Linicomn v. Hill, 17-10101

• Decision Date: 05 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-10101,17-10101
• Citation: 902 F.3d 529
• Parties: Vernon LINICOMN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Maurico HILL; Cheryl Matthews; Does 1-3, Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

902 F.3d 529

Vernon LINICOMN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Maurico HILL; Cheryl Matthews; Does 1-3, Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-10101

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED September 5, 2018

Kenneth Stuart Harter, Law Offices of Kenneth S. Harter, Carrollton, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Barbara Elaine Rosenberg, Esq., Jennifer Carter Huggard, James Bickford Pinson, Assistant City Attorney, Tatia R. Wilson, City Attorney's Office for the City of Dallas, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

Vernon Linicomn brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action asserting that Dallas, Texas, police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by forcibly entering his house without a warrant, without his consent, and without reason to believe that any person inside was in imminent danger of harm; and by assaulting and arresting him with excessive force. Two of the officers, Maurico Hill and Cheryl Matthews, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which the district court granted. Vernon now appeals.

I

A

We review a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page , 809 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2015). A Rule 12(c) motion may dispose of a case when there are no disputed material facts and the court can render a judgment on the merits based on "the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Id. An adequate pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A pleading offering only "labels and conclusions," "naked assertions," or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC , 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). We must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can plead specific allegations demonstrating (1) the violation of a constitutional right that (2) was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). A right is "clearly established" when "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Rice v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. , 770 F.3d 1122, 1130 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ).

B

Vernon Linicomn alleged the following facts in his pleadings.¹ He was awarded primary custody of his two minor children in his divorce from their mother, Linda, who suffers from mental disorders that render her unfit to be a custodial parent. After the divorce, and prior to the incident involved in this lawsuit, Linda falsely reported to the City of Dallas’s Police Department on numerous occasions that the welfare of the children was endangered while they resided with Vernon.

However, although the police responded on each occasion, no action was taken against Vernon because each of the reports proved to lack substance or justification.

On October 23, 2011, at approximately 4:40 p.m., Linda called 911 regarding the welfare of the children and told dispatch that Vernon was "abusing" the children. Officers Gilbert and Oliver went to Vernon’s house, knocked on the door, but received no response; they departed without taking further action. At 9:20 p.m. that same night, Linda again called the police department and reported a "disturbance" pertaining to the children at Vernon’s residence. The Defendants, Officers Hill and Matthews, responded² and arrived at Vernon’s house between 9:30 and 10:41 p.m.³ Upon arrival, the officers met Linda and Dallas paramedics and firefighters outside. Linda informed the officers that her daughter was "lethargic and sick" inside Vernon’s house. The paramedics stated that they had been unable to gain entry to Vernon’s house. The officers tried to contact Vernon by calling his cell phone and knocking repeatedly at his front door. Vernon did not respond.

Officer Hill contacted his supervisor, Sergeant Melquiades Irizarry, who arrived on the scene soon after. Sergeant Irizarry spoke with Linda and directed Hill to announce through the police public address system that they would enter the house—with or without Vernon’s cooperation. Eventually, Vernon answered the door. Vernon advised Sergeant Irizarry and Officer Hill, who were standing at the threshold of the doorway, that his daughter was asleep and did not need medical assistance. Meanwhile, Officer Matthews stood off to the side of the door with her back to Vernon and the other officers. The officers did not have a warrant to enter Vernon’s house.

Vernon refused to allow anyone entry without a warrant. Sergeant Irizarry placed his hand on Vernon’s shoulder and asked him to step aside so that paramedics could enter and verify that Vernon’s daughter was safe. Vernon pushed Sergeant Irizarry’s hand away. Officer Hill then clasped Vernon’s right arm and shoulder. Vernon pushed Officer Hill away, retreated, and tried to close the door to the house. Officer Hill and Sergeant Irizarry prevented Vernon from closing the door, and Vernon ran toward the back of the house. Officer Hill ran after Vernon. Officer Matthews entered the house but remained near the front door. Inside the house, a struggle ensued. Officer Hill grabbed Vernon and tried to take him to the floor. Vernon resisted. Sergeant Irizarry sprayed Vernon with pepper spray. Vernon was then handcuffed, escorted outside, and treated by paramedics. The officers spoke with Vernon’s children and confirmed that they had been asleep and were not ill. The children also confirmed that Linda had a history of making exaggerated claims about their welfare.

C

Vernon filed suit in Texas state court against Officers Hill and Matthews,⁴ alleging assault and battery as well as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The state court dismissed the assault and battery claims, and Officers Hill and Matthews removed the case to federal court. Officers Hill and Matthews affirmatively asserted the defense of qualified immunity, and the district court ordered Vernon to reply to that defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a). The district court ultimately granted the officers’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), dismissing Vernon’s § 1983 claims with prejudice. Vernon appeals that judgment. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

II

The district court granted the officers’ Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Vernon’s amended complaint and Rule 7(a) reply to the Officers’ answers did not overcome the officers’ qualified immunity defense.⁵ Vernon challenges that order, arguing that his pleadings sufficiently demonstrate that the officers acted objectively unreasonably and violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by (1) entering his house without a warrant and (2) using excessive force by assaulting and pepper spraying him.

A

The Supreme Court has held that we have discretion to address either prong of the qualified immunity analysis first. See Pearson , 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808 (holding that the two-step, qualified-immunity sequence set forth in Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), "should not be regarded as mandatory in all cases"). Further, the Court recognized that, even where defendants are clearly entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong, undertaking the two-step procedure "is often beneficial ... [because it] promotes the development of constitutional precedent and is especially valuable with respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable." Id. We believe this to be the case here. Accordingly, although we ultimately conclude that the officers were entitled to a judgment on the pleadings based on the second prong of the qualified-immunity inquiry, we begin our analysis with the first prong. See id.

Under the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis, we consider whether the officers’ actions violated Vernon’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Trammell v. Fruge , 868 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Saucier , 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 ). Vernon argues that the officers entered his house without a warrant and absent exigent circumstances or any other exception to the warrant requirement.

"Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. , 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972).

A warrantless search of a person’s home is presumptively unreasonable, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Carroll v. Ellington , 800 F.3d 154, 169 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398, 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) ). One exception is the existence of exigent circumstances justifying immediate action. Rice , 770 F.3d at 1130–31 (citing Stuart , 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943 ). Whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless search depends on whether, given the totality of the circumstances, the search was objectively reasonable. See Stuart , 547 U.S. at 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943. Officers cannot manufacture exigency through their own action or inaction. United...