Hayes v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., Civil Action No. 15-cv-02015-REB

• Decision Date: 19 July 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-cv-02015-REB
• Citation: 401 F.Supp.3d 1194
• Parties: John HAYES, Plaintiff, v. SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

401 F.Supp.3d 1194

John HAYES, Plaintiff,

v.SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-cv-02015-REB

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed July 19, 2019

Amy Dell Trenary, Appeal to Justice, LLC, Broomfield, CO, Mary Josephine Lowrey, Sarah J. Parady, Lowrey Parady, LLC, Denver, CO, Paul J. Maxon, Paul Maxon, P.C., The Law Office of, Boulder, CO, for Plaintiff.

Gregory M. Saylin, Tyson C. Horrocks, Holland & Hart LLP, Scott M. Petersen, Fabian VanCott, PC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Robert E. Blackburn, United States District Judge

The matter before me is Defendant's Motion for New Trial [#265],¹ filed October 24, 2018. I deny the motion.

I. JURISDICTION

I have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a case has been tried to a jury, a new trial may be granted "for any of the reasons for which new trial have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A). In matters decided without a jury, the court may grant a new trial on any issue "for any reason for which a rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal court." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(B). see also McHargue v. Stokes Division of Pennwalt Corp. , 912 F.2d 394, 396 (10th Cir. 1990).

In either instance, a motion for new trial "is not regarded with favor and should only be granted with great caution," United States v. Kelley , 929 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1991), and then "only to correct manifest errors of law or to present newly discovered evidence," Elm Ridge Exploration Co., LLC v. Engle , 721 F.3d 1199, 1216 (10th Cir. 2013). see also Charles Alan Wright et al., 11 Federal Practice & Procedure Civil § 2804 (3rd ed.) ("A motion for a new trial in a nonjury case...should be based upon manifest error of law or mistake of fact, and a judgment should not be set aside except for substantial reasons.") (footnote omitted). The decision whether to grant a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Kelley , 929 F.2d at 586.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff John Hayes's claims for retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 - 2654, and for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213, were tried to a jury on September 18-22, 2017. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Mr. Hayes on all claims submitted to it and awarded substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant SkyWest Airlines, Inc. ("SkyWest") now moves for a new trial on numerous grounds under Rule 59(a)(1)(A). Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(B), it also seeks reconsideration of my order granting Mr. Hayes's post-trial motion for an award of front pay. (See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Orders Re: Front Pay [#247], filed September 24, 2018 [hereinafter "FOF & COL "].) For the reasons set forth herein, I deny the motion in all particulars.

A. Evidence of Mr. Hayes's Employment with UGE

SkyWest argues first that Mr. Hayes withheld material evidence regarding his subsequent employment as a ramp agent with United Ground Express ("UGE") in Memphis, Tennessee. More specifically, SkyWest maintains Mr. Hayes failed to apprise it timely that, beginning in July 2017 and continuing through the time of trial, he had been placed on medical leave by UGE and thus was not working. The circumstances of UGE's decision were set forth in my findings awarding Mr. Hayes front pay:

Mr. Hayes's position as a Ramp Agent for UGE is physically demanding work that required him to work outside in all weather conditions. While Mr. Hayes was still receiving dialysis, he was more susceptible to dehydration, a condition exacerbated by Memphis's summertime heat and humidity. Mr. Hayes's doctors were "not supportive" of his decision to take the job with UGE for this very reason. As a result of this confluence of factors, on July 7, 2017, Mr. Hayes collapsed at work. He was placed on medical leave by UGE and was not approved to return to work until September 17, 2018.

(FOF & COL at 12 (footnote omitted).) SkyWest insists a new trial is warranted based on the failure to provide this evidence prior to trial.

I disagree. To warrant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, SkyWest must show each and all of the following:

(1) the evidence was newly discovered since the trial; (2) [the moving party] was diligent in discovering the new evidence; (3) the newly discovered evidence could not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the newly discovered evidence [was] material; and (5) that a new trial, with the newly discovered evidence[, will] probably produce a different result.

Joseph v. Terminix International Co. , 17 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming arguendo SkyWest can satisfy the first three elements of the relevant standard, I cannot find Mr. Hayes's circumstances at UGE were material, much less that they would have changed the outcome of the trial.

