Hayden v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1992
• Docket Number: Civil No. F 91-177.
• Parties: J. William HAYDEN, Plaintiff, v. LA-Z-BOY CHAIR CO., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

838 F. Supp. 384

J. William HAYDEN, Plaintiff, v. LA-Z-BOY CHAIR CO., Defendant.

Civil No. F 91-177.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

October 28, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael T. Blee, Burt, Blee, Dixon & Sutton, Fort Wayne, IN, for J. William Hayden, plaintiff.

Larry J. Saylor, Richard J. Seryak, Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, Detroit, MI, Richard P. Steele, Barnes and Thornburg, Fort Wayne, IN, for La-Z-Boy Chair Co., defendant.

ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment. The parties have fully briefed the issues and oral argument was heard on October 7, 1992. For the following reasons defendant's motion will be granted.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, Rule 56(c) is not a requirement that the moving party negate his opponent's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 2512, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; In re Matter of Wildman, 859 F.2d 553, 557 (7th Cir.1988); Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir.1988); Valentine v. Joliet Township High School District No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986). No genuine issue for trial exists "where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1988); Guenin v. Sendra Corp., 700 F.Supp. 973, 974 (N.D.Ind.1988); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983). In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). To establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; First National Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir.1988). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

Discussion

Plaintiff J. William Hayden ("Hayden"), a sixty-one year old male, has asserted a claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") against defendant La-Z-Boy Chair Co. ("La-Z-Boy"), a manufacturer and distributor of home furnishings and furniture. The ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), provides that:

It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.

Hayden had been an independent sales representative for La-Z-Boy from 1968 until December of 1990, when his latest one-year contract was not renewed. Hayden has also asserted state law claims for tortious interference with business relations, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

With respect to the ADEA claim, defendant argues that plaintiff is an independent contractor, and not an employee, and thus he is not covered by the ADEA. Plaintiff admits that he is not alleging that he is an employee of La-Z-Boy. Nevertheless, plaintiff insists that he is one of those persons that the ADEA is intended to benefit.

A review of the caselaw reveals that the courts have uniformly required that a person seeking to recover under the ADEA be an employee of the organization he is seeking to recover from. For example, in EEOC v. Zippo Manufacturing Co., 713 F.2d 32, 33 (3d Cir.1983), the court simply stated that "the ADEA only covers employees." The Court further noted that:

The legislative history of the ADEA, 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 2214-27, evinces the clear legislative intent to prohibit "age discrimination by employers against employees and applicants for employment." Levine v. Fairleigh Dickinson University, 646 F.2d 825, 828 (3d Cir. 1981). Therefore, if appellants were not Zippo employees, ADEA is not applicable to their cause and their allegation that Zippo violated ADEA in terminating them because they reached the age of 65 must be rejected.

Id. at 35.

Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has held that "a plain reading of the ADEA indicates that an `individual' only has a cause of action under this provision if he is an `employee' at the time of his termination." Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 980 (4th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit, in Hickey v. Arkla Industries, Inc., 699 F.2d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 1983), stated:

Hickey argues that even if he is not an employee of Arkla's within the meaning of the cases, he still has a cause of action. According to him, because the ADEA covers all individuals having an economic relationship with a business entity, employee status is irrelevant. This argument is primarily based upon principles of statutory construction advanced by him, and in our considered opinion, his contentions are found to be greatly wanting, if not specious.

There is no legislative history to support Hickey's contention that employee status is not required for coverage under the ADEA. Moreover, his argument defies a plain reading of the statute. Whether it would be desirable to include independent contractors within ADEA coverage is clearly a matter for Congress, and emphatically not for the courts, to decide.

Plaintiff does not dispute that, thus far, the ADEA has been held to be applicable only to persons who are "employees". Rather, plaintiff suggests that this court should adopt a liberal interpretation of the ADEA and rely on Title VII precedent in interpreting the scope of the ADEA. Specifically, plaintiff claims that under Title VII, a person may bring a cause of action even though he is not a "traditional employee" as long as "some employment relationship" exists. In this case, the plaintiff was an employee of his own corporation, J. William Hayden, Inc. At plaintiff's request, La-Z-Boy paid Hayden's commissions to the corporation; the corporation then paid Hayden an annual salary. Plaintiff asserts that since La-Z-Boy's actions affected his employment relationship with his corporation, he may properly sue La-Z-Boy under the ADEA.

The Supreme Court has observed that the ADEA is a hybrid of both the Fair Labor Standards Act and Title VII. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 576-80, 98 S.Ct. 866, 868-69, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). The appellate courts have looked to the standards enunciated in Title VII cases when deciding whether a plaintiff meets employee status under the ADEA or is merely an independent contractor. See e.g., Zippo, supra at 38. Although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the language of Title VII is broad¹ and provides protection to persons who are not employees of an employer, the Seventh Circuit has not yet decided whether the ADEA should likewise be given a broad reading.

In 1973, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit handed down Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C.Cir.1973). Sibley held that the plaintiff had a Title VII claim, despite the absence of an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant hospital....