Hayden v. Reickerd

• Decision Date: 03 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 89-16534,89-16534
• Citation: 957 F.2d 1506
• Parties: 139 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2769, 121 Lab.Cas. P 10,173, 7 IER Cases 1841 Robert HAYDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.A. REICKERD, Michael Hernandez, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., Lockheed Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1506

957 F.2d 1506

139 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2769, 121 Lab.Cas. P 10,173,

7 IER Cases 1841

Robert HAYDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.A. REICKERD, Michael Hernandez, Lockheed Missiles & Space

Company, Inc., Lockheed Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-16534.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 5, 1991.

Memorandum Dec. 19, 1991.

Order and Opinion March 3, 1992.

Henry M. Steinberg, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

Patricia Murray, Morrison & Foerster, Santa Clara, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Before TANG, FARRIS and D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The memorandum disposition filed December 19, 1991, is redesignated as an authored opinion by Judge Tang.

OPINION

TANG, Circuit Judge:

Robert Hayden, a Lockheed Corporation employee and union steward, sued Lockheed and two of its management employees in state court for battery and retaliation. Lockheed removed the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Lockheed and its management employees summary judgment, holding that federal labor law preempts Hayden's state claims. Upon Hayden's appeal, we vacate judgment and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Hayden, a thirty-year employee of Lockheed, is an active member of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 2228 ("Union"). As a union steward, Hayden represented other Lockheed employees in grievance proceedings at Lockheed's Sunnyvale, California plant. On February 15, 1988, Hayden and another union member met for a grievance procedure with defendant J.A. Reickerd, a Lockheed management employee. Lockheed alleges that during the meeting, Hayden used obscene language and called Reickerd a liar. Hayden alleges that Reickerd "abruptly terminated the meeting, grabbed [Hayden] by the shoulders; turned him around in the direction of the door and violently shoved [Hayden] out of" Reickerd's office.

Hayden alleges that this shoving injured his back and neck and aggravated a preexisting disc disease. The day after the shoving incident, Hayden sought medical treatment from a Lockheed doctor. The doctor limited Hayden's work duties to "bench" work and recommended reducing stress. Lockheed thereafter denied Hayden workers' compensation benefits. Hayden therefore sought continuing treatment from his private physician. That doctor continued to limit Hayden's work duties and recommended reducing stress.

Hayden alleges that his Lockheed supervisor, defendant Michael Hernandez, subsequently conspired to harass and retaliate against Hayden for his union activities. This course of harassment, according to Hayden, culminated in his suspension from work for an involuntary medical leave. On August 30, 1988, Hernandez sent Hayden back to the Lockheed doctor for a physical examination. The Lockheed doctor reiterated the bench work limitation and reduction in stress. At Hernandez's insistence, Hayden alleges, the Lockheed doctor then changed his recommendation. Hernandez then placed Hayden on involuntary medical leave.

Hayden filed a union grievance alleging that Reickerd and Hernandez violated Lockheed's collective bargaining agreement with the union. That grievance eventually was arbitrated. Hayden missed, however, the six-month statutory deadline for filing a federal cause of action based on Reickerd's assault and battery.

On November 9, 1988, nine months after the battery and three months after placement on involuntary medical leave, Hayden filed a complaint in California state court against Reickerd, Hernandez, and Lockheed. Hayden alleged the torts of assault and battery against Reickerd, and claimed Lockheed is vicariously liable for Reickerd's conduct. Hayden also alleged that Reickerd and Hernandez conspired to harass and retaliate against him for his union activities, causing him stress against doctors' orders. Hayden alleged Lockheed is vicariously liable for the retaliation and conspiracy also. Hayden claimed damages for physical injury, uncompensated medical expenses, mental anguish, and lost time from work. He also sought punitive damages.

In December 1988, Lockheed removed Hayden's state court action to federal district court. The district court agreed that Hayden's complaint falls under exclusive federal jurisdiction by implicating federal labor law. Lockheed then moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Reickerd, Hernandez, and Lockheed summary judgment. The district court held that federal labor law preempts all of Hayden's state law claims. Hayden's only recourse for the allegations in his complaint, the district court held, was in an action under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Because Hayden had failed to file such an action in time, the district court concluded, Hayden could pursue no claims in federal court. The court therefore entered judgment for all the defendants.

Hayden timely appeals the district court's decision that federal labor law preempts his state tort claims. He seeks reversal and remand of the case to state court to pursue his state tort action.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgement. Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990). In conducting this review, we must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hayden, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1989).

DISCUSSION

Hayden asserts two distinct causes of action, battery and retaliation for union activities. Hayden's complaint seeks to hold Reickerd, Hernandez, and Lockheed jointly and severally liable for both causes through theories of conspiracy and vicarious liability. California law establishes both Hayden's causes of action and his theories of liability. The district court held that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") preempts Hayden's claims. In addition, Lockheed argues on appeal that the "Garmon" doctrine of preemption under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") vests exclusive jurisdiction for Hayden's claims in the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB").

A. Section 301 Preemption

The district court held that Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), preempts all of Hayden's state law claims. We have previously explained the rationale for section 301 preemption in Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir.1988). "Section 301," the Miller court said, "creates a federal cause of action for breach of collective bargaining agreements ... even if brought in state court. Applying federal law to these cases ensures a uniform interpretation of labor contract terms, a goal that the Supreme Court has described as particularly compelling." Id. (citation omitted). Toward this goal, even suits based on torts such as Hayden's "are governed by federal law if their evaluation is 'inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract.' " Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)). Therefore, section 301 "preempts all state-law causes of action evaluation of which requires interpretation of a labor contract's terms." Id.

The Miller court observed that the scope of section 301 is "substantial," but not infinite. Id. "If a court can uphold state rights without interpreting the [collective bargaining agreement]," the court said, "allowing suit based on the state rights does not undermine the purpose of section 301 preemption." Id. at 545-46. Therefore, the Miller court noted, " 'non-negotiable state-law rights ... independent of any right established by contract' are not preempted." Id. at 546 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 105 S.Ct. at 1912). "A contrary rule," the Miller court reasoned, "would permit unions and employers to exempt themselves from state labor standards. Congress never intended 'to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.' " Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212, 105 S.Ct. at 1912).

We have also explained the more recent Supreme Court cases describing the two bases upon which section 301 may preempt state law claims such as Hayden's. See Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir.1989). "First, section 301 may preempt a state claim 'on the basis of the subject matter of the law in question,' Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1883, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 ... (1988), as where the " 'claims [are] founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements." ' Id. 108 S.Ct. at 1884 n. 10 (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 [107 S.Ct. 2425, 2431, 96 L.Ed.2d 318] (1987))." Id. "Second, where the right is created by state law and not by the collective-bargaining agreement, a claim based upon that right is preempted 'if [the application of state law] requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.' Id. 108 S.Ct. at 1885; see Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 394 ('Section 301 governs claims ... "substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement." ')." Id. Accordingly, if Hayden's claims are neither based upon Lockheed's collective bargaining agreement nor dependent upon an interpretation of that agreement, section 301 does not preempt them. Id. Notably, " ' "[N]ot every dispute ... tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement is preempted by 301." ' Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at 1885 n. 12 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211, 105 S.Ct. at 1911). Rather, [a] claim is preempted only...