Hayes v. New Britain Gas Light Co.

• Citation: 185 A. 170,121 Conn. 356
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 14 May 1936
• Parties: HAYES v. NEW BRITAIN GAS LIGHT CO.

185 A. 170

121 Conn. 356

HAYES v. NEW BRITAIN GAS LIGHT CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 14, 1936

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Patrick B O'Sullivan, Judge.

Action by Anna J. Hayes against the New Britain Gas Light Company to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by negligence of defendant. From a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

No error.

One who enters upon premises of another as licensee or invitee must use due care not to do injury to owner.

Cyril F. Gaffney, of New Britain (Bernard F. Gaffney, of New Britain, on the brief), for appellant.

George J. Coyle, of New Britain (Thomas F McDonough, of New Britain, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to set the verdict aside. The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: James Lynch, an employee of the defendant, went to the house occupied by the plaintiff, for the purpose of reading a gas meter which was in the cellar. Entrance to the cellar was gained through a trapdoor in a small pantry off the kitchen. The door constituted almost the entire floor of the pantry. When opened, it leaned against the wall in such a way as not to interfere with the door of the pantry. Lynch entered the kitchen and was directed by the plaintiff to go to the cellar through the pantry. He opened the trapdoor, went to the cellar, and on his return left the trapdoor open and closed the door to the pantry. The pantry was without windows and unlighted. After he left, the plaintiff, having occasion to go to the pantry, opened the door, stepped over the threshold, and fell into the cellar, suffering the injuries to recover damages for which she brought this action. The contentions of the defendant are that Lynch was under no duty to close the door, and therefore could not be charged with negligence in not doing so, and that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

The defendant in its brief speaks of Lynch as a licensee upon the premises and seeks to apply in determining his obligation to use care the same principles as are involved when a licensee suffers injury upon the premise of a landowner. The description of Lynch as a licensee is open to question in view of his purpose in going upon the premises, but we have no need to consider that matter. An owner of land ordinarily owes no duty to a licensee, any more than he does to a trespasser, to keep his premises in a safe condition, because the licensee or trespasser must take the premises as he finds them and assumes the risk of any danger arising out of their condition. Wilmot v. McPadden, 79 Conn. 367, 375, 65 A. 157, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1101; Pastorello v. Stone, 89 Conn. 286, 289, 93 A. 529. But by our law, where the presence of a licensee or trespasser becomes known, the owner is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in his own conduct to avoid injury to him. Pomponio v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 66 Conn. 528, 541, 34 A. 491, 32 L.R.A. 530, 50 Am.St.Rep. 124; Kalmich v. White, 95 Conn. 568, 571, 111 A. 845; Ulrich v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 98 Conn. 567, 569, 119 A. 890; Voltz v. Orange Volunteer Fire Ass'n, Inc., 118 Conn. 307, 309, 172 A. 220. If we assume that the test of the existence of a duty on the part of Lynch is the same as would be applied as regards the plaintiff, had she, knowing that he was on the premises and would have occasion to enter the pantry, left the trapdoor open and the pantry door shut, it would necessarily follow that there was a duty on his part to exercise due care in the situation before us.

Approaching the question more broadly, there is no reason why one who enters upon the premises of another as licensee or invitee should be freed of the obligation to use due care not to do injury to the owner. Indeed, it would be shocking to the common feeling of men to hold that one invited or permitted by another to go upon his premises owed to that other no duty to refrain from acting so negligently as to expose the owner to danger or injury. In Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 407, 177 A. 262, we pointed out that the imposition of a duty upon one to use due care not to injure another was not dependent upon the underlying legal relationship between them, and we said (119 Conn. 398, at page 409, 177 A. 262, 266): " It is because he is intrusted with the person or property of another or has assumed the performance of an act which may affect the rights of another under such circumstances that, unless he uses proper care, that other will suffer injury, that the law imposes or implies a duty to use such care. In other words, the particular facts which bring two persons into a relationship to each other are not necessarily controlling,...