Madison v. Motion Picture Set Painters/Sign Writer

• Citation: 132 F.Supp.2d 1244
• Decision Date: 06 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. CV 99-12399 MMM AJWX.,CV 99-12399 MMM AJWX.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Michael D. MADISON, Plaintiff, v. MOTION PICTURE SET PAINTERS AND SIGN WRITERS LOCAL 729, Defendant.

132 F.Supp.2d 1244

Michael D. MADISON, Plaintiff, v. MOTION PICTURE SET PAINTERS AND SIGN WRITERS LOCAL 729, Defendant.

No. CV 99-12399 MMM AJWX.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

March 6, 2000.

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Bennett Rolfe, Carmichael A SmithLow, Bennett Rolfe Law Offices, Camarillo, CA, for plaintiff.

Leo Geffner, Ira L Gottlieb, An T Le, Geffner & Bush, Burbank, CA, for defendant.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

MORROW, District Judge.

This case involves claims of racial discrimination by plaintiff Michael Madison against his union, the Motion Picture Set Painters and Sign Writers Local 729 (the "Union"). Madison commenced this action in Los Angeles Superior Court on October 22, 1999, alleging causes of action for violation of the California Fair Employment & Housing Act ("FEHA") and Article I, § 8 of the California Constitution. The Union timely removed on November 30, 2000, asserting that Madison's "artfully pled" state law claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") and/or the duty of fair representation.

Madison contends that the action was improperly removed and seeks to have it remanded to state court on the basis that the court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction. He asserts that his claims are not preempted because they involve neither the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") — as required for § 301 preemption — nor the duty of fair representation.

The Union opposes remand. Additionally, it seeks judgment on the pleadings, arguing that once Madison's causes of action are properly characterized as claims arising under the federal labor law, they are barred by the applicable six-month statute of limitations and fail on their merits. To the extent his claims arise under federal law, Madison asserts they are not time-barred because he has alleged a continuing violation. He also argues that he should be given leave to amend to correct any pleading deficiencies.

Madison's complaint alleges that the Union discriminated against its African-American members by negotiating a collective bargaining agreement that allows employers to "pick and choose" those Union members they wish to employ as set painters and sign writers, and thus to engage in discriminatory hiring that disparately impacts African-Americans. Additionally, he contends the Union discriminated against him by issuing a meritless grievance against Paramount Pictures, his employer, that reflected badly on him. Madison asserts that both acts violated FEHA and Article I, § 8 of the California Constitution.

Madison's claims are both preempted. To the extent he seeks to hold the Union liable for issuing a grievance, Madison's claim is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, since resolution of the parties' respective rights will require interpretation of the CBA between the Union and the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers. To the extent Madison seeks to hold the Union liable for agreeing to hiring procedures that disparately impact African-American members, his claim is preempted by the federal duty of fair representation. Accordingly, the causes of action must be recharacterized as federal claims, and Madison's motion to remand must be denied. Viewed as claims arising under federal law, Madison's causes of action are time-barred, since he knew or should have known the facts giving rise to both claims no later than October 1998. His suit was brought more than six months later, and the Union's motion for judgment on the pleadings must thus be granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Madison is an African-American male, who has been a member of the Union for several years.¹ He asserts that the Union has approximately 1,000 members, only a small percentage of whom are African-Americans.² Of these, Madison contends that only a portion are able to obtain steady employment due to the Union's "refusal to properly represent them by allowing business entities ... for whom they provide personnel to essentially pick and choose among the members of [the Union] ... to work as set painters and sign writers."³ Madison asserts that this procedure allows employers to engage in "direct racial discrimination" and/or "so-called cronyism," with the result that the Union members chosen to work are primarily Caucasian.⁴

Madison himself has worked "steadily" on "Sabrina the Teenage Witch." This television show is produced only a few months a year, however,⁵ and Madison asserts that the Union's allegedly discriminatory practices have made it impossible for him to find employment during the periods "Sabrina" is not in production.⁶ Additionally, he contends the Union caused him to be "identified as a racist, as a result of ... [his] having hired African-Americans [to work] on ... Sabrina...."⁷ Attached to Madison's complaint is a claim he filed with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") that provides further detail concerning this allegation. The claim asserts that the Union Appointed Lot Steward, Dennis Ivanjak, told Madison, who is the Paint Foreman for "Sabrina," that he wanted him to hire Caucasians to work on his crew.⁸ At the time, Madison employed only African-Americans.⁹ Shortly thereafter, the Union filed a grievance against Paramount Pictures, the show's producer, which alleged that Paramount was hiring non-Union members to paint at night in violation of the CBA.¹⁰ The Union allegedly filed this grievance without consulting Madison or asking him whether the allegations were true, and the grievance was posted publicly in Paramount's paint department.¹¹ Madison contends he told the Union the charge was false, but it refused to issue a retraction.¹² He asserts that at the time he filed the DFEH complaint, he was "still receiving negative comments from Union members about the grievance, including being called a racist."¹³

Based on these facts, Madison pleads claims against the Union for violation of Article I, § 8 of the California Constitution and of FEHA. As relief, he seeks, inter alia, an injunction "requiring [the Union] to fairly represent its African-American members, and to negotiate with the motion picture and related industries contracts under which African-American painters and sign writers shall receive a fair portion of work[.]"¹⁴

II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A suit may be removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) only if it could have been brought there originally. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). "Federal district courts have original federal question jurisdiction of actions `arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'" Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850, 108 S.Ct. 150, 98 L.Ed.2d 106 (1987) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331). Generally, a claim "arises under" federal law only if a federal question appears on the face of plaintiff's complaint. Thus, removal jurisdiction is lacking even if defendant asserts a defense based exclusively on federal law. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) ("The party who brings the suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon"); Franchise Tax Board, supra, 463 U.S. at 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841 ("federal courts have jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law"); id. at 10, 103 S.Ct. 2841 ("a defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff's complaint establishes that the case `arises under' federal law" (emphasis added)); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908); Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863, 106 S.Ct. 180, 88 L.Ed.2d 150 (1985).

There is, however, an exception to this "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Under the "artful pleading" doctrine, a plaintiff cannot defeat removal of a federal claim by disguising or pleading it artfully as a state claim. If the claim involved is one arising under federal law, the federal court will recharacterize the claim and uphold removal. See Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 702 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir.1983).

Where a state law claim is completely preempted by federal law, the "artful pleading" doctrine applies. See Caterpillar, supra, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425 ("[o]nce an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law"); Sullivan, supra, 813 F.2d at 1372 ("A traditional example of the artful pleading doctrine is one in which the defendant has a federal preemption defense to a state claim and federal law provides a remedy").

B. Section 301 Preemption

Section 301 of the LMRA establishes federal jurisdiction over "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). See Franchise Tax Board, supra, 463 U.S. at 23, 103 S.Ct. 2841 ("The preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action `for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.' Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301"). See also Caterpillar, supra, 482 U.S. at 393, ...