Hayes v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 October 1941 |
| Citation | 37 N.E.2d 121,310 Mass. 81 |
| Parties | HAYES v. LUMBERMENS MUT. CASUALTY CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action of contract by Helen C. Hayes, administratrix, against the Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, to recover upon an accident insurance policy issued by defendant to one Hayes. From an order for judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Judgment for defendant.Appeal from Superior Court, Berkshire County; E. T. Broadhurst, judge.
Argued before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, DOLAN, COX, and RONAL, JJ.
W. A. Heaphy, of Pittsfield, for plaintiff.
F. M. Myers, of Pittsfield, for defendant.
This is an action of contract to recover the indemnity provided for in an accident policy issued by the defendant to one Hayes, whose death resulted from a collision of two automobiles, one of which he was operating, on a public way in Holyoke in the early morning of February 9, 1940. The case was submitted to the Superior Court upon a statement of agreed facts, and the defendant appealed from an order for judgment for the plaintiff.
Hayes, a patrolman in the division of the State police of the department of public safety of the Commonwealth, had been assigned to duty as a special officer to stimulate greater public interest in exercising caution in the use of the highways. He gave numerous lectures to children at the various schools, organized safety patrols for the protection of school children and addressed civic and social organizations in the western part of the Commonwealth on safety promotion. His duties required him to spend some evenings with organizations which were interested in this subject. He co-operated with safety councils and automobile clubs in formulating programs in the interest of safety. On the day previous to the accident he had visited the schools in three different towns, and in accordance with an appointment made with one Laporte, the secretary of an automobile club, Hayes arrived at the home of Laporte shortly before midnight and discussed with him a program for the protection of pedestrians which was then being drafted by safety clubs and councils. Laporte had promised to collect for him suitable material for further lectures for schools and other organizations. Hayes declined to spend the night at the Laporte home as his uniform was at his aunt's home in Holyoke and as ‘he had to be in Greenfield at 8:15 A. M. the following morning and in uniform.’ He left Laporte's house at ten minutes before one o'clock in the morning for his aunt's home. He was operating a ‘police cruiser’ type of automobile, owned by the Commonwealth, or his way to his aunt's home when the collision occurred.
The policy issued to Hayes provided that ‘This insurance shall not cover accident, injury, disability, death or other loss caused directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, by * * * [various causes] nor (8) while the Insured is performing any duty as a member or employee of a paid fire or police department.’ Hayes at the time of the accident was undoubtedly a member of a police department and received compensation for his services. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 22, §§ 1, 9, 9A; Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 192 N.E. 618, 96 A.L.R. 977. This policy does not preclude a police officer from all benefits but limits indemnity to those instances where the officer was not performing any duty as such when the accidental injury was incurred. If the insured was actually engaged in the performance of his duties as a State police officer at the time he was killed, then there can be no recovery.
The case was heard solely upon a statement of agreed facts. This statement was in effect a case stated. Azevedo v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 308 Mass. 216, 31 N.E.2d 559;Redden v. Ramsey, 309 Mass. 225, 34 N.E.2d 648. The conclusions of the trial judge based upon the facts stated and inferences therefrom are not binding upon us, and questions of fact as well as of law are open for review upon an appeal. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. English Construction Co., 303 Mass. 105, 20 N.E.2d 939,Howell v. First of Boston International Corp., 309 Mass. 194, 34 N.E.2d 633.
The agreed facts do not show that any regular hours for active service had been established for Hayes. Perhaps the nature of his duties, including the various places where they were to be performed and the different hours at which opportunities ordinarily presented themselves for their performance, would prevent the adoption of a definite schedule of fixed periods for the rendition of services. His work differed from that usually performed by police officers who are regularly engaged in active duty during prescribed hours.
The visit to the home of Laporte was for the purpose of furthering a plan for the protection of pedestrians and also,...
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Yates v. City of Salem
...231, § 126. We are free to draw therefrom such inferences and reach such conclusions as we think are warranted. Hayes v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 310 Mass. 81, 37 N.E.2d 121; Caissie v. City of Cambridge, 317 Mass. 346, 347, 58 N.E.2d 169. The parties must have meant by the term 'traffic ......