Evidence is material if it goes to "one of the most significant aspects" of the case. Graham by Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, Division of American Home Products Corp. , 906 F.2d 1399, 1417 (10 thCir.), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 981, 111 S.Ct. 511, 112 L.Ed.2d 523 (1990). While SkyWest focuses myopically on whether Mr. Hayes could perform the lifting duties of a Ramp Agent as SkyWest defined that position,² Mr. Hayes never maintained he could perform that aspect of the job. Indeed, it was quite clear he could not. Nevertheless, it was also clear from the evidence presented at trial that Mr. Hayes could perform, and desperately wished to perform, other jobs which did not require lifting beyond his medical restrictions,³ including the very job he was performing at the time SkyWest forced him back on medical leave in August, 2014.⁴

More importantly, whether another employer determined Mr. Hayes could not work as a "ramp agent," as that employer defined the position, does not speak to the material question that was at the center of this case: SkyWest's motivations for forcing Mr. Hayes to go back on medical leave and refusing to hire him for other available positions within the company. Those decisions are specific to the relationship between Mr. Hayes and SkyWest. SkyWest's intentions in dealing with Mr. Hayes could not have been informed by the actions of a different employer in a different city occurring several years after the events in this case.⁵ If anything, allowing this evidence would have risked jury confusion over the relevant issues in the case.⁶

Nor would this evidence been likely to change the jury's award of punitive damages, for the same reasons. The jury was tasked to consider whether SkyWest acted with malice or reckless indifference to Mr. Hayes's federally protected rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). That standard is met when the evidence shows the employer knew it was acting in violation of federal law or that it acted "in the face of a perceived risk that its action will violate federal law." Kolstad v. American Dental Association , 527 U.S. 526, 535-36, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 2124-25, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). Here again, the focus is entirely on why SkyWest knew and how it acted toward Mr. Hayes. Whether it was reasonable for another employer to place Mr. Hayes on medical leave, three years after the events in this case, simply would not have made it more or less likely that SkyWest did not understand its obligations to Mr. Hayes under the disability discrimination laws.

Because this evidence was not material, it would not have changed the outcome of this trial. The jury heard copious evidence that fully supported its determinations that SkyWest intentionally discriminated and retaliated against Mr. Hayes. Having presided over this trial, I have no trouble in concluding that evidence of UGE's treatment of Mr. Hayes would not have altered the jury's perception of the reasonableness or legality of SkyWest's decisions.

B. Contempt Findings/Plaintiff's Closing Arguments

SkyWest next alleges error in my advisements to the jury following the three contempt citations that occurred during the course of the trial. It claims these comments, together with arguments made by counsel for Mr. Hayes during his rebuttal closing, unfairly prejudiced the jury against it. Stripping away SkyWest's hyperbole about these matters, none of these alleged errors, either Individually or collectively, warrants a new trial. See United States v. Lopez-Medina , 596 F.3d 716, 741 (10th Cir. 2010) ("Where, as here, a defendant has failed to establish the existence of multiple non-reversible errors... he cannot benefit from the cumulative error doctrine.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Regarding the contempt citations against SkyWest's paralegal, Ann Rutledge, and its corporate representative, Jaime Sorensen, as well as against the juror implicated in Ms. Sorensen's contempt, I note that SkyWest failed to lodge a contemporaneous objection to the advisements I gave to the jury about the absence of these individuals from the courtroom. My review therefore is limited to plain error only. See Henderson v. United States , 568 U.S. 266, 277, 133 S.Ct. 1121, 1129, 185 L.Ed 2d 85 (2013) ; United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta , 403 F.3d 727, 744-45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 546 U.S. 967, 126 S.Ct. 495, 163 L.Ed.2d 375 (2005).

I perceive no error, much less plain error, in this regard. First, and contrary to SkyWest's reckless misrepresentation, I did not reprimand or dismiss any of these three individuals in the presence of the jury. When I witnessed what I perceived to be Ms. Rutledge's attempts to coach Ms. Sorensen as the latter was asked to testify about a particular trial exhibit, I immediately called the parties to the bench to apprise them of what I had seen and then dismissed the jury, telling them only...