Voltz v. Orange Volunteer Fire Ass'n, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 April 1934 |
| Citation | 118 Conn. 307,172 A. 220 |
| Parties | VOLTZ v. ORANGE VOLUNTEER FIRE ASS'N, Inc., et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; John A. Cornell Judge.
Action by Harman Voltz against the Orange Volunteer Fire Association, Inc., and others, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants. The case was tried to the jury and from a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
No error.
Robert J. Woodruff, of New Haven, for appellants.
Edwin G. Hayes, of New Haven, for appellee.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.
The named defendant is a volunteer fire association organized for the purpose of fighting fires in the town of Orange, which does not maintain a fire department but has made annual appropriations in favor of the defendant. It maintained a fire house and a motor driven combination hose wagon and pumper. On November 26, 1931, there was an alarm of fire, and the plaintiff, who was not a member of the association but lived near the fire house, proceeded to the fire house, mounted the driver's seat of the truck, and manipulated the " choke" while a young man who was there turned the engine over with a crank, which the plaintiff had procured from behind the cushion of the seat. While the plaintiff was thus engaged, the defendant Brown, assistant chief of the association and one of the authorized drivers of the truck, came into the fire house and, after the engine was started, climbed up on the driver's seat and took his position behind the wheel, while the plaintiff slid across the seat toward the other side of the truck and started to get off. Brown started the truck, and, as it was being driven out of the fire house, the plaintiff fell or was thrown from the truck and sustained the injuries for which he is seeking to recover. The plaintiff claimed that he told Brown he was going to get off the truck, and that the latter, though he knew the plaintiff was getting off, so operated the truck that it suddenly jumped forward and threw the plaintiff off. The defendants claimed that Brown did not know that the plaintiff was getting off the truck, and did not know that he was injured until he was so informed at the scene of the fire. The defendants' appeal from the denial of their motion to set aside the verdict, and for alleged errors in the charge to the jury and the refusal to charge as requested, and in certain rulings on evidence.
Defendants requested the court to charge that the plaintiff was a trespasser, and that the defendants owed him no duty other than to avoid willfully injuring him, and that they were under no obligation to exercise any degree of care for his protection while he was in the fire house. The court charged that the plaintiff, when he mounted the truck, was a volunteer and, as such, was, under the circumstances, a trespasser, and that if the driver of the truck did not know that he was in a position of peril, his only duty toward him was to refrain from conduct which was wanton or willful. It further charged that if the driver of the truck knew of the plaintiff's presence upon it, and that he was in a position of peril, it was his duty to use the care and caution that a reasonably prudent person would use under the circumstances to refrain from injuring him. This was a correct statement of the duty owed to a trespasser whose presence is known, Kalmich v. White, 95 Conn. 568, 111 A. 845, and a charge to which the plaintiff was entitled in view of his claim that his presence on the truck and his intention to leave it were known to the driver.
The defendants requested the court to charge that in responding to an alarm of fire the defendants were performing a public duty, that they were not responsible for any injuries to others occurring in such service, and were not obliged to exercise any degree of care for the protection of the plaintiff, and that especially this was true if the town of Orange accepted the services of the association as a fire fighting force and contributed to its support. The court did not so charge, but charged that, while the defendant association was a corporation performing meritorious services, it was not a municipal corporation and was not entitled to the immunity ordinarily granted such corporations from liability for the negligence of its servants and agents in the performance of its governmental functions. The...
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Borelli v. Renaldi
...set forth by § 14-283 (d), which codifies the reasonable care standard articulated by this court in Voltz v. Orange Volunteer Fire Assn., Inc. , 118 Conn. 307, 311, 172 A. 220 (1934), and Tefft v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co ., 116 Conn. 127, 134, 163 A. 762 (1933).4 I part c......
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Gordon v. HNS MANAGEMENT CO., INC.
...in character and not appealable). 13. The plaintiffs in the present case argue that our decision in Voltz v. Orange Volunteer Fire Assn., Inc., 118 Conn. 307, 172 A. 220 (1934), addressed this question and supports the trial court's determination. In Voltz, the plaintiff sued a volunteer fi......
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Adesokan v. Town of Bloomfield
...means of a defective road or bridge may recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair" (emphasis added)). [11] The plaintiff in Voltz from a fire truck as the defendant assistant fire chief began to drive the truck out of the firehouse. See Voltz v. Orange Volunteer Fire Assn., ......
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State v. Walker
...with sufficient accuracy to render it admissible, is a preliminary question for the court...." Voltz v. Orange Volunteer Fire Assn., Inc., 118 Conn. 307, 311-12, 172 A. 220 (1934); Blanchard v. Bridgeport, 190 Conn. 798, 806, 463 A.2d 553 (1983). Further, the trial court has wide discretion......