Hayford v. Fed. Bureau Of Prisons
| Decision Date | 10 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 23-3011-JWL |
| Parties | BENJAMIN HAYFORD, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Benjamin Hayford is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
1. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff proceeds pro se in this civil rights case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff has paid the filing fee. At the time of filing, Plaintiff listed his address as the Turley Correctional Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma.[1]
Plaintiff alleges that he was confined at the Federal Prison Camp at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas (“USPL”) from January 20, 2021, through February 8, 2022, and was confined at the Turley Residential Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma, from February 8, 2022, through April 29 2022. (Doc. 1, at 3.) Plaintiff's claims relate to his incarceration at USPL.
Plaintiff alleges that “prison officials” at USPL prevented him from wearing his religious clothing for 191 days prevented him from participating in weekly religious communal services for five weeks while in segregation for 31 days prevented Plaintiff from meeting with clergy and religious volunteers for 55 weeks; and kept Plaintiff from receiving and using two BOP preapproved Church magazines for 19 weeks. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff alleges that the prison officials' actions caused him to sustain “emotional injuries, including mental anguish suffered from the entire episode.” Id. at 4; see also Doc. 1-2, at 4 (). Plaintiff alleges that he presented his claims through the administrative remedies procedures to Warden Hudson, and did not receive a response. Id. at 6. He also expressed his concerns to Chaplains Dale Sutton and (fnu) Presser, and Dr. Carpenter and Dr. Brian Vo. (Doc. 1, at 6.)
Plaintiff alleges violations of: his First Amendment free exercise rights; his Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”); the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Id. at 3. Plaintiff also alleges that he is bringing this action under the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”). Id. at 5.
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, compensatory damages in the amount of $920,652, 592.00, and his attorneys' fees. Id. Plaintiff states that “[t]he wrongs alleged in this complaint are not occurring at the present time.” Id.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff acknowledges that he is no longer housed at USPL and that “[t]he wrongs alleged in this complaint are not occurring at the present time.” (Doc. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff names the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and the U.S. Department of Justice as the sole defendants.
Plaintiff references 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a source of jurisdiction for his claims. (Doc. 1, at 2.) “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). A defendant acts “under color of state law” when he “exercise[s] power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'” Id. at 49 (citations omitted). Plaintiff provides no factual claim or support for a claim that any defendant acted under color of state law.
Plaintiff has not shown that a Bivens remedy is available for his First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Bivens claims cannot be asserted directly against the United States, federal agencies, or federal officials acting in their official capacities. Smith v. U.S., 561 F.3d 1090, 1099 (10th Cir. 2009) (); see also Heffington v. Bush, 337 Fed.Appx. 741, 743 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (). Therefore, any Bivens claim would be barred against the named defendants.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff were to assert individual-capacity claims, the Supreme Court has “declined to extend Bivens to a claim sounding in the First Amendment” and has “not found an implied damages remedy under the Free Exercise Clause.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (citing in part Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983)); see also Ealom v. United States, No. 18-3045-SAC, 2018 WL 1899135, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 20, 2018) (citing Mochama v. Zwetow, No. 14-2121-KHV, 2017 WL 36363, at *11 (D. Kan. Jan. 3, 2017)); Williams v. Klien, 20 F.Supp.3d 1171, 1175 (D. Colo. 2014); Hall v. Shumard, No. 15-cv-01949-RBJ-MJW, 2017 WL 694589, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2017). The Supreme Court “has made it clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored' judicial activity.” Zigler v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff asserts a claim under RFRA. Although the Supreme Court has held that damages claims are permissible in individual-capacity suits under RFRA, Plaintiff has not brought individual-capacity claims in this case. See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S.Ct. 486, 489-93 (2020) ()[2] Individuals do not enjoy sovereign immunity. Id. at 493.
To the extent plaintiff seeks damages under RFRA against the Defendants in this case, sovereign immunity bars any such claim. See Hale v. FBOP, 759 Fed.Appx. 741, at n.4 (10th Cir. 2019) (...
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