Haygood v. Bell

• Decision Date: 15 January 1931
• Docket Number: 20619.
• Citation: 157 S.E. 239,42 Ga.App. 602
• Parties: HAYGOOD v. BELL.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

157 S.E. 239

42 Ga.App. 602

HAYGOOD v. BELL.

No. 20619.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

January 15, 1931

Rehearing Denied Feb. 28, 1931.

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Evidence authorized inference that servant was operating bicycle within scope of employment at time of accident, shifting burden to master to show contrary.

Evidence disclosed that employee running into plaintiff with bicycle was employed by defendant merchant as delivery boy; that merchant kept bicycle for use of servant in delivering packages to customers; and that at time plaintiff was struck employee was operating bicycle on street in usual manner.

Evidence supported allegation of negligence of defendant's servant in failing to have under control bicycle striking pedestrian.

Evidence showed that defendant's servant was riding bicycle at high speed and undertook to turn his wheel to left into intersecting street; that he turned so rapidly that he ran up to sidewalk and lost control of wheel, and thus struck pedestrian.

Error from City Court of Richmond County; J. C. C. Black, Jr. Judge.

Action by Alice Bell against V. M. Haygood. Judgment for plaintiff defendant's motion for new trial was overruled, and defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

Benj. E. Pierce (on motion for rehearing) and W. D. Lanier, both of Augusta, and Joe Hill Smith, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Hammond & Kennedy, of Augusta, for defendant in error.

Syllabus OPINION.

BELL J.

1. When the plaintiff's evidence showed that the individual who ran against her with a bicycle was employed by the defendant merchant as a delivery boy, that the merchant kept the particular bicycle for the use of this servant in delivering packages to customers, and that at the time the plaintiff was struck such employee was operating the bicycle upon a street in the usual manner, the jury were authorized to infer that the servant was at the time operating the machine within the scope of his employment in the master's service, and the burden of evidence was then shifted to the defendant to show the contrary. Gallagher v. Gunn, 16 Ga.App. 600 (1) 85 S.E. 930; Yellow Cab Co. v. Nelson, 35 Ga.App. 694 (1), 134 S.E. 822.

(a) The evidence introduced by the defendant in rebuttal was not so clear and certain as to demand a contrary inference as a matter of law. Whiddon v. Hall, 155 Ga. 570 (6), 118 S.E. 347; Continental Trust Co. v. Tennille Banking Co., 39 Ga.App. 163 (2), 146 S.E. 566, and cit. The present case is...