Hayes v. Osborn
| Decision Date | 26 June 1945 |
| Docket Number | 31829. |
| Citation | 160 P.2d 956,195 Okla. 612,1945 OK 212 |
| Parties | HAYES v. OSBORN. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Oklahoma County; Carl Traub Judge.
Action by J. H. Osborn against Natalie Hayes, doing business as Havlin Hotel, for penalty and attorney's fee because of charges in excess of rent ceiling. From judgment for plaintiff and order overruling motion for new trial defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The right of an overcharged tenant under the Emergency Price Control Act to recover $50 is not limited to cases in which the landlord's violation of the Act is willful.
2. Where throughout the thirty day period ending March 1, 1942 there was paid and received the sum of $3.00 per week as rental for a room such amount by force of Maximum Rent Regulation 54-A became the ceiling rent per week at which said room might thereafter be leased in compliance with provisions of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 U.S.Stats. at Large 23, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq. until such maximum was changed by Administrator on petition of the landlord.
3. The filing by the landlord in the Office of Price Administrator of registration of such room wherein weekly rental is recited at an amount in excess of $3 is ineffective of itself to change the ceiling price as fixed by said regulation or impair the force thereof.
Robert O. Swimmer, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
Arthur H. Dolman, of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant in error, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, against plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as defendant.
Plaintiff sued defendant in Justices of the Peace Court to recover $50 and reasonable attorney's fees, and from judgment awarded plaintiff defendant appealed to the Court of Common Pleas where said cause was tried de novo to a jury resulting in judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the principal sum of $50 and $75 as attorney's fees.
It is alleged in the bill of particulars that plaintiff was compelled to pay $3.50 per week from November 1, 1942, to and including May 20, 1943, for rent of room No. 20 in the Havlin Hotel operated by the defendant; that, by reason of Maximum Rent Regulation 54-A, section 1388-334 of the Office of Price Administration under Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Title 1, section 2, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 902, approved January 30, 1942, and effective November 1, 1942, the rent ceiling for said room was $3.00, same being the rent charged and collected by said defendant on said room per week on March 1, 1942; and that by reason thereof defendant became liable to plaintiff in a sum treble the amount of the excess rent so paid or the sum of $50, whichever be greater, together with reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed by the court.
Defendant's answer was a general denial of the allegations of plaintiff's petition.
Of the eight assignments of error set out in petition in error only the second, fourth and seventh are presented and supported by argument. The assignments not presented will not be considered. Harrington v. City of Tulsa, 170 Okl. 20, 39 P.2d 120.
Assignments second and fourth, dealing with the court's instructions, are presented under the following proposition: 'In an action for treble damages or penalty under Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 for charging rent on hotel room in excess of maximum allowed under regulations made pursuant to Executive Order No. 5, issued by the President of the United States October 22, 1942, recorded in 7 Federal Registry No. 8596, freezing rents effective November 1, 1942, it is a defense that the omission to charge the correct rate was done in good faith pursuant to price schedule thereunder, and where there is evidence from which the jury might reasonably conclude that there was no intention to violate the act it is the duty of the court to submit the issue to the jury.'
In support of this proposition reliance is placed upon the express provisions of Title 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(d). It is contended that by reason of such provisions there was no liability for damages where one violating the regulation acted in good faith, and therefore the instructions of the court directing liability to turn upon the question whether the law was violated as alleged without submitting to the jury the question of defendant's good faith constituted fundamental error.
This contention involves a misinterpretation of the section mentioned which by its express terms has reference to liability that might otherwise exist in respect to things done or omitted in pursuance of the requirements of the act and has no reference to things done in violation of such requirements for which remedies are prescribed, and hence affords no support to the contention.
Section 205(e) of the Emergency Control Act provides:
And 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(e), after fixing the time in which such action may be brought, further provides:
The question presented, which necessarily involves a construction of the foregoing provisions, has been considered by several intermediate courts and in each court except one it was held that the seller or the landlord as the case may be was not relieved of liability by reason of good faith or unintentional violation. Everly v. Zepp D.C.E.D.Pa., 57 F.Supp. 303; Ward v. Bochino, 181 Misc. 355, 46 N.Y.S.2d 54; Zwang v. A. & P. Food Stores, 1944, 181 Misc. 375, 46 N.Y.S.2d 747; Brown v. Cummins Distilleries Corporation, D.C.Ky.1944, 53 F.Supp. 659. The court which held to the contrary was the Municipal Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, which held by reason of the good faith of seller the recovery should be limited to $5.00, the actual amount of overcharge, rather than the statutory sum of $50. This holding was reversed by the U.S.C.A. District of Columbia, in Bowles, Price Adm'r, v. American Stores, Inc., 78 U.S.App.D.C. 238, 139 F.2d 377, 378, and certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court, 322 U.S. 730, 64 S.Ct. 947, 88 L.Ed. 1565. The substance of the holding in the last cited case is that the phrase 'may bring an action' appearing in section 205(e) is equivalent to 'shall have a right of action for $50' and thus meaning a right to recover $50, and that there is nothing in said section 205(e) or the Act itself that suggests that the right of recovery is limited to cases where the seller's violation of the Act is willful. It is further held that, while the unqualified language of section 205(e) is sufficient to refute any...
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