

This was an action upon a written instrument in the nature of a promissory note for $1,000, bearing date January 23, 1882, made by Eliza W. Brown, the defendant's testatrix, to the plaintiff, payable on or before one year after the death of the maker, with interest. The instrument, upon its face, states that its consideration was services rendered by the plaintiff to the deceased since the year 1864 to date, and to be rendered from that time until the death of the maker, whenever that event should occur. The maker died in January, 1890, leaving a will, in which the defendant, then and ever since a resident of Chicago, was named as executrix. The defendant accepted the trust, duly qualified, and proceeded to administer the estate by advertising for claims under the order of the surrogate of Otsego county, where the testatrix resided at the time of her death, and who had jurisdiction in the case. The notice specified a time and place within that county for the presentation of all claims against the estate of the deceased. The plaintiff presented her claim, and it was rejected on the 25th of January, 1891, and notice of its rejection given to her, and, as no stipulation to refer it was made, this action was commenced by procuring an order for the publication of the summons, December 14, 1891, which was followed by service of the summons upon the defendant in Chicago, January 9, 1892. The defendant appeared and answered, interposing various defenses, and, among them, payment and the short statute of limitations. It appeared upon the trial that the deceased, on the 2d of October, 1886, purchased a house, for which she paid $1,600, and on the same day conveyed it to the plaintiff for the nominal consideration of one dollar, the grantee giving back to the deceased a contract securing to her the control of the premises during her life, with the right to the rents and profits. The principal question litigated at the trial was whether this house was conveyed to the plaintiff in payment and satisfaction of the claim, or as an independent gift or additional reward for her care of the deceased during the long period when such relations existed between the parties. The evidence on this point was conflicting, and the learned trial court submitted the question to the jury, and a verdict was found for the plaintiff. It will be seen by the dates above given that this action was not commenced within six months from the rejection of the claim, and as the defendant was, during all the time, a non-resident of the state, the application of the short statute of limitations to the case was a pure question of law, which the courts below have decided against the defendant's contention. That is now the only question presented by the appeal, as the other defense has been determined against the defendant under such a state of facts as precludes a review in this court. By section 1822 of the Code, an action upon a disputed claim against the estate of a deceased person must be commenced within six months after its rejection by the executor or administrator, unless it is referred under the statute, or in default thereof the claim is barred. But by section 401, if the defendant, when a cause of action accrues against him, is without the state, the action may be commenced within the time limited therefor after his return into the state. If this section applies to this case, of course it is a complete answer to the defense of the short statute of limitations. But the learned counsel for the defendant insists that this section has no application to the case, and it must be admitted that the letter of the law at least supports the contention. In chapter 4 of the Code, containing over 50 sections, the various periods of limitations applicable to the several classes of actions therein specified are to be found, and section 401 is one of the provisions of that chapter. Section 414, the last of the chapter but one, defines the application of the various preceding provisions contained in it, and reads as follows: ‘The provisions of this chapter apply and constitute the only rules of limitation applicable to a civil action, or special proceeding, except in one of the following cases: (1) A case where a different limitation is specially prescribed by law, or a shorter limitation is prescribed by the written contract of the parties.’ The other subdivisions of the section are not matterial to the question under discussion. It cannot well be denied that the six-months statute of limitations found in section 1822 is ‘a case where a different limitation is specially prescribed by law,’ and as to such cases, by the strict language of section 414, the exception as to nonresidence, found in section 401, has no application. This result would, doubtless, follow from a literal reading of the section, but we think that such was not the intention of the legislature. It is a familiar rule that a construction of a statute is to be avoid which is liable to produce a public mischief or to promote injustice. Language, however strong, must yield...