Hayes v. Mercy Hosp. and Medical Center

• Decision Date: 03 July 1990
• Docket Number: Nos. 68500,68501,s. 68500
• Parties: , 145 Ill.Dec. 894, 88 A.L.R.4th 321 Brenda HAYES, Adm'r of the Estate of Vincent Hayes, v. MERCY HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER et al. (The City of Chicago et al., Appellants).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 873

557 N.E.2d 873

136 Ill.2d 450, 145 Ill.Dec. 894, 88

A.L.R.4th 321

Brenda HAYES, Adm'r of the Estate of Vincent Hayes, v. MERCY HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER et al. (The City of

Chicago et al., Appellants).

Nos. 68500, 68501.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

July 3, 1990.

Kelly R. Welsh, Judson H. Miner, Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ruth M. Moscovitch and L. Anita Richardson, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of counsel, for appellant City of Chicago.

Fraterrigo, Best & Beranek, Chicago, Fredrick J. Fraterrigo, Kevin G. Nedved and Keith G. Dronen, of counsel, for appellant Penn Trailers & Truck Bodies Corp. et al.

Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago, John M. Stalmack and Ruth E. VanDemark, of counsel, for appellee Michael Jerva.

Liana A. Bizios, Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Assn Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

On October 28, 1986, the City of Chicago, Anthony Wilczak and Arnold Cisco (the City) filed a third-party complaint for contribution against Dr. Michael Jerva, alleging negligence in his treatment of the plaintiff in the underlying action. Three days later, Penn Trailers Truck and Bodies Corporation and Irving Nuger (Penn Trailers), named defendants in the same underlying suit, also filed a third-party complaint for contribution against Dr. Jerva. Jerva thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaints, which the trial court granted. The trial court found that because the third-party actions were filed more than four years after the alleged acts of negligence occurred, they were barred by the statute of repose contained in section 13-212(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 13-212(a)). The City and Penn Trailers appealed, contending that an action for contribution is timely if it is filed during the pendency of the underlying direct action. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the third-party complaints. (180 Ill.App.3d 441, 129 Ill.Dec. 372, 535 N.E.2d 1137.) We allowed the City's and Penn Trailer's petitions for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and consolidated the matters for oral argument and disposition. In addition, we granted the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association leave to submit a brief as amicus curiae.

On December 29, 1983, Vincent Hayes brought an action in the circuit court of Cook County against the City, Michael Jerva and Penn Trailers, among others, for injuries allegedly sustained by him on January 1, 1982, while he was being transported in a police "Squadrol" and while undergoing medical treatment for those injuries later that day. After filing the suit, Hayes died and Brenda Hayes, administrator of his estate, was substituted as plaintiff. On January 29, 1985, pursuant to the stipulation of Brenda Hayes and Michael Jerva (for reasons that do not appear in the record), the trial court dismissed Dr. Jerva from the cause with prejudice. On August 6, 1986, Brenda Hayes filed an amended complaint against the City and Penn Trailers, among others. Dr. Jerva was not named a defendant in the amended complaint.

On October 28, 1986, the City filed a third-party complaint for contribution against Dr. Jerva (the defendant), alleging acts of negligence arising out of the defendant's treatment and care of Vincent Hayes on January 1, 1982. Penn Trailers also filed a third-party complaint for contribution against the defendant based on the same alleged acts of negligence. On September 25, 1987, Jerva filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaints filed by the City and Penn Trailers. In his motion to dismiss the third-party complaints, the defendant alleged, among other things, that because the City's and Penn Trailer's third-party complaints were filed more than four years after the alleged acts of negligence occurred, the actions were barred by the statute of repose contained in section 13-212(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter the medical malpractice statute of repose) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 13-212(a)). The provision provides in relevant part:

"Except as provided in Section 13-215 of this Act, no action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought * * * more than four years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death."

