State Dept. of Revenue v. Price-Williams
Citation | 594 So.2d 48 |
Decision Date | 17 January 1992 |
Docket Number | PRICE-WILLIAMS and E |
Parties | STATE of Alabama DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. Thorntonlizabeth L. Price-Williams. 1900722. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., Ron Bowden, Chief Counsel, and John J. Breckenridge, Asst. Counsel, Dept. of Revenue, and Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.
Mark J. Everest of Collins, Galloway & Smith, Mobile, for appellees.
This case involves a dispute between the Alabama Department of Revenue ("Department") and owners of land over the rights of those owners to redeem the property against the Department, which had bought the property at a sale for delinquent taxes.
The issues raised are 1) whether the trial court incorrectly applied Ala.Code 1975 § 40-10-83, to the redemption of property sold for the failure to pay "income" taxes; 2) whether the trial court lacked in rem and personal jurisdiction to order redemption under Ala.Code 1975, § 40-10-83, against the Department, because of the State's immunity from suit; 3) whether the owners who sought redemption were the proper parties to obtain redemption under § 40-10-83; and 4) whether the Department was paid an adequate amount for redemption under § 40-10-83.
On January 4, 1977, Thornton Price-Williams and Elizabeth L. Price-Williams, the appellees, purchased lots 714 and 715 from Murdock C. Stephens and Carmen M. Stephens for $85,000 and received a warranty deed. However, the Price-Williamses did not record the deed until January 9, 1980.
On June 14, 1979, the Department recorded a certificate of lien for taxes, claiming that the Stephenses owed the Department $3,705.27 for income taxes due from 1976. On September 19, 1979, a final assessment of income tax for 1976 was entered against the Stephenses in the amount of $3,705.27.
On August 18, 1980, the Department issued a writ of execution against all property belonging to the Stephenses. On October 27, 1980, lots 714 and 715 were sold at a sheriff's sale, at public auction, and the Department bought the property.
The Price-Williamses filed suit to quiet title and to remove the cloud on their title resulting from the tax liens and the sheriff's deed. The trial court declared that the title to the land was free and clear of all claims, interests, liens, or encumbrances of the Department, voided the deed under which the Department claimed title, and removed the cloud from the Price-Williamses' title to the lots. The trial court's findings of fact included, inter alia, a finding that the Price-Williamses were purchasers in the "usual course of trade" and that the Stephenses retained no interest in the property after the January 4, 1977, conveyance to the Price-Williamses. The trial court concluded that the Department did not obtain a lien against the lots because the Price-Williamses were prior purchasers in the "usual course of trade" within the meaning of § 40-1-2, and that the Department was not a "judgment creditor" so as to be able to take advantage of Ala.Code 1975, § 35-4-90, which provides:
The trial court made no finding whether the Department had notice of the Price-Williamses' interest in the lots.
The Department appealed that judgment, and this Court reversed and remanded, Department of Revenue v. Price-Williams, 545 So.2d 7 (Ala.1989), and ordered the trial court to determine whether the Department had actual and/or constructive notice of the unrecorded deed within the meaning of § 35-4-90, so as to make it a "judgment creditor with notice." A judgment lien creditor with notice is not protected against an unrecorded deed, while a judgment creditor without notice is protected. Department of Revenue, 545 So.2d at 9. The Price-Williamses, as holders of an unrecorded deed, had the burden of proving that the Department had notice of the unrecorded deed. Id.
On remand, the trial court found that the Department did not have notice of the unrecorded deed at the time the final assessment was entered, and that the Department was a judgment lien creditor under the provisions of Ala.Code 1975, § 35-4-90(a). Nevertheless, in order to "best serve equity," the trial court allowed the Price-Williamses, under § 40-10-83, to redeem the lots from the Department upon payment of the final assessment and interest. This section provides that an owner in possession of property can redeem. It states:
Ala.Code 1975, § 40-10-83.
The Department again appeals. We affirm.
