Hayes v. Temecula Valley Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 February 2018
• Docket Number: D072998
• Citation: 21 Cal.App.5th 735,230 Cal.Rptr.3d 576
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Karen HAYES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TEMECULA VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

21 Cal.App.5th 735

230 Cal.Rptr.3d 576

Karen HAYES, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.TEMECULA VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

D072998

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed February 28, 2018

Wagner & Pelayes, Dennis E. Wagner and Jacob P. Menicucci, Riverside, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Walsh & Associates, Encino, Dennis J. Walsh and Alice Chung, Encino, for Defendant and Respondent.

HALLER, J.

Karen Hayes appeals a judgment denying her writ of mandate petition seeking an order directing the Temecula Valley School District (District) to reinstate her as a middle school principal. The District removed Hayes as principal and reassigned her to a teaching position for the 2015-2016 school year under its statutory authority to reassign a school principal without cause. ( Ed. Code, § 44951.)¹ The District also placed Hayes on paid administrative leave through the end of the 2014-2015 school year.

Hayes primarily challenges her release and reassignment from her school principal position and, to a lesser extent, her placement on paid administrative leave for about three months. She contends the court erred in denying her writ petition because: (1) the District's notice of the no-cause reassignment was untimely as the governing school board (Board) did not approve the notice until two days after the March 15 statutory deadline ( § 44951 ); (2) her removal was in fact "for cause" and therefore she was entitled to a hearing and due process before the removal and reassignment; and (3) her placement on paid administrative leave violated statutes and internal District policies.

On the first issue, we determine the notice was timely because the statutes do not require school board preapproval for a section 44951 March 15 notice to be valid. We conclude the remaining contentions are without merit on the factual record before us. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Under the applicable review standard, we summarize the facts accepting the truth of the District's evidence and drawing all reasonable factual inferences favoring the court's ruling.² (See Agosto v. Board of Trustees of Grossmont-Cuyamaca Community College Dist. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 330, 336, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 300 ( Agosto ).)

Hayes served as a principal at Margarita Middle School beginning in 2002. During the next 12 years, she received positive performance reviews and was viewed favorably by many teachers, parents, and students. In late 2014, a female teacher (JD) at the middle school complained about a male teacher (RF). Hayes was responsible for investigating and resolving the complaint, with the assistance of District's human resource directors Joe Mueller and Tiffany Martinez. After the investigation, Hayes found some of JD's complaints against RF to be substantiated.

In early 2015, RF submitted a Public Records Act request to the District for documents related to the complaint and investigation, including Hayes's emails. While gathering the responsive records, Mueller found that Hayes's email communications showed she had not been objective and impartial in the investigation. He believed the emails were unprofessional, and Hayes had showed favor toward JD and bias against RF.

Mueller immediately showed the emails to Tim Ritter, the District's superintendent (Superintendent). After his evaluation of the emails, the Superintendent decided to provide Hayes with notice of possible release and reassignment to a teaching position for the next year because he had lost confidence in her abilities to serve as principal at the middle school. The next day, on March 11, 2015, the Superintendent and the human resource directors met with Hayes and gave her a reassignment notice, which Hayes signed. The March 11 notice, titled "Notice of Possible Release and Reassignment," stated in relevant part:

"You are hereby given notice pursuant to Education Code section 44951 that you may be released from your present position as Middle School Principal and reassigned to another certificated administrative or teaching position, effective at the end of the 2014-2015 school year. The Board of Education will take action on this matter and provide additional notice prior to June 30, 2015, if you are to be released and reassigned.

"This notice does not preclude any other administrative or disciplinary action which may otherwise be appropriate under specific circumstances." (Italics added.)

The identified statute, section 44951, governs the timing and nature of a preliminary notice (known as a March 15 notice) required before a school district can reassign a school principal for "no-cause."³ As discussed below, this statute requires a school district to provide notice by March 15 that a school administrator "may be released from his or her position for the following school year." ( § 44951.) Without this notice, a no-cause transfer from administrator to a teaching position is invalid, and the principal may continue in his or her position under the same terms and conditions for the next school year. (Ibid. )

At this March 11 meeting, the Superintendent also gave Hayes a letter stating that, "effective today," she was being placed on "paid administrative leave until further notice." The letter said the purpose of the leave was "to allow the District to conduct an investigation into allegations of misconduct." Hayes was also told she had the option to voluntarily resign her principal position before the next scheduled school board meeting (March 17) to allow her to "land softly" if she wanted to apply to a different school district without a public record of removal. Contrary to Hayes's assertions, the record does not support that she was told the District intended to terminate her.

At the end of the March 11 meeting, the Superintendent asked Hayes if she had any personal items she needed from her office between March 11 and the March 17 Board meeting. Later that evening, Mueller met Hayes at the middle school to allow her to retrieve her briefcase, but Hayes began removing all of the items in her office, which surprised Mueller, as the Board had not taken action regarding her possible removal and release.

The next morning, on March 12, Hayes sent an email to the District's human resources department asking for clarification of her choices, including whether she was being terminated. Later that day, a District human resources director sent a lengthy letter to Hayes explaining her options:

"You have been served notice pursuant to Education Code section 44951 that you may be released and reassigned to the classroom or another certificated position at the end of the 2014-2015 school year, without cause .

This is a preliminary notice to meet the statutory March 15 deadline. This recommendation has not yet been made to the Board and the Board has not yet taken action.

"The [D]istrict will complete its investigation in advance of the March 17, 2015, Board meeting. This will allow the administration to make a recommendation on that date concerning your release and reassignment without cause at the end of the school year.

"Should the circumstances warrant, as determined by the results of the investigation , the administration may recommend an immediate release and reassignment for cause. This would involve serving and filing an official statement of charges of misconduct with the Board, after which you would be provided the due process called for in such a case.

"The decision on whether either recommendation will be presented to the Board ... has not yet been made, and will depend on the results of the investigation. [¶] ... [¶]

"Each of the two administrative recommendations under consideration and described above, if approved, will involve formal action of the Board to release you from your position as Principal and reassign you to a classroom or other certificated position. The first option is without cause, effective at the end of the school year. The second option is for-cause, based upon a formal statement of charges, and would be effective immediately upon completion of the required due process. Neither of these actions will terminate your status as a permanent certificated employee of the ... District and you will retain the attendant rights and responsibilities.

"As always, you have other options available to you that would eliminate the need for formal Board action. Whether you consider a voluntary resignation in lieu of formal Board action is a matter for you to consider and discuss with your personal representative, if desired. Any such action would require written confirmation from you prior to 2:00 pm on Friday March 13, 2015. [¶] ... [¶]

"If necessary, on March 17, 2015, District administration will brief the Board on the results of the investigation and (if warranted ) the options for administrative, corrective, or disciplinary action.

The Board will hear specific allegations and/or charges against you. This will occur during the closed session portion of the meeting beginning at or about 4:15 p.m. on Tuesday March 17, 2015 ....

"You are hereby notified that pursuant to Government Code section 54957, you have the right to have this matter considered in open, public, session instead of closed session. If you desire to have this matter heard in open session, you must notify me at or before 4:00 p.m. on Monday March 16, 2015.

"After the Board meeting you will be notified of the specific course of action chosen by the Board and of your further rights and responsibilities. [¶] ... [¶]

"As discussed in our meeting on March 11, 2015, you have been placed on paid administrative leave pending the District's investigation into your conduct in handling complaints between staff at your school site, and related issues. While on paid administrative leave you are to remain available for interviews concerning this matter and any other matter within the scope of your employment.

"Furthermore, the District reserves the right to reassign you to an equivalent

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