Citing as authority the appellate court's decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Architectural Management, Inc. (1987), 158 Ill.App.3d 515, 110 Ill.Dec. 529, 511 N.E.2d 706, which held that a similar statute of repose for actions against certain persons for construction-related activities governed third-party actions for contribution, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the third-party complaints on March 8, 1988. In addition, the trial court concluded that there was no just reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of the order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (107 Ill.2d R. 304(a)).

The City and Penn Trailers (the plaintiffs) appealed, contending that the medical malpractice statute of repose does not govern an action for contribution. Instead, the plaintiffs argued, an action for contribution is timely if it is filed during the pendency of the underlying direct action. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the third-party complaints. The appellate court concluded that a plain reading of the disputed provision demonstrated that it applied to all medical malpractice actions against physicians regardless of the claim. The appellate court determined that "a contribution action is just a 'different way' of bringing an action * * * for injury or death against a physician." (180 Ill.App.3d at 444, 129 Ill.Dec. 372, 535 N.E.2d 1137.) The appellate court then determined that the specific period of repose in the medical malpractice statute controlled over the general statute of limitations found in the Contribution Act. 180 Ill.App.3d at 447, 129 Ill.Dec. 372, 535 N.E.2d 1137.

The plaintiffs raise here their argument below that the four-year period of repose set forth in section 13-212 does not apply to contribution actions. In addition, the plaintiffs contend that even if the language in section 13-212 encompasses actions for contribution, the medical malpractice statute of repose is superseded by the rule, established by this court in Laue v. Leifheit (1984), 105 Ill.2d 191, 85 Ill.Dec. 340, 473 N.E.2d 939, that an action for contribution can be brought anytime during the pendency of the underlying action.

The plaintiffs initially point to the condition in the statute of repose that "no action for damages for injury or death against any physician * * * whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care" can be brought after the running of the repose period. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 13-212(a).) The plaintiffs argue that the phrase "action for damages" in the disputed provision refers only to an action at law for damages and not to an equitable apportionment of the damages among those who proximately caused the original plaintiff's injury. Therefore, the plaintiffs contend, the term "otherwise" in the provision relates only to various, but unenumerated, theories for recovery of damages for a plaintiff's injury or death. Citing this court's opinion in Doyle v. Rhodes (1984), 101 Ill.2d 1, 14, 77 Ill.Dec. 759, 461 N.E.2d 382, the plaintiffs then submit that a contribution action is not an "action for damages" but is instead a separate and independent action in equity, designed to insure that all joint tortfeasors bear their fair share of the damages awarded in the underlying direct action.

Defendant counters that the term "action" in the disputed provision should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Defendant offers an excerpt from Black's Law Dictionary defining the term to include "all the formal proceedings in a court of justice attendant upon the demand of a right made by one person of another in such court, including an adjudication upon the right and its enforcement or denial by the court." (Black's Law Dictionary 26 (5th ed. 1979).) Defendant then contends that the phrase "no action for damages" is met here because the plaintiffs' actions for contribution are for the recovery or credit of damages directly caused by defendant's alleged malpractice "arising out of patient care."

When interpreting a disputed provision, courts should ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature, considering first the statutory language. (In re Marriage of Logston (1984), 103 Ill.2d 266, 277, 82 Ill.Dec. 633, 469 N.E.2d 167.) Unambiguous terms, when not specifically defined, must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. (See, e.g., People v. Moore (1978), 69 Ill.2d 520, 523, 14 Ill.Dec. 470, 372 N.E.2d 666.) Moreover, courts should not insert words into legislative enactments when the statute otherwise presents a cogent and justifiable legislative scheme. (See Hagen v. City of Rock Island (1959), 18 Ill.2d 174, 179, 163 N.E.2d 495.) A plain reading of the disputed provision leads us to conclude that the General Assembly did not intend to define an "action for damages" in the medical malpractice statute of repose as an "action at law for damages." We believe that the medical malpractice statute of repose bars any action after the period of repose seeking damages against a physician or other enumerated health-care provider for injury or death arising out of patient care, whether at law or in equity.

Because we find that the statute of repose is not limited to actions at law, we need not address the plaintiffs' argument that this court's decision in Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill.2d at 1, 77 Ill.Dec. 759, ...