Hayman v. Davis

• Decision Date: 30 November 1921
• Docket Number: 481.
• Parties: HAYMAN v. DAVIS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

109 S.E. 554

182 N.C. 563

HAYMAN v. DAVIS.

No. 481.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 30, 1921

Appeal from Superior Court, Randolph County; McElroy, Judge.

Action by Mary Ella Hayman against Nathan M. Davis. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals. Error.

A complaint by plaintiff seeking to recover for services performed by her for her father under a contract broken by him preventing her performance was on demurrer ore tenus, to be liberally construed.

This is a civil action brought by Mary Ella Hayman against Nathan M Davis, who is her father, on a quantum meruit for services rendered to said Nathan M. Davis, covering a period of 22 years.

The complaint alleges that the defendant contracted and agreed with the plaintiff that, if she would live with him, take care of him, do the cooking, washing, mending and work in the house and field as a dutiful daughter, he would give her the tract of land she was, and is now, living on, and that said tract of land should be the consideration for her services. That Nathan M. Davis, after the plaintiff had lived with him and cared for him for 22 years, and fully performed her part of the contract, breached the said contract by leaving the premises referred to, and by refusing to let plaintiff take care of him and carry out her contract as alleged in the complaint.

The defendant demurred ore tenus to the complaint. The court sustained the demurrer and signed judgment dismissing the action, and plaintiff appealed.

Brittain Brittain & Brittain, of Ashboro, for appellant.

J. A Spence, of Ashboro, for appellee.

WALKER J. (after stating the facts as above).

The plaintiff contended that, as there was no evidence taken at the time of the trial, the court could pass only upon the allegations of the complaint, and it held, and so adjudged, that the plaintiff had not stated a sufficient cause of action. This, the plaintiff insists, was error. There was consent on the part of both the plaintiff and defendant, and if the defendant breached the contract in such a way as to make it impossible for the plaintiff to carry out her contract, as was contemplated at the time of making the contract, and this was done by the defendant without the consent of the plaintiff, the former became liable for the services already rendered before the breach in such amount as they were reasonably worth.

The plaintiff alleges, in her complaint, that she served her father according to the terms of their contract for many years, in the house and in the field, where she did a man's work, and by doing so she impaired her health, so that she is not now able to work and labor, as she formerly could, and has thereby diminished her capacity to earn a living; that her father broke the contract by leaving her alone and without the ability to further serve him and continue performance of the contract so that she can get the full amount of compensation promised to her; and while she does not clearly abandon the special contract, that is, in so many words, the effect of the pleading is, when it is liberally construed, as it should be, that her father has rendered full performance of the contract impossible by his conduct, and, therefore, she elects to treat it as abandoned and fall back upon her right to recover for her services their reasonable value.

The demurrer admits the truth of the allegations of the complaint, the substance of which we have stated. The mere fact of her being ready to accept a deed for the land in full satisfaction should be treated as surplusage, or unnecessary for she is not entitled to a deed at this time, and, if the contract had been kept, not until her father's death, as the stipulation was that she should work for him during his lifetime; and he is still living, and she was not to get the land until he died. She cannot, of course, have the land and full compensation for her services, and besides, she has no present right of action for the land, but she does allege that defendant, by his conduct, has prevented her from performing the contract, and she asserts her right to damages for such breach, and specifically asks for the value of the services performed by her and for...