Hayes v. Jones Cnty.
Decision Date | 30 September 2022 |
Docket Number | Civil Action 2:20-cv-118-TBM-MTP |
Parties | MEKESHIA HAYES PLAINTIFF v. JONES COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; JONES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; and OFFICER JAKE DRISKELL DEFENDANTS |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Mekeshia Hayes was at her home when her door was kicked open by officers from the Jones County Sheriff's Department. Officer Jake Driskell and other officers entered the home and executed a search warrant. [22], ¶ 13. After questioning Desmond Hicks-Hayes' boyfriend- about the location of alleged drugs, Hayes and Hicks were arrested for possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. However the officers discovered no drugs during the search. Hayes filed suit in this Court against Officer Driskell, the Jones County Sheriff's Department, and Jones County alleging that the Defendants violated Hayes' constitutional rights and Mississippi law.
Now before the Court is Officer Driskell's Renewed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [24]. For the reasons discussed fully below, Officer Driskell's Motion [24] based on qualified immunity is granted in part and denied in part.
This matter arises out of a February 13, 2020, search of Hayes' home in Laurel, Mississippi at approximately 8:00 p.m. and the events that followed. Officer Driskell and the Jones County Sheriff's Department had a valid search warrant that provided for the search of 1350 Ellisville Blvd Lot F, Laurel, Mississippi, “occupied and controlled by: Desmond Hicks and Other Occupants Unknown.” [13-1].
Officer Driskell supplied the affidavit for the search warrant stating:
On the night of February 13, 2020, Hayes “noticed blue lights outside of her home” and went to the door. [22], ¶¶ 11-12. Before she could get there, “Doe Officer 1 kicked the door open” and “Officer Jake Driskell and Doe Officers 2-5 then entered [her] home.” Id. ¶ 12. Hayes was told to “[s]hut up and sit down” by Doe Officer 1 while the officers questioned Hicks and searched for drugs. Id. ¶ 14. Hayes alleges that Officer Driskell told Hicks Id. ¶ 17.
After Hicks failed to reveal the location of the alleged drugs, Officer Driskell said “fine we'll take her to jail to piss her off and to teach her a lesson.” Id. ¶ 21. Hayes asked Officer Driskell “multiple times why they were there” but was never shown the search warrant. Id. ¶ 23. Officer Driskell “ordered [Hayes] to call someone to pick up her children, and she called her aunt Tyra Blackmon.” Id. ¶ 27. Hayes requested the reason for her arrest and “Doe Officer 2 responded that she was being arrested for conspiracy, but Officer Driskell told [Hayes] that she was being arrested for possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute.” Id. ¶ 29. After her aunt arrived, Hayes was handcuffed. Id. ¶ 30.
Hayes alleges that Id. ¶ 31. Hayes was taken to jail and allowed to make a phone call. However, she “was told that she would probably not see a judge until after the weekend since it was President's [D]ay weekend.” Id. ¶ 34. She was also told “she could not be given a bond until she saw a judge.” Id. Id. ¶ 35. “While [Hayes] waited to see if she was going to be given a bond or an initial appearance, Chloe Morgan was given a bond, and released by the Jones County Sheriff's Department within two hour[s] of being arrested.” Id. ¶ 36.
On February 14, 2020, Hayes asked a guard “when they would set her Court or bail hearing” and was told “she was not on the list to be taken in front of a judge.” Id. ¶ 37. Hayes did not have a bond or initial appearance hearing on February 14, 2020. However, “Desmond Hicks was given an initial appearance on February 14, 2020.” Id. ¶ 38. The following day, Hayes was released and told that “on the orders of Officer Driskell, the charges were being dropped.” Id. ¶ 41. Officer Driskell “never filed an affidavit or an arrest warrant to place [Hayes] in criminal proceedings.” Id. ¶ 43.
Hayes alleges that “Officer Driskell and/or the Jones County Sheriff's Department sent [her] mugshot to The Laurel Leader Call along with the alleged charge of ‘Possession of Methamphetamine-Warrant' knowing that this charge was false and/or fabricated.” Id. ¶ 45.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004)). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court accepts all well pleaded facts as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Linicomn v. Hill, 902 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2018). But “the complaint must allege more than labels and conclusions.” Jebaco, Inc. v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 587 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2009). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, and factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Jebaco, 587 F.3d at 318. “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 664. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.
Officer Driskell contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity on all federal claims against him because Hayes' Amended Complaint [24] failed to plead facts establishing a constitutional violation to overcome qualified immunity. Officer Driskell asserts that he had “arguable probable cause to arrest [Hayes] as there is a fair probability that [Hayes] was aware of, and connected to, Hicks' actions.” [25], pg. 18.
Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v Forsyth, 472...
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