Haymore v. North Carolina State Highway Commission

• Decision Date: 28 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 7217SC207,7217SC207
• Citation: 14 N.C.App. 691,189 S.E.2d 611
• Parties: Glenn R. HAYMORE and wife, Reva S. Haymore, and Joe C. Haymore and wife, Cleo B. Haymore v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 611

189 S.E.2d 611

14 N.C.App. 691

Glenn R. HAYMORE and wife, Reva S. Haymore, and Joe C Haymore and wife, Cleo B. Haymore v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION.

No. 7217SC207.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 28, 1972 Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court Aug. 31, 1972.

White, Crumpler & Pfefferkorn by James G. White, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff appellants.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan by Asst. Atty. Gen., H. A. Cole, Jr., for defendant appellee.

GRAHAM, Judge.

The principal question raised in this appeal is whether the court erred in determining that the service road now furnishes plaintiffs with reasonable access to Highway 52. We hold that there was no error.

'The question of what constitutes a taking of a landowner's right to access has been the subject of numerous decisions in this jurisdiction, all to the effect that while a substantial or unreasonable interference with an abutting landowner's access constitutes the taking of a property right, the restriction of his right of entrance to reasonable and proper points so as to protect others who may be using the highway does not constitute a taking. Such reasonable restriction is within the police power of the sovereign and any resulting inconvenience is Damnum absque injuria.' State Highway Comm. v. Yarborough, 6 N.C.App. 294, 301, 170 S.E.2d 159, 164 and cases cited.

It has been held repeatedly in this State that a landowner is entitled to no compensation for the restriction of access where he is provided with a freely accessible service road connecting with the highway on which his property formerly abutted. North Carolina State Highway Commission v. Nuckles, 271 N.C. 1, 155 S.E.2d 772; Moses v. State Highway Commission, 261 N.C. 316, 134 S.E.2d 664; North Carolina State Highway Comm. v. Rankin, 2 N.C.App. 452, 163 S.E.2d 302.

Plaintiffs insist that even though they have been provided a fully accessible service road which runs the length of their property, their access to the highway has nevertheless been unreasonably diminished because of the substantial distance of travel now required to reach Highway 52. We answer this simply by noting that the distance here involved, and the inconvenience to plaintiffs, is no greater than that present in various cases in which the Supreme Court has held that the property owner was afforded reasonable access. See for example, North Carolina State Highway Commission v. Nuckles, Supra; Moses v. State Highway Commission, Supra.

Plaintiffs also contend they have been deprived of reasonable access because the service road does not connect directly with a ramp leading onto Highway 52, but connects with an existing road, Holly Springs Road, which in turn leads onto the interchange. We find this of little significance. There is a distance of only 600 feet from the point where the nearest ramp enters Holly Springs Road to the point where the service road enters Holly Springs Road. Sound engineering practice undoubtedly required that a reasonable distance separate the nearest ramp and the service road. Otherwise, traffic moving in a northerly direction along the ramp and onto the service road would be required to make an immediate 180 degree turn in order to enter the service road. This type of maneuver would be dangerous and inconvenient, if not altogether impossible.

A right-of-way agreement for the construction of a portion of Highway 52 was acquired from plaintiffs in 1953. Plaintiffs argue that since no abutters rights were conveyed by them in the agreement, they retained these rights. We agree. Had plaintiffs surrendered all right of access under the agreement, defendant would have been under no obligation to construct the service road or otherwise arrange for plaintiffs' access to Highway 52 when it was converted to a controlled access facility. The point is that while entire access may not be cut off, an abutting landowner is not entitled, as against the public, to access to his land at all points in the boundary between it and the highway. Barnes v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 257 N.C. 507, 126 S.E.2d 732. When the State interferes with the access of a property owner the question is always whether reasonable means of ingress and egress remains or is provided. State Highway Comm. v. Yarborough, Supra. This question has been resolved against plaintiffs by findings of fact which are...