The Department argues that the trial court erred when it applied § 40-10-83 to the redemption of property sold for the failure to pay "income" taxes, contending that the statute is limited to the redemption of property sold for the failure to pay "ad valorem" taxes. While the Department argues that Chapter 10 of Title 40 deals exclusively with "ad valorem" taxes, this Court has not found anything to convince us that § 40-10-83 is so limited. If we limited the application of § 40-10-83 to property sold for the nonpayment of ad valorem taxes only, as the State urges us to do, at least two principles of law applicable to the right of redemption would have to be discarded: (1) that legislation authorizing an owner to redeem where the State is the purchaser should be liberally construed in favor of the right to redeem, and (2) that statutes authorizing former owners to redeem property bought in by the State for nonpayment of taxes should be liberally construed so as to foster the return of land to the tax rolls of the State.
In its order, the trial court stated:
It is well settled in this court that a proceeding under § 40-10-83 (former Ala.Code 1940, § 296, Title 51), "is a straight bill to enforce a redemption in equity." Bobo v. Edwards Realty Co., 250 Ala. 344, 345, 34 So.2d 165, 166-67 (1947). See Tensaw Land & Timber Co. v. Rivers, 244 Ala. 657, 15 So.2d 411 (1943) (emphasis added).
Bobo, 250 Ala. at 346, 34 So.2d at 167.
The underlying principle in a court of equity is that "nothing will be permitted within its jurisdiction which is unconscionable." Humphrey v. Humphrey, 254 Ala. 395, 48 So.2d 424, 427 (1950). Allowing the Department to keep the Price-Williams property, worth at least $85,000, for the nonpayment of $3,740.28, would be inequitable, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so finding. Both parties in this case were made whole upon payment to the Department of the delinquent taxes and upon the return of title to the Price-Williamses. Therefore, this Court finds that the equitable redemption statute, § 40-10-83, is applicable to the redemption of property sold for the nonpayment of any type of tax and is not limited to the redemption of property sold for the nonpayment of ad valorem taxes only.
The Department argues that the trial court lacked both in rem and personal jurisdiction to allow redemption against it because the Department, as an agency of the State, is immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Ala. Const., 1901, art. I, § 14. We find this argument to be without merit. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense. See ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Austill v. Prescott, 1170709
...without regard to possession by the redemptioner.’ " 10 So. 3d at 992 (emphasis added).The dissent points to State Department of Revenue v. Price-Williams, 594 So. 2d 48 (Ala. 1992), decided after Buzzelli and Karagan, as an example of the Court's applying the possession requirement for jud......
-
Hamilton v. Guardian Tax AL, LLC
...a tax sale. Id. Fourth, there must not be a suit pending to enforce or test the opposing party's claim. Id." State Dep't of Revenue v. Price-Williams, 594 So. 2d 48, 52 (Ala. 1992). Shamblin bases his right to redeem under § 40-10-83 on his assertion that he has been the owner in possession......
-
Hamilton v. Guardian Tax AL, LLC
...Id. Fourth, there must not be a suit pending to enforce or test the opposing party's claim. Id."State Dep't of Revenue v. Price-Williams, 594 So. 2d 48, 52 (Ala. 1992). Shamblin bases his right to redeem under § 40-10-83 on his assertion that he has been the owner in possession of the prope......
-
Grogan v. Hillman, 2040227.
...is so clear that no one denies it. George E. Wood Lumber Co. v. Williams, 157 Ala. 73, 47 So. 202 (1908)." State Dep't of Revenue v. Price-Williams, 594 So.2d 48, 52 (Ala.1992). Given its natural and plain meaning, the term "any possession" includes "constructive possession." The trial cour......
-
Alabama Tax Certificate Investors Beware: Negotiating Through the Labyrinth Of, and Important Limitations to Recovering Money In, the Redemption Process
...ALA. CODE § 40-10-83 (West, Westlaw through Act 2011-255 of the 2011 Regular Session).65. State Dep't of Revenue v. Price-Williams, 594 So.2d 48, 53 (1992) (citing Morris v. Card, 223 Ala. 254, 135 So. 354 (1931)).66. Natl Fireproofing Corp. v. Hagler, 226 Ala. 104, 106, 145 So.421, 423 (19......
-
Money for Nothing: Who Is Entitled to the Excess Paid at a Tax Sale?
...the construction in any case of doubt or ambiguity should be in favor of the right to redeem"); State Dept. of Revenue v. Price-Williams, 594 So. 2d 48, 52-53 (Ala. 1992) (recognizing that the judicially created redemption method arising from Ala. Code § 40-10-83 has been expanded over the ......