Hayes v. Payne
Decision Date | 31 July 1987 |
Citation | 523 So.2d 333 |
Parties | Ronnie B. HAYES v. Robert Q. PAYNE. 85-608. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
John D. Gleissner of Davies, Williams & Wallace, Birmingham, for appellant.
Louis W. Scholl, Birmingham, for appellee.
On July 23, 1984, Robert Q. Payne filed a suit in circuit court against Ronnie B. Hayes. The complaint alleged breach of contract and fraud regarding the sale by Hayes to Payne of 50 percent of the stock in B H & R Fabricators, Inc., a corporation owned by Hayes. Hayes filed a pro se answer to the complaint, denying each of the allegations contained in the complaint. The case proceeded to trial, and on September 25, 1985, judgment was entered on a jury verdict in favor of Payne and against Hayes, with damages assessed at $152,976.11.
On October 22, 1985, Hayes filed a pro se motion for new trial. On December 20, 1985, an attorney entered an appearance on behalf of Hayes, filing an "amendment to answer," pleading the applicable one-year statute of limitations as a bar to the plaintiff's allegations with regard to fraud. Hayes sought to have the court "relate this defense back to the date of the original answer and remit the verdict and judgment accordingly." Payne filed an objection to Hayes's motion. Hayes, through his attorney, filed additional motions seeking a new trial, remittitur, and other relief. On January 24, 1986, the trial judge overruled the motion for new trial and refused to set aside or remit the jury verdict.
Hayes contends on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the amended answer pleading the defense of the statute of limitations after the jury had returned its verdict. We find no error based on the record before us.
Rule 8(c), A.R.Civ.P., provides that the statute of limitations is an affirmative "
defense that must be affirmatively pleaded. Where an answer has been filed and an affirmative defense has not been pleaded, the defense generally is deemed to have been waived. Wallace v. Alabama Ass'n of Classified School Employees, 463 So.2d 135 (Ala.1984); Robinson v. Morse, 352 So.2d 1355 (Ala.1977). There are exceptions to this rule, as recognized by Robinson v. Morse, at 1357, quoting 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1278:
Additionally, an affirmative defense that has not been pleaded may be revived if the defense appears on the face of the complaint. Wallace, supra.
Hayes correctly points out that Rule 15, A.R.Civ.P., requires that amendments be granted liberally when justice so requires. Regarding the application of Rule 15, A.R.Civ.P., this Court, in Stead v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, 294 Ala. 3, 6, 310 So.2d 469, 471 (1975), said:
The trial judge is vested with discretion to allow or to deny amendments under Rule 15, Pierce v. Webb, 398 So.2d 271 (Ala.1981); Stallings v. Angelica Uniform Co., 388 So.2d 942 (Ala.1980), and the trial judge's determination should not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Hughes v. Wallace, 429 So.2d 981 (Ala.1983).
In the instant case, Hayes contends that his amended answer raising the statute of limitations should be allowed as an exception because the defense appears on the face of the complaint and because the issue of the statute of limitations was tried by the implied consent of the parties. We agree with the determination of the trial court that the defense of the "statute of limitations does not appear on the face of [the] complaint." The only record of the proceedings at trial is a statement of the evidence and proceedings, made pursuant to Rule 10(d), A.R.App.P. This statement does not indicate that the statute of limitations issue was tried by the "express or implied consent" of the parties.
The statement of the evidence and proceedings reveals that, prior to trial, the judge encouraged Hayes to get a lawyer and informed him that the case would be continued if he desired to obtain the services of an attorney. However, Hayes declined a continuance on that basis. The defense of the statute of limitations was raised for the first time after judgment was entered in favor of Payne. The only reason advanced for the failure to raise the Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the amended answer asserting the affirmative defense to be presented following the jury verdict and entry of judgment. See Moseley v. Commercial State Bank, 457 So.2d 967 (Ala.1984); Robinson v. Morse, 352 So.2d 1355 (Ala.1977).
defense earlier is that Hayes, who was not represented by an attorney at trial, was unaware of the necessity of pleading the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. We do not deem this to be a justifiable reason for failing to raise the defense earlier. In Phillips v. Alonzo, 461 So.2d 796 (Ala.1984), the appellant, who had proceeded pro se in a legal malpractice suit, sought relief under Rule 60(b)(6), A.R.Civ.P., from the summary judgment that had been entered against him. The appellant contended that the trial judge had abused his discretion by failing to inform appellant that it was necessary to file a counteraffidavit of an expert in order to defeat the summary judgment motion. The court held that the appellant failed to show an abuse of discretion by the trial judge to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
Hayes filed a motion for new trial, or alternatively, a motion for remittitur, contending that the jury verdict was excessive and was the result of prejudice, bias, or passion. The trial court did not state the factors it considered in denying the motion for new trial based upon the alleged excessiveness of the jury verdict. See Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986)....
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