Hayes v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-1294,19-1294
• Citation: 12 F.4th 1186
• Parties: John HAYES, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

12 F.4th 1186

John HAYES, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant - Appellant.

No. 19-1294

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

FILED September 9, 2021

Marcy G. Glenn, Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado (Jessica E. Whelan of Holland & Hart LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada; Gregory M. Saylin and Tyson C. Horrocks of Holland & Hart LLP, Salt Lake City, Utah; and Scott M. Petersen of Fabian VanCott, Salt Lake City, Utah, with her on the briefs), for Defendant-Appellant SkyWest Airlines, Inc.

Paul Maxon, The Law Office of Paul Maxon, P.C., Boulder, Colorado (Sarah Parady of Lowrey Parady Lebsack, LLC, Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee John Hayes.

Before HOLMES, KELLY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.

CARSON, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff John Hayes prosecuted his employment discrimination case to a favorable verdict and judgment. But he encountered bumps along the road. Now we must examine a district court's authority to manage proceedings and sanction litigants before it, to grant a mistrial or a new one, and to award equitable remedies. Because these essential powers inhere to us and to our colleagues by the structure and independence of the judicial branch, we police them cautiously—especially as an appellate tribunal. Keeping this responsibility in mind, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion or authority in this case.

During trial, two instances of misconduct prompted Defendant SkyWest Airlines, Inc. to request a mistrial. But it was Defendant's own misconduct. Thus, the district court tried to remedy the misconduct and preserve the integrity of the proceedings but did not grant Defendant's request. After the trial, exercising its equitable powers, the district court granted Plaintiff's request for a front pay award. Following final judgment, Defendant moved for a new trial based, in part, on the district court's handling of the misconduct incidents and on newly discovered evidence. The district court denied that motion. Defendant appeals, asking us to reverse and remand for a new trial or, at the very least, to vacate (or reduce) the front pay award. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Defendant, an aviation company, provides ground services to airlines at airports across the country. For many years, Defendant provided ground services for United Airlines ("United") at Denver International Airport ("DIA"). Plaintiff worked as a "ramp agent" for Defendant at DIA from 2006 until his termination in 2014. Defendant promoted Plaintiff twice—first to "ramp supervisor" and then, in 2013, to "ramp shift manager." Tragically, however, Plaintiff's chronic kidney disease

deteriorated in 2013, so he resigned his management role and returned to regular line employment. But Plaintiff maintained his designation as a Certified Station Trainer ("CST"). That designation showed Plaintiff's authority and eligibility to train other employees and receive additional compensation for that work.

In 2014, because of his deteriorating condition, Plaintiff exhausted his Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") benefits. Over the next few months, Plaintiff received and used discretionary leave, as well as leave donated to him by other employees. Eventually, Plaintiff returned to work, at which time the parties began the "interactive accommodation process" under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiff also sought reassignment to other positions within the company. When those discussions failed, Plaintiff's employment ended in November 2014. Meanwhile, in the fall of 2014, Defendant learned that United would not renew Defendant's contract at DIA for 2015. Therefore, Defendant furloughed many of its Denver employees in December 2014.

Plaintiff sued, alleging Defendant violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the FMLA. After a week-long trial in 2017, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff. The jury found that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff, failed to accommodate him, and retaliated against him, all in violation of the ADA. The jury awarded Plaintiff $2.3 million in back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages under the ADA. And the jury found that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the FMLA, awarding him another $150,000 for that violation. The jury found against Defendant on all its affirmative defenses and found that Plaintiff did not fail to mitigate his damages. The district court reduced the monetary awards to reflect the single-recovery rule and statutory caps.

None of the events up to the December 2014 furlough are at issue on appeal, nor is the jury's verdict. But certain events at trial, as well as some post-trial events, are the subject of this appeal. During trial, two instances of misconduct prompted the district court to take remedial actions, including advisements to the jury. First, a paralegal for Defendant's team gestured to a witness. And second, Defendant's corporate representative conversed with a juror. After the second, Defendant moved for a mistrial. The district court denied that motion. After trial, Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the incidents during trial and the district court's responsive conduct tainted the jury and deprived Defendant of a fair trial. The motion also sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, which Defendant said Plaintiff withheld. The district court denied that motion as well. Defendant urges us to grant it a new trial on either or both grounds.

Post-trial, Plaintiff moved for additional monetary awards, including front pay. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, and awarded over $300,000 in front pay. The district court found that Defendant's discrimination prevented Plaintiff from obtaining employment with the company that took over United's ground services contract at DIA, Simplicity USA ("Simplicity"). The district court found (1) Defendant's actions kept Plaintiff from knowing about or applying for the "trainer" position with Simplicity, (2) Plaintiff possessed all qualifications for that position, (3) had he applied, Simplicity would more likely than not have offered Plaintiff the position, and (4) had Simplicity offered the position, Plaintiff would have accepted it. So the trainer position became the basis for the front pay award.

Although not in the trainer position, Plaintiff worked for a few companies between 2014 and judgment. In November 2014, after negotiations with Defendant fell apart, Plaintiff took an entry-level job with Signature Air ("Signature"). Plaintiff left that job because of trouble negotiating his return from a brief medical leave. But in March 2015, Plaintiff started in a part-time position with United's own ground services department. He chose United because of the health insurance and job protection it offered, as well as certain other benefits. During Plaintiff's employment with United, his spouse's employer laid her off from her job in Denver, forcing the couple to relocate to Memphis, Tennessee, where she found full-time work. Although Plaintiff could not support himself and his spouse on his part-time earnings alone, he could have supported them on the Simplicity trainer position. So, had he been in that position, they would not have had to move, and his spouse could have continued her job search in Denver, where the couple wished to stay.

After a few months searching for employment in Memphis, Plaintiff started a night-shift position with Delta Ground Services, but that conflicted with his overnight dialysis schedule. So he went to work in a part-time, entry-level position at PrimeFlight, and then transitioned to a position with United Ground Express ("UGE"), where he remained employed through the time of the front pay hearing. The district court used the UGE job as the comparison point for the front pay award, calculating front pay as the difference between what Plaintiff made working for UGE and what he would have made in the Simplicity trainer position. The district court found that, more likely than not, Plaintiff would have stayed in the Simplicity trainer position until retirement at age 65, and that, more likely than not, he would remain at UGE for that same time.¹

II.

This case presents three issues. First, whether the district court should have granted Defendant's motion for mistrial or its motion for new trial based on unfairly prejudicial trial proceedings. We review both denials for abuse of discretion. United States v. Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (mistrial); Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 1291, 1296 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (new trial). Second, whether the district court should have granted Defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence—which we also review for abuse of discretion. FDIC v. Arciero, 741 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Finally, whether the district court erred in awarding or calculating front pay. We review the award for abuse of discretion. Ballard v. Muskogee Reg'l Med. Ctr., 238 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

A district court abuses its discretion if its ruling is arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical, or arises from an error of law or a clear error of fact. Amoco Oil Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 231 F.3d 694, 697 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). A fact finding is clearly erroneous only where it wholly lacks support in the record or if, after reviewing the evidence, we are definitively and firmly convinced that the district court made a mistake. Acosta v. Foreclosure Connection, Inc., 903 F.3d 1132, 1134 (10th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

III.

"It has long been understood that ‘[